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ABSTRACT—What aspects of human liberty does incarceration impinge? A 
remarkable group of Black and white prisoners, most of whom had little 
formal education and no resources, raised that question in the 1960s and 
1970s. Incarcerated individuals asked judges for relief from corporal 
punishment; radical food deprivations; strip cells; solitary confinement in 
dark cells; prohibitions on bringing these claims to courts, on religious 
observance, and on receiving reading materials; and from transfers to long-
term isolation and to higher security levels. 
Judges concluded that some facets of prison that were once ordinary 
features of incarceration, such as racial segregation, rampant violence, and 
filth, violated the Constitution. Today, even as implementation is erratic and 
at times abysmal, correctional departments no longer claim they have 
unfettered authority to do what they want inside prisons walls. And, even as 
the courts have continued to tolerate the punishment of solitary confinement 
in the last decade, a few lower courts have held unconstitutional the profound 
sensory deprivations such isolation has entailed. 
 Prisoners have also sought procedural protections to constrain arbitrary 
decision-making about placements in solitary confinement and transfers to 
adverse settings. In response, the Supreme Court has required that, to state a 
Fourteenth Amendment claim that their liberty had been infringed, prisoners 
have to demonstrate that a specific practice imposed an “atypical” and 
“significant hardship.” 
What is typical in prisons? What are the sources of knowledge and the 
baselines used by Justices to decide? How did isolation come to be seen as 
an ordinary incident of prison life? We answer these questions through 
analyzing debates in both the U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts about 
what deprivations in prison are “normal.” After excavating the conflicts 
within the Court about the kinds of liberty interests prisoners retained, we 
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mined hundreds of lower court opinions to learn how judges determine when 
constrictions on human movement meet the test of atypicality and hardship. 
By documenting the high tolerance many federal judges have for periods of 
isolation lasting months, years, and decades, we demonstrate the central role 
judges play in constructing the “normal” of prisons. 
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I. LOSING LIBERTY 
Incarceration limits individuals’ liberty. How much individual liberty 
dims with incarceration has been the subject of debate for the last sixty years. 
The issue emerged in courts when prisoners sought to and succeeded in 
circumscribing what had been the unfettered discretion of prison officials, 
who had unilaterally controlled all aspects of their lives. 
 Once prisoners convinced judges that the U.S. Constitution did not stop 
at the prison gate,1 they raised a host of questions. If being sent to prison is 
 
 1 Justice Thurgood Marshall’s phrase was that “a prisoner does not shed his basic constitutional rights 
at the prison gate.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 580–81 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part), discussed infra notes 314–358 and accompanying text.  
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the punishment, who decides what happens to people once inside? Are there 
conditions and forms of in-prison punishment that are unconstitutional? How 
relevant (if at all) are the intentions of officials to punish prisoners? Does the 
frequency of a challenged practice, be it commonplace or unusual, have a 
bearing on its legality? And, if making comparative judgments between free 
people and among people differently incarcerated, how are the referents and 
baselines chosen? 
To explicate the boundaries of licit punishment, Justices had to develop 
the contours of the constitutional rights allegedly infringed, as they wrote 
about liberty, property, religious freedom, speech, and equality. Justices 
addressed the sources of constitutional protections and whether the fact of 
incarceration altered the contours of rights of prisoners. Members of the 
Court debated whether such rights were inalienable and predated the 
Constitution, were protected by it, or depended on enactments in federal and 
state law. Those analyses in turn were framed by judicial concern about how 
much deference to accord to state and federal actors and about the numbers 
of claims that could be filed, given the myriad of practices in prison and the 
large population of people subjected to control. 
In this Essay, written for a symposium on solitary confinement, we 
explore the stakes—for the incarcerated, for courts, and for the body 
politic—of judicial engagement with in-prison punishments. We show how, 
over the course of sixty years, courts came to reject the filth, squalor, 
violence, and racial discrimination that were once commonplace in prisons, 
and yet developed and applied the idea that some radical deprivations—
solitary confinement included—were so “normal” in prisons as not to be 
subject to much judicial oversight. 
In Part II, we begin where prison law did, in the 1960s and 1970s when 
federal judges moved away from complete deference to prison officials (a 
“hands off” approach) and began to assess the constitutionality of in-prison 
treatment. The civil rights movement of the 1960s produced pressures for 
law (at national and local levels and in legislatures and courts) to recognize 
that governments disproportionately policed, incarcerated, and oppressed 
poor people and especially those of color. 
Litigation in the 1960s and 1970s from across the country details the 
horrific treatment that had once been “ordinary in prison.”2 We place that 
 
 2 Using Westlaw, we entered the following search string: “prison! OR inmate OR incarcerat! OR 
imprison! OR confinement OR custody.” We limited the search to decisions from 1960 to 1970, and 
included each federal circuit, so as to identify decisions from around the country. In order to select cases 
that addressed violations of prisoner rights, we narrowed the search based on three key numbers: Prisons, 
Constitutional Law, and Civil Rights. Under these parameters, we found 2,381 reported cases that we 
culled by a variety of means to focus on in-prison conditions. 
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phrase in quotes to underscore that the constitutive elements of prison are the 
result of decisions, rather than of a preexisting, natural kind. We also 
document how prisoners pressed courts and how judges contributed to de-
normalizing many practices that once were common. Relying on various 
parts of the Constitution, prisoners succeeded in taking some sanctions out 
of officials’ repertoire and in gaining authority at times to defend against 
claims that their behavior warranted additional in-prison punishment. For 
example, predicated on the Eighth Amendment, lower courts banned 
whippings and putting people into dungeons.3 Relying on the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that prison officials could 
not take away earned “good-time credits” and prolong the time spent 
incarcerated without providing prisoners with opportunities to contest 
charges.4 
Examining the first two decades of prison law clarifies the relationship 
between solitary confinement cases and system-wide conditions challenges. 
We trace how individual decisions finding unconstitutional the degrading 
treatment accorded to people in solitary confinement (some of whom were 
held in single dark cells and others in groups crammed for days into small, 
filthy cells) came to be seen as unconstitutional for incarcerated people in 
general population. Even as many prisons remain miserable and frightening 
today, as mandates for safety and health are far from implemented,5 and as 
solitary confinement is commonplace, conditions in many facilities 
improved somewhat. 
That “somewhat” is a critical caveat also addressed in Part III, which 
analyzes the limits of the initial victories. This account of decades of prison 
litigation makes plain that whether taking a self-described deferential or an 
engaged role, courts are always central in structuring the conditions under 
which incarcerated individuals live. 
By the late 1970s and into the 1980s, appellate courts reversed lower 
courts that sought not only to stop the filth, violence, and lack of sanitation, 
health care, and adequate food, but also the treatment of people as objects to 
be “warehoused,” rather than as individuals in need of human interaction, 
 
 3 See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968). Then-Judge Harry Blackmun wrote the 
opinion for the Eighth Circuit. Id. at 572. 
 4 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555–58, discussed infra notes 315–358 and accompanying text. 
 5 See, e.g., Complaint, Lang v. Taylor, No. 4:20-cv-00030 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 25, 2020); Shaila Dewan, 
Inside America’s Black Box: A Rare Look at the Violence of Incarceration, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/30/us/inside-americas-black-box.html [https://perma.cc/TL5M-
UNW7]; Rick Rojas, More Slayings at Parchman as Mississippi Confronts Prison Crisis, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/21/us/parchman-mississippi-prison-deaths.html 
[https://perma.cc/T2TD-AK6Z]. 
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stimulation, varied activities, and autonomy.6 Cutbacks came through a 
variety of doctrines, and we focus on two that are central to the expansive 
use of solitary confinement.  
In 1981, the Court concluded that double-celling was not a punishment 
that the Constitution prohibited.7 By licensing intense social density and the 
lack of personal privacy entailed in cramming more people into cells 
designed for one,8 the Court constitutionalized overcrowding.9 
Normalization of that practice means that, rather than governments paying 
the cost of unbridled policing and prosecution policies, people in detention 
suffer from hyper-density and a lack of services. The tragic consequences 
have become all the more vivid in the wake of COVID-19, which emerged 
as we wrote. Overcrowded facilities came to be used as a justification for 
reliance on solitary confinement, which a 2005 Supreme Court decision 
tolerated as a permissible response, as it characterized prisons as fearsome 
places in which gangs imperiled security.10 As of 2020, solitary confinement 
remains a feature of almost all prison systems in the United States. 
In Part III, we turn to empirical work on the aspect of incarcerated 
people’s lives—solitary confinement—that is at the center of this 
Symposium. We summarize the data on the numbers of people held in 
isolation. Since 2013, national surveys have analyzed the policies governing 
solitary confinement and the numbers held in isolation.11 Thus, we know that, 
 
 6 See, e.g., Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 306, 325–31 (D.N.H. 1977). The court 
underscored the harms of warehousing, even if adequate on some dimensions, and ruled the conditions 
of confinement unconstitutional. Id. at 307, 315–31. 
 7 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
 8 Id. at 349–50. 
 9 Some overcrowding remained actionable. See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 545 (2011). 
 10 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for a unanimous Court, invoked the “brutal reality of prison 
gangs, . . . [c]landestine, organized, fueled by race-based hostility, and committed to fear and violence.” 
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 227 (2005), discussed infra notes 56, 230, 472, 528 and accompanying 
text. 
 11 See ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS & THE ARTHUR LIMAN CTR. FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW AT 
YALE LAW SCH., REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: THE 2018 ASCA-LIMAN NATIONWIDE SURVEY 
OF TIME-IN-CELL 4 (2018), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/liman/document/ 
asca_liman_2018_restrictive_housing_released_oct_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6SG-ZD7B] 
[hereinafter ASCA/LIMAN 2018 REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING] (authors include Judith Resnik, 
Anna VanCleave, Kristen Bell, Alexandra Harrington, Greg Conyers, Catherine McCarthy, Jenny Tumas, 
and Annie Wang). This report was one of a series of research projects coauthored by the Association of 
State Correctional Administrators (ASCA) and The Arthur Liman Center for Public Interest Law at Yale 
Law School and has created a longitudinal, nationwide database. For other reports, see ASS’N OF STATE 
CORR. ADM’RS & THE ARTHUR LIMAN PUB. INTEREST PROGRAM AT YALE LAW SCH., AIMING TO 
REDUCE TIME-IN-CELL: REPORTS FROM CORRECTIONAL SYSTEMS ON THE NUMBERS OF PRISONERS IN 
RESTRICTED HOUSING AND ON THE POTENTIAL OF POLICY CHANGES TO BRING ABOUT 
REFORMS (2016), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/liman/document/aimingtoreducetic.
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as of the fall of 2017, more than 61,000 people were held in solitary 
confinement, defined as spending an average of twenty-two hours per day or 
more in isolation cells for fifteen days or more;12 some 3,700 had been in 
such settings for three years or more.13 In this Part, we also sketch accounts 
from some of the people who have lived in solitary confinement14 and from 
social and health scientists aggregating data to evaluate the impact. 
Part IV probes the doctrine governing the rights of the people placed in 
solitary confinement, and that law is embedded in a larger set of cases 
governing in-prison discipline, transfers, and administration. A small 
number of opinions directly evaluate solitary confinement under the Eighth 
Amendment. Many more decisions address the question of whether prisoners 
are entitled to processes to protect them from arbitrary placement in solitary 
confinement. In this Part, we excavate debates within the Court about 
prisoners’ liberty and then provide the analysis of their application in the 
lower courts. We undertook an ambitious project to mine the case law 
spawned by the directive that lower courts assess when prisons impose an 
“atypical and significant hardship.” We identified more than 9,000 decisions, 
both reported and unreported, that were issued between 1995 and 2019, in 
which that phrase appeared with “solitary confinement” and variations such 
as “special housing unit.”15 We culled that set to analyze across the circuits 
the governing doctrine and application. 
 
pdf [https://perma.cc/GH6E-KQEV] [hereinafter ASCA/LIMAN 2016 AIMING TO REDUCE TIME-IN-
CELL]; ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS & THE ARTHUR LIMAN PUB. INTEREST PROGRAM AT YALE LAW 
SCH., RETHINKING “DEATH ROW”: VARIATIONS IN THE HOUSING OF INDIVIDUALS SENTENCED TO 
DEATH (2016), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/Liman/deathrow_reportfinal.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MA7E-QLBD] [hereinafter ASCA/LIMAN 2016 RETHINKING “DEATH ROW”]; 
ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS & THE ARTHUR LIMAN PUB. INTEREST PROGRAM AT YALE LAW SCH., 
TIME-IN-CELL: THE ASCA-LIMAN 2014 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION IN 
PRISON (2015), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/liman/document/time-in-
cell_combined_-web_august_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM4V-3RYE] [hereinafter ASCA/LIMAN 2014 
NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION] (authors include Sarah Baumgartel, Corey 
Guilmette, Johanna Kalb, Diana Li, Josh Nuni, Devon Porter, Judith Resnik, Camille Camp, and George 
Camp). 
 12 ASCA/LIMAN 2018 REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING, supra note 11, at 10. 
 13 Id. at 14. 
 14 See generally ALBERT WOODFOX WITH LESLIE GEORGE, SOLITARY (2019); Reginald Dwayne 
Betts, Only Once I Thought About Suicide, 125 YALE L.J.F. 222 (2016). 
 15 Using Westlaw, we entered the following search string: adv: (atypical! /s significant!) AND 
(“solitary confinement” OR “segregated confinement” OR “adseg” OR “keeplock” OR “special housing 
unit” OR “SHU” OR “restrictive housing” OR “administrative segregation” OR “protective”). We limited 
the search to decisions from January 1, 1995 through September 1, 2019. This search produced 9,350 
decisions. Of these, 8,571 were district court decisions (414 reported, 8,157 unreported). Circuit court 
decisions accounted for 779 (207 reported, 572 unreported). We then did a purposeful sampling to find 
governing circuit law. A repeated search by the Northwestern University Law Review in 2020 found 
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A preview of our findings is in order. First, these decisions reflect how 
much federal judges have taken for granted profound human isolation as 
“incident” to “normal” confinement and how little they have seen themselves 
obliged to intervene.16 Second, this raft of cases demonstrates the variation 
about what has been held to be “atypical” in different circuits, on different 
panels, and at different times. While a few opinions consider isolation for 
101 days or 305 days as markers of constitutional deprivations, many rulings 
have concluded that four, or eight, or ten, or more than twenty years do not 
constitute a liberty problem.17  
Third, as for selections of baselines for comparative assessments of 
impact of solitary confinement, no decisions looked to how people outside 
prison move about in their daily lives or use their bodies. These rulings also 
do not rely on professional standards or statutes that regulate either the 
amount of space that people need or the use of solitary confinement. 
Moreover, unlike the decisions under the Eighth Amendment, most 
procedural due process opinions do not discuss the studies of the harms of 
solitary confinement. Rather, some decisions used the treatment of people in 
general population (often without details of the governing rules) as a 
baseline, while others focused on the control exerted in high-security 
facilities or over people held in solitary confinement. Fourth, judges 
generally credited prison defendants’ views of the challenged practices or 
offered their own opinions about what was “normally incident” to life in 
prison. Fifth, factors differently weighted include in-cell conditions 
(including infestation by “vermin” and reductions in food)18 and the impact 
 
slightly different numbers, with 9,275 total cases, of which 8,513 were district court decisions (396 
reported, 8,117 not reported) and 760 circuit court decisions, of which 199 were reported and 561 not. As 
we discuss infra note 480, not all cases make it into the group that are reported or unreported. We provided 
the numbers (and their variation when the search was run months later) to underscore the hundreds of 
times judges are asked to consider isolation as a punishment and how they have responded. 
 16 Work focused on solitary confinement in particular prison systems includes MICHELLE SHAMES 
& PHILIP DESGRANGES, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, TRAPPED INSIDE: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND 
FUTURE OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN NEW YORK (2019), 
https://www.nyclu.org/en/publications/trapped-inside-past-present-and-future-solitary-confinement-
new-york [https://perma.cc/F9E5-EPUY], and ACLU OF TEX., A SOLITARY FAILURE: THE WASTE, COST, 
AND HARM OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN TEXAS (2015), https://www.aclutx.org/en/report/a-solitary-
failure [https://perma.cc/5W2K-7EFG]. Efforts to generate reforms are documented in ALISON SHAMES, 
JESSA WILCOX & RAM SUBRAMANIAN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: COMMON 
MISCONCEPTIONS AND EMERGING SAFE ALTERNATIVES (2015), 
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/solitary-confinement-misconceptions-safe-alternatives-
report_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/32SU-5UVL]. For more reports on future directions of prison reform, see 
ASCA/LIMAN 2018 REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING, supra note 11, and RUTH DELANEY, RAM 
SUBRAMANIAN, ALISON SHAMES & NICHOLAS TURNER, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, REIMAGINING PRISON 
(2018), https://www.vera.org/reimagining-prison-web-report [https://perma.cc/4SXZ-PG4W]. 
 17 Discussion of all of the cases can be found infra Section III.B.3. 
 18 Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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of solitary confinement on the prospect of future release. Sixth, many 
opinions did not parse whether an “atypical and significant hardship” 
entailed two independent and necessary assessments or whether one factor—
such as the length of time spent or gross conditions—could suffice to meet 
both prongs. 
Part IV pulls together our analyses of six decades of litigation on prison 
conditions, of solitary confinement data, and of case law to underscore that 
judges—and the law they make—are always present in prisons. Judges have 
helped to turn the lack of sanitation, health care, and safety into 
unconstitutionality, although such conditions persist in many systems. And, 
even as the Court’s doctrine sought to circumscribe judges’ involvement 
through according a good deal of deference to prison officials, these 
constitutional adjudications serve as guidelines for the system of criminal 
law enforcement. If double-celling is licit, then prosecutors have license to 
seek to send more people to confinement. If hearings are required before 
decisions, then prison officials have to try to provide them. 
In short, the Supreme Court’s effort to limit judicial involvement by 
framing tests of deference does not extricate constitutional law from prisons, 
but instantiates its relevance. What courts condone or decry are central parts 
of the engine making practices “normal” or “atypical” in prisons today. 
II. PRISON, SQUALOR, AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 
A. Shaping a Jurisprudence of Constitutional Punishment’s Boundaries  
In the second half of the twentieth century, when courts began to 
address prisoners’ claims of unconstitutional treatment, they were also 
considering challenges to sentences imposed by legislatures, such as the 
death penalty, mandatory minimum sentences, and the conversion of unpaid 
fines into jail time. Although the law of sentencing is often addressed as a 
category discrete from the law of prisoners’ rights, both kinds of claims 
require courts to consider the same question: what constrains the sovereign 
power to punish? In response, courts generated legal theories on the 
boundaries of licit punishment that entailed assessments of the forms of 
imposition on liberty that conviction licensed. 
Of course, judges are never solo actors. Litigation about the death 
penalty and prisoners’ rights was part of the civil rights movement, which 
propelled a reconceptualization of the relationship between the federal 
government (courts included) and many state institutions. In the 1950s and 
1960s, as sentenced and convicted people were pressing judges to respond 
to particular instantiations of punishment, legislatures and the Executive 
Branch were calling for the reconstruction of policies and practices to 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
54 
interrupt racial discrimination and multiple forms of subordination. Federal 
funding flowed to law enforcement, including for initiatives for correctional 
officials to improve their facilities and training.19  
Further, because one vector for reform was courts, Congress helped 
provide some of the means to use them. In 1976, Congress authorized 
successful plaintiffs in civil rights cases to be paid attorneys’ fees by losing 
defendants, such as prison systems.20 In 1980, Congress enacted the Civil 
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), which authorized the U.S. 
Department of Justice to investigate conditions in state institutions housing 
juveniles, individuals with mental and physical disabilities, detainees, and 
prisoners.21  
Judges in turn grappled with the problems prisoners presented by 
drawing on reform projects (such as standard setting) of professional 
organizations of lawyers and of correctional experts. The common law and 
constitutional traditions of analysis prompted judges to search for metrics by 
which to assess punishment practices, both in and out of prison. In rulings 
on the death penalty, on the conversion of fines into prison time, on 
mandatory minimum sentences, and on conditions in prisons, courts weighed 
the justifications for a particular punishment or administrative action against 
their evaluation of the harms entailed.  
Borrowing from the social sciences of penology and criminology, 
Justices sought to identify the “penological purposes” that legitimated 
particular sanctions. Justices invoked ideas of deterrence, incapacitation, 
retribution, and rehabilitation as well as administrative convenience, 
community and institutional safety, and expense.22 Many Justices described 
themselves as taking these concerns into account as they assessed whether a 
particular sanction was excessively severe or disproportionate, entailed the 
unnecessary infliction of pain, failed to reflect the decency of the social 
 
 19 The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) was established in 1968. See Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified at 34 U.S.C. 
§§ 10101–60501 (2012)). The agency was abolished in 1982. Records of the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration [LEAA], NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-
records/groups/423.html [https://perma.cc/7EH9-3AZT]. 
 20 Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012)). The first Supreme Court interpretation of that Act came in 1978 in 
Hutto v. Finney, related to the class action Arkansas prison-reform litigation. See infra notes 88–89 and 
corresponding text. 
 21 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 22 The history of that approach and its limits are discussed in Judith Resnik, (Un)Constitutional 
Punishments: Eighth Amendment Silos, Penological Purposes, and People’s “Ruin,” 129 YALE L.J.F. 
365 (2020) [hereinafter Resnik, (Un)Constitutional Punishments]. 
115:45 (2020) Punishment in Prison 
55 
order, or undermined values such as equality, liberty, religious freedom, and 
dignity. 
In their discussions, judges paid little attention to the distinctions that 
occupied punishment theorists who explained the tensions among 
punishment’s different aims and impacts. Judges did not often delineate 
among purposes, principles, and constraints; tease out means from ends; or 
require empirical bases to make causal claims. Rather, in both the 
constitutional decisions on sentencing and on in-prison punishments, courts 
proffered a laundry list of what they deemed to be legitimate state goals and, 
in general, permitted both legislative and executive punishment structures to 
stand. 
B. In-Prison Punishment 
In the United States, legislators have routinely endowed judges with 
authority to impose sentences, as well as leeway in determining whether to 
send people to prison and, if so, for how long. Furthermore, prison 
administrators have been given a great deal of discretion. While some state 
statutes had included directions, such as requiring “hard labor,” spending 
time in solitary confinement, and limiting food to bread and water,23 many 
of those statutes are no longer on the books. On occasion, judges who impose 
sentences call for specific assistance (such as drug treatment), but generally 
they do not specify what form confinement should take. Thus, most of the 
 
 23 Some state statutes impose solitary confinement as a part of a prison sentence. A few statutes do 
so only for people sentenced for capital crimes. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2705 (West 
2020) (“Whenever a person is under death warrant, . . . the warden of the prison in which the person is 
incarcerated shall keep the condemned person in solitary confinement until execution.”); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 23A-27A-31.1 (2020). Other statutes apply to persons sentenced for a range of offenses. See, 
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3902 (West 2020) (“In every case of sentence to imprisonment for a term 
exceeding 3 months, the court may by the sentence direct that a certain portion of the term of 
imprisonment, not exceeding 3 months, shall be in solitary confinement; and any person so sentenced 
shall not be allowed to work during that portion of the term of imprisonment.”); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 10.64.060 (West 2020) (“In every case where imprisonment in the penitentiary is awarded against 
any convict . . . he or she may also be sentenced to solitary imprisonment for such term as the court shall 
direct, not exceeding twenty days at any one time; and in the execution of such punishment the solitary 
shall precede the punishment by hard labor, unless the court shall otherwise order.”). A few states 
had statutes that authorized courts to impose a restricted bread and water diet along with a prison 
sentence. For example, a Minnesota statute from the first part of the twentieth century authorized a city 
court to sentence a person guilty of violating a city ordinance, bylaw, or regulation with 
“imprisonment . . . not exceeding thirty days . . . [and a diet of] bread and water.” MASON’S MINN. 
STAT. c. 9, ch. IV, § 32 (1927). Other “bread and water” statutes included NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-715 
(1929); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 13415 (1926); PA. CONS. STAT. § 20253 (1920); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 3-673 (1910); WIS. STAT. § 53.10 (1945). 
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decision-making about the contours of confinement come from the people 
who run prisons. 
Those people have created hyper-regulated environments. A wide array 
of behavior can trigger a host of sanctions. Some prison rules address 
conduct (such as assaults and thefts) that would be the basis for criminal 
charges against perpetrators, whether incarcerated or not. Atop that internal 
criminal code, prison authorities then add hundreds of other regulations, 
some codified and others imposed by staff members.  
Animated by concerns about safety, exploitation, and control, in-prison 
rules address clothing, hair, possessions, movement, sex, speech, and 
activities.24 Many edicts are stated at a level of generality that would, if in a 
criminal code, be unenforceable as unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, or 
impermissibly intrusive on human autonomy. For example, in 1972, 
Nebraska’s rules ranged from prohibiting “escape” and “mutiny, riot, or 
insurrection” to banning “[p]ossession of any negotiable item, such as 
stamps or mon[ey],” or referring to other incarcerated individuals “either in 
writing or orally, by any other than his correct name, or commonly used 
name in good taste,” and failing to address “officers and staff” by their 
“titles.”25 
In addition, prison systems give staff authority to punish “conduct 
which disrupts or interferes with the security or orderly running of the 
institution.”26 Further, officials generally have power over the assignment of 
individuals to different levels of security and kinds of facilities. When 
classifying and ordering transfers, prison officials sometimes denote their 
acts as administrative and other times as disciplinary, and always as 
responsive to the demands of managing a complex group of people. 
 
 24 See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3062(a) (2013) (“[a]n inmate’s hair and facial hair shall be . . . 
neatly styled[] and groomed . . .”); OR. ADMIN. R. 291-105-0015(4)(r)(B) (2020) (prohibiting 
participation in a petition drive without authorization); N.D. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., FACILITY 
HANDBOOK 35 (2018) (prohibiting three-way calls, conference calls, and 1-800 calls); N.Y. DEP’T OF 
CORR. & CMTY. SUPERVISION, HANDBOOK FOR THE FAMILIES AND FRIENDS OF NEW YORK STATE 
DOCCS INMATES 8 (2019) (prohibiting incarcerated people from receiving more than two “food 
packages” a month in the mail). 
 25 McDonnell v. Wolff, 342 F. Supp. 616, 644–645 (D. Neb. 1972), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 483 
F.2d 1059 (8th Cir. 1973), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 
As discussed infra notes 316–317, the district court ordered restoration of good time for people who had 
lost it for reasons such as “cussing a guard.” Id. 
 26 This phrasing comes from the Federal Bureau of Prison’s rules, in effect in 1975 and appended to 
the amicus brief of Solicitor General Bork. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 27, Baxter v. 
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) (Nos. 74-1187 & 74-1194), 1975 WL 173645, at *55 [hereinafter Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Baxter v. Palmigiano]. As of 2020, conduct that “disrupts or 
interferes with the security or orderly running of the institution” remained prohibited. See 28 C.F.R. 
§ 541.3. 
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What are the boundaries on these broad powers? If the model of 
government sanctions comes from its treatment of people outside prison, 
then the Constitution’s protections against “cruel and unusual punishments” 
and its safeguards of liberty under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments apply. Individuals would be entitled to familiar procedural 
rights including notice, an opportunity to contest and present evidence, 
insulation from self-incrimination, at times lawyers, and decisions by people 
understood as able to be impartial. Other constitutional guarantees of free 
expression, religious opportunities, and equal protection also could come 
into focus. In short, once courts recognized that the Constitution applied 
somehow to prisons, judges had to decide whether any in-prison 
punishments violated the Eighth Amendment and the relevance of other 
facets of the Constitution. 
C. Race, Poverty, and Constitutional Authority over Criminal  
Law Enforcement 
The impetus for constitutional engagement with prisons came from 
convicted individuals and from prisoners who, despite hundreds of rebuffs, 
persisted over decades in arguing that law protected them. A series of 
Supreme Court decisions, beginning in 1958, paved the way for lower 
federal courts to hear prisoners’ claims. The key legal predicates were shifts 
in the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment and about federal judicial 
authority for claims alleging that state actors had violated individuals’ civil 
rights. 
The Supreme Court’s reading of the Eighth Amendment came through 
two rulings, one addressing an individual prosecuted in the federal system 
and a second brought by a person convicted in the state system. In 1958 in 
Trop v. Dulles, the Court held unconstitutional a federal statute that imposed 
the punishment of denationalization.27 Chief Justice Earl Warren’s plurality 
opinion explained that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”28 In 1962, the Court held in Robinson v. California that the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments applied to the 
states and ruled unconstitutional a California statute criminalizing the status 
of addiction.29 
These substantive Eighth Amendment rulings interacted with the 
Court’s recognition that prisoners—like other civil rights claimants—have 
 
 27 356 U.S. 86, 101–03 (1958). 
 28 Id. at 101. 
 29 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). For further discussion of incorporation of the Eighth Amendment, see 
Resnik, (Un)Constitutional Punishments, supra note 22, at 370–71. 
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rights of access to the federal courts. In 1961, Monroe v. Pape held that 
individuals could invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983, enacted in the nineteenth century 
in the aftermath of the Civil War, to seek federal court relief when alleging 
that state officials acted under “color of state law” and violated their civil 
rights. The Court concluded that individuals could pursue such claims 
whether or not those actions were authorized by state law and whether or not 
state courts had reviewed the challenged conduct.30 In Cooper v. Pate, 
decided in 1964, the Court applied the precept of Monroe to Illinois prison 
officials alleged to have prevented Thomas Cooper from purchasing 
“religious publications . . . disseminated by the Black Muslim Movement.”31 
Prisoners could come to federal court when prison staff, acting “under color 
of state law,” had violated their constitutional rights. 
As Thomas Cooper’s claim reflected, in-prison racial discrimination 
framed the Warren Court’s initial encounters with prisoners’ rights.32 Race 
was at the core of Washington v. Lee, the first prisoner class action to reach 
the Supreme Court. Alabama had long had statutes that made it illegal for 
“white and colored convicts to be chained together or to be allowed to sleep 
together.”33 In 1966, a group of “one white and five Negro citizens,”34 on 
behalf of all Alabama prisoners, challenged their segregation.35 The 
Honorable Frank Johnson, writing for a three-judge court, held that the 
 
 30 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184–87 (1961). 
 31 See 324 F.2d 165, 166 (7th Cir. 1963). Cooper argued that while other prisoners could “obtain the 
King James and Revised versions of the Bible,” he was not able to have a copy of the Quran. Id. at 166. 
The district court dismissed the case, and Cooper proceeded without counsel on appeal. Id. at 165–66. 
The record included the statement of the warden, Joseph F. Ragen, that Cooper was “always surrounded 
by . . . [a] hundred to 150 inmates, (mostly colored and Mexican),” and the warden worried about losing 
control of the prison. Id. The Seventh Circuit concluded that Illinois could “suppress movements that 
would otherwise be constitutionally protected” if violence was a “reasonably likely consequence.” Id. at 
166–67. In a per curiam decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that “the complaint stated a cause of 
action and it was error to dismiss it.” Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964). The Court cited cases 
from the Second and Fourth Circuits that had recognized religious rights of Muslims. See, e.g., Pierce v. 
LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233, 236 (2d Cir. 1961); Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196, 197–98 (4th Cir. 1961). 
 32 Prisoners asserted the mix of race and religious discrimination in Cooper, and the Court used the 
template of race discrimination in Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972), in responding to an allegation that 
Cruz was subject to discrimination on the basis of his Buddhist religion. The interaction between racial 
and religious discrimination is vivid in a variety of prison and other cases. 
 33 ALA. CODE tit. 45, § 52 (1958) (repealed 1975); see Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 n.4 
(M.D. Ala. 1966). 
 34 The group was composed of Caliph Washington, Hosea L. Williams, Julia Allen (for her minor 
incarcerated son, Willie), Agnes Beavers (for her minor son, Cecil McCargo), Johnnie Coleman, and 
Thomas E. Houck, who described themselves as such and who were represented by the ACLU and 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund. See Washington, 263 F. Supp. at 327–28. 
 35 Washington, 263 F. Supp. 327; Complaint, Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966) 
(No. 2350-N). 
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discrimination violated the Fourteenth Amendment and ordered 
desegregation.36 In 1968, the Supreme Court affirmed in a brief per curiam 
opinion.37 
D. Prisoners Protesting Strip Cells and Slime 
The Supreme Court’s decisions prompted some lower court judges to 
entertain prisoners’ civil rights claims, and several rulings found practices 
unconstitutional.38 Yet doing so entailed rejecting arguments by states that 
 
 36 Washington, 263 F. Supp. at 333. The court required the Commissioner to take “necessary and 
appropriate steps to effect complete desegregation” within six months of the “honor farms,” youth centers, 
and prison hospitals, and provided more time for desegregation of higher security facilities. The caveat 
was that in “some isolated instances,” prison security and discipline could require “segregation of the 
races for a limited period.” Id. at 331–33. See generally Judith Resnik, The Puzzles of Prisoners and 
Rights: An Essay in Honor of Frank Johnson, 71 ALA. L. REV. 665 (2020) [hereinafter Resnik, Puzzles 
of Prisoners and Rights]; Michael B. Mushlin & Naomi Roslyn Galtz, Getting Real About Race and 
Prisoner Rights, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 27, 37–40 (2009). 
 37 Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968). Memoranda in the archives of the papers of Chief Justice 
Warren and of Justices Abe Fortas, Potter Stewart, and Byron White reflect what the concurring opinion 
stated: that some of the Justices were concerned about desegregation in the context of prisons. Letter from 
Justice Hugo Black to Justice Byron White (Nov. 13, 1967), in Earl Warren Papers, MSS52258, Box 650, 
File 11 (housed at the Sterling Memorial Library, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University); Letter 
from T.M. to Justice Byron White (Nov. 14, 1967), in Potter Stewart Papers,  MS 1367, Box 228, File 
2524 (housed at the Sterling Memorial Library, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University); 
Memorandum from T.M. to the Conference (Nov. 16, 1967), in Earl Warren Papers, MSS52258, Box 
650, Opinions—Per Curiam (housed at the Sterling Memorial Library, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale 
University); Letter from Justice Hugo Black to Justice Byron White (Feb. 5, 1968), in Earl Warren Papers, 
MSS52258, Box 650, File 11 (housed at the Sterling Memorial Library, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale 
University). The Court’s brief per curiam opinion stated in part: 
This appeal challenges a decree of a three-judge District Court declaring that certain Alabama 
statutes violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that they require segregation of the races 
in prisons and jails, and establishing a schedule for desegregation of these institutions. . . . [T]he 
specific orders directing desegregation of prisons and jails make no allowance for the necessities 
of prison security and discipline, but we do not so read the “Order, Judgment and Decree” of the 
District Court, which when read as a whole we find unexceptionable. 
Lee, 390 U.S. at 333–34. Justice Hugo Black, joined by Justices John Marshall Harlan and Stewart, wrote 
in the concurrence that they wanted to 
make explicit something that is left to be gathered only by implication from the Court’s opinion. 
This is that prison authorities have the right, acting in good faith and in particularized 
circumstances, to take into account racial tensions in maintaining security, discipline, and good 
order in prisons and jails. We are unwilling to assume that state or local prison authorities might 
mistakenly regard such an explicit pronouncement as evincing any dilution of this Court’s firm 
commitment to the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition of racial discrimination. 
Id. at 334 (Black, J., Harlan, J., and Stewart, J., concurring). 
 38 Examples spanning the country include Pierce v. LaVallee, 293 F.2d 233, 235–36 (2d Cir. 1961); 
Sewell v. Pegelow, 291 F.2d 196, 198 (4th Cir. 1961); United States ex rel. Cleggett v. Pate, 229 F. Supp. 
818, 822 (N.D. Ill. 1964); Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683, 691 (E.D. Ark. 1965); Washington, 263 F. 
Supp. at 333; Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993, 994–95 (4th Cir. 1966); Johnson v. Avery, 252 F. Supp. 
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federal courts had no role to play because prisoners had no constitutional 
rights to assert. 
To help readers in the twenty-first century realize the kinds of 
conditions correctional officials around the United States once defended, we 
draw on the experiences of three prisoners: Robert Jordan, William Fulwood, 
and Lawrence William Wright. Held in California, the District of Columbia, 
and New York, each told federal judges about the brutal conditions to which 
they were subjected. These pioneering prisoners succeeded in the 1960s in 
persuading courts to acknowledge that constitutional law required prison 
officials to make changes. 
California prison authorities put Robert Jordan into what they called a 
“strip cell” in the California Correctional Training Facility in Soledad.39 
Unrepresented, Jordan submitted a variety of papers to the federal court in 
the Northern District of California, including a “Motion and Petition for 
 
783, 787 (M.D. Tenn. 1966), rev’d, 382 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1967), rev’d, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Wright v. 
McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 525 (2d Cir. 1967); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 683 (N.D. Cal. 1966); 
Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005, 1013 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580–81 
(8th Cir. 1968); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 888–89 (S.D.N.Y 1970), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part sub nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786, 
792 (M.D. Tenn. 1969); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Sostre v. McGinnis, 
442 F.2d at 203–204. A genealogy of how prisoners in one jurisdiction built on the efforts of prisoners in 
another in a series of cases decided between 1966 and 1974 comes from Resnik, Puzzles of Prisoners and 
Rights, supra note 36. 
 39 See Complaint, Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (No. 44786) [hereinafter 
Complaint in Jordan v. Fitzharris]. According to newspaper sources, Robert Charles Jordan Jr. was born 
in 1939 and was twenty-seven years old when he filed the strip cell case. He had been convicted at age 
nineteen of assault and held in prison thereafter. See Soledad Prison Goes on Trial Tomorrow, SANTA 
CRUZ SENTINEL, Aug. 8, 1966, at 4. That report stated that Jordan had been “disciplined 65 times” since 
his incarceration, and that most of the charges involved assaults or threats of assault. Id.; see also Soledad 
Prisoner to Serve Time Elsewhere, OAKLAND TRIB., Aug. 19, 1966, at 17. In April and June of 2020, we 
received answers to letters that we had sent to Mr. Jordan, who remains as of this writing incarcerated in 
a California prison (on file with authors). He said that part of what animated his filings in the 1960s was 
that prison authorities had denied the humanity of prisoners. In this correspondence, Mr. Jordan described 
himself as a self-taught paralegal who watched the changes on the U.S. Supreme Court and in the lower 
courts, was in relationship with other litigants bringing structural cases, and was self-conscious about and 
engaged in what he understood to be a legal and political battle for rights and authority. He explained that 
when filing the lawsuit, he was affiliated with the “black nationalist” movement, and he noted as well 
that he appreciated his appointed lawyer’s contributions. 
 In addition to the strip cell case, Mr. Jordan filed lawsuits against the prison system on other 
occasions, including a challenge to the failure to provide confidential exchanges between prisoners and 
their attorneys. He won. See In re Jordan, 526 P.2d 523, 527 (Cal. 1974); In re Jordan, 500 P.2d 873, 
879–80 (Cal. 1972); see also Philip Hager, Privacy of Inmates’ Letters to Lawyers Upheld by Court, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 16, 1972, at 31. As far as records reflect, he brought other cases and remains, as of January 
2020, incarcerated. See, e.g., Jordan v. Greenan, No. 1:99-cv-05093-REC-SMS-P, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 8298 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2006); People v. Jordan, No. B153586, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
6278 (Ct. App. July 9, 2002); Jordan v. Rowland, 24 F.3d 247 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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Appointment of Counsel” and a detailed complaint.40 He alleged that, naked 
and cold, he spent twelve days in the dark in a space measuring six by eight 
feet.41 The concrete enclosure had no light and no furnishings; the toilet could 
only be flushed from the outside.42 Jordan provided graphic details: 
The floors and walls of the cell were also encrusted and filthy with the body and 
urinary wastes of the previous occupants who evidently and obviously placed 
them there deliberately. It was impossible to avoid bodily contact. Plaintiff hand 
and body (being naked) were continually coming into contact with filthy wastes 
and again no possible chance of washing or cleansing his hands, face or body 
was given plaintiff and he was forced to eat and handle his food with his hands 
contaminated with other human beings[’] filth and urinary wastes.43 
Seeking protection under law44 Jordan argued that these conditions 
violated federal and state law because they constituted “1. Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment; 2. Cruel and Wilful Inhumanities and Atrocities; 3. Violations 
of Federal Constitutional and Civil Rights; 4. Denial and refusal of the Equal 
Protection of the Laws; 5. Physical injury, harm and loss; [and] 6. Criminal 
Conspiracy and Prejudicial Discrimination.”45 
Such degradation was not unique to California. William Fulwood, held 
at Lorton Reformatory and thereafter in the District of Columbia’s jail, 
alleged that he had been put into solitary confinement because he was a Black 
Muslim leader.46 When federal judge Burnita Matthews (the first woman to 
sit on the federal district courts) concluded in 1962 that the discriminatory 
 
 40 Motion & Petition for Appointment of Legal Counsel, Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. 
Cal. 1966) (No. 44309); Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. 
Cal. 1966) (No. 44786). 
 41 Jordan, 257 F. Supp. at 676. 
 42 Id. At the hearing, a psychiatrist testified that the cell was not totally dark because “a slight seepage 
of light” existed. Id. at 682. 
 43 Complaint in Jordan v. Fitzharris, supra note 39, at 10; see also Trial Transcript at 368–422, 
Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (Nos. 44309 & 44786). 
 44  Complaint in Jordan v. Fitzharris, supra note 39, at 6. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Fulwood filed a writ for mandamus or habeas corpus; he alleged that he was prevented from 
practicing his religion because he could not join religious services or receive materials and that he was 
discriminated against because of his religion by being prevented from corresponding with the leader of 
his faith. Fulwood also alleged that prison officials interfered with access to his lawyer. See Fulwood v. 
Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 372–78 (D.D.C. 1962). This decision came two years before Cooper v. Pate, 
which held that prisoners could bring civil rights claims. See 378 U.S. 546 (1964). Online genealogical 
databases provide some information about Fulwood, who was born in 1933. He had been sentenced to 
two to eight years for robbery. Press coverage of the litigation included the headline “Black Muslim 
Denies Hate of Whites Taught” for a story by Phil Thomas published in April 7, 1962 in D.C.’s Evening 
Star. 
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retaliation was unconstitutional, she described the space in which he spent 
thirteen days: 
[That] cell . . . is approximately eight feet by twelve feet, with a stone floor and 
stone walls on three sides. There is no window, so that no natural light enters 
the cell, and the single artificial light is controlled from outside the cell. There 
is no bed; a mattress is placed on the floor at ten o’clock at night and taken out 
at six o’clock in the morning. The toilet has no top and in most cases is not 
flushable from inside the cell. There is no wash basin.47 
The judge further explained that a prisoner was “allowed no reading 
matter, no exercise, no visitors, no mail unless of an emergency nature, and 
only occasionally a shave and shower . . . . For breakfast he usually receives 
some dry cereal and water, and for lunch and dinner some potatoes and a 
vegetable or two with bread and water.”48 
 
 47 Fulwood, 206 F. Supp. at 378. Judge Matthews was nominated by President Harry Truman in 
1949. See Linda Greenhouse, Burnita S. Matthews Dies at 93; First Woman on U.S. Trial Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 28, 1988), https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/28/obituaries/burnita-s-matthews-dies-at-93-
first-woman-on-us-trial-courts.html [https://perma.cc/QY8Z-GDKH]. A daughter of the owner of a 
plantation in Mississippi, Judge Matthews pursued law when many barriers for women to do so existed. 
See Kathanne W. Greene, Burnita Shelton Matthews: Suffragist, Feminist, and Judicial Pioneer, MISS. 
HIST. NOW (Aug. 2017), http://mshistorynow.mdah.state.ms.us/articles/417/burnita-shelton-matthews-
suffragist-feminist-judicial-pioneer [https://perma.cc/3XDN-5HZX]. Judge Matthews selected a high-
profile lawyer, E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., to represent Fulwood. Prettyman was the son of a judge on the 
D.C. Circuit after whom the U.S. federal courthouse in D.C. is named. Between 1953 and 1955, 
Prettyman, Jr. clerked on the U.S. Supreme Court for Justices Robert Jackson, Felix Frankfurter, and 
Harlan in a period during which the Court issued its unanimous ruling in Brown v. Board of Education. 
In his oral history, Prettyman, Jr. explained that the court had asked him to represent 
a gentleman named William Fulwood, who was a Black Muslim at the District of Columbia Jail, 
and this was now in the very early stages of the Muslim movement among African-Americans. 
He had recently become a Muslim, and he was attempting to have possession of the Koran and to 
wear Muslim medals and so forth, and the prison authorities denied him that right. We had 
extensive hearings before Judge Burnita Matthews, who was a female judge from Mississippi, 
and she held, I believe for the first time in this country, that indeed Muslims have the right to 
practice their religion, to carry their medals, to have the Koran and so forth, in prison, and she 
entered an order to the prison authorities to that effect. And that, of course, has had wide-ranging 
repercussions since. 
Interview by Robert H. Kapp, Historical Soc’y of the D.C. Circuit Court, with E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., 
in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 3, 1996), available at https://dcchs.org/sb_pdf/interview-5-e-barrett-
prettyman/ [https://perma.cc/8UDX-AZQ4]; see also Sam Roberts, E. Barrett Prettyman Jr., Lawyer Who 
Fortified Desegregation Ruling, Dies at 91, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016), 
http://nytimes.com/2016/11/09/us/e-barrett-prettyman-jr-lawyer-who-fortified-desegregation-ruling-
dies-at-91.html [https://perma.cc/38ZS-6FW2]; Legends in the Law: E. Barrett Prettyman, D.C. BAR 
(Apr./May 1997), https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/publications/washington-lawyer/articles/legend-
prettyman.cfm [https://perma.cc/2KE5-3X2H]. 
 48 Fulwood, 206 F. Supp. at 378. Thereafter, prison officials transferred Fulwood to the D.C. Jail 
where Fulwood was put into a “Special Treatment Unit,” then in a special “control cell,” and back to the 
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The experiences of Jordan and Fulwood were paralleled by those of 
Lawrence William Wright, confined at Clinton State Prison, a maximum-
security facility in upstate New York. The district court, dismissing the 
complaint in 1966, bemoaned the “flood” of prisoners’ claims imposing a 
“burden” on federal courts for allegations within the discretion of prison 
officials.49 Reversing, the Second Circuit quoted Wright’s description: 
[T]he said solitary confinement cell wherein plaintiff was placed [for 54 days] 
was dirty, filthy and unsanitary, without adequate heat and virtually barren; the 
toilet and sink were encrusted with slime, dirt and human excremental residue 
superimposed thereon; plaintiff was without clothing and entirely nude for 
several days [elsewhere said to be 11 days] until he was given a thin pair of 
underwear to put on; . . . denied the use of soap, towel, toilet paper, tooth brush, 
comb, and other hygienic implements and utensils . . . compelled under threat 
of violence, assault or other increased punishments to remain standing at 
military attention in front of his cell door each time an officer appeared from 
7:30 A.M. to 10:00 P.M. every day . . . therefore . . . [in] subfreezing 
temperatures causing plaintiff to be exposed to the cold air and winter weather 
without clothing or other means of protecting himself . . . .50 
When called upon to defend these lawsuits, state officials often argued 
that, as a matter of federalism and separation of powers, they alone had the 
authority to determine the metes and bounds of in-prison practices. Prison 
officials asserted that federal courts had nothing to say to them. For example, 
when seeking to have the complaint dismissed in Jordan v. Fitzharris, 
California contended that Jordan’s “general allegations” were “insufficient 
 
Special Treatment Unit for months, where he was under a myriad of restrictions. In all, he was out of 
“general inmate population” for more than two years. Id. at 378–79. 
 49 See Wright v. McMann, 257 F. Supp. 739, 740 (N.D.N.Y. 1966), rev’d, 387 F.2d 519, 521 (2d Cir. 
1967). That judge, Stephen Brennan, who was appointed by President Truman and served as the Chief 
Judge of the Northern District from the late 1940s until 1963, opined: “This is one of the continuous flood 
of applications by state prisoners which seek some form of relief, from the federal courts, apparently 
occasioned by the expanded concept of an individual’s constitutional rights as delineated in recent 
authoritative decisions. That the vast majority of such applications are without merit does not relieve the 
court from the burden imposed.” Id. 
 50 Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 521 (2d Cir. 1967) (quoting Wright’s pro se complaint, finding 
him to have stated a claim and remanding for further proceedings). On appeal, Wright was listed as “pro 
se,” and an attorney, Betty D. Friedlander, was also listed as appearing for him. Id. at 520. As the Second 
Circuit noted, Wright was serving an indeterminate sentence after a 1963 conviction “for certain sexual 
offenses.” Id. at 521 n.1. Wright, born in 1939, is white and as of the winter of 2020, was listed as having 
been convicted thereafter and incarcerated in the New York prison system. 
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to state a claim for relief under the Civil Rights Act”51 because no federal 
cause of action existed to challenge prison conditions.52 
Reduced to its essentials, these allegations merely mean that plaintiff does not 
agree with the defendant as to the degree of custody required to maintain proper 
control and discipline over him . . . . [T]he practice of placing unruly or 
dangerous prisoners [in strip cells] . . . is accepted penological practice in the 
prison systems of both the federal government and the state’s.53 
In addition, arguing the merits, officials generally claimed that their 
sanctions served the penological purposes of maintaining control and 
deterring misbehavior. Again, Jordan provides an example. California 
argued that it needed strip cells to contain disruptive prisoners. As the judge 
explained, California’s officials had argued that “the use of the ‘strip’ or 
‘quiet’ cell is warranted in eliminating so-called ‘incorrigible’ inmates from 
the rest of the inmates in the institution; that fighting, physical violence, 
throwing objects, vile, abusive and threatening language and epithets, 
sometimes coupled with overt conduct, call for stringent, strong and 
protective measures.”54 
That defense of “correctional need” was not idiosyncratic but was 
repeated in other cases in the 1960s and thereafter. In the Seventh Circuit’s 
1963 decision in Cooper v. Pate (subsequently reversed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court), Illinois contended that punishing Thomas Cooper and cutting off 
access to religious materials was justified because the Black Muslim 
movement used the “façade” of religion to cloak its true aim: to 
“overthrow . . . the white race.”55 More than forty years later, in 2005, Ohio 
asserted in Wilkinson v. Austin that solitary confinement was a necessary tool 
of prison management.56 
In the cases brought by Jordan, Fulwood, and Wright, the states lost, 
and each ruling garnered attention because it was pathbreaking. Jordan v. 
Fitzharris again is illustrative. According to the press, the Honorable George 
Harris convened a hearing “for the first time in federal history” at the 
California state prison to take testimony from several other prisoners who 
 
 51 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 6, Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. 
Cal. 1966) (No. 44786). 
 52 See Return to Order to Show Cause & Points & Authorities in Opposition to Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus at 2, Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (No. 44309). 
 53 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 51, at 7–8 (citations omitted). 
 54 Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 679–80 (N.D. Cal. 1966). 
 55 324 F.2d 165, 166 (7th Cir. 1963), rev’d, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964) (paraphrasing the Attorney 
General of Illinois). 
 56 See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 16, Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005) (No. 04-495). 
115:45 (2020) Punishment in Prison 
65 
had been in strip cells.57 Rather than defer to the State’s claims that federal 
courts had no jurisdiction or that strip cells were useful modes of control for 
disruptive prisoners, Chief Judge Harris prohibited that treatment, which he 
described as not what a “beast” or a human should have to endure.58 
Chief Judge Harris found that the State had not given Jordan the 
“essentials for survival” such as “water and food and . . . basic sanitation”59 
and concluded that “[r]equiring man or beast to live, eat and sleep under the 
degrading conditions . . . does violence to elemental concepts of decency.”60 
Because prison authorities had “abandoned elemental concepts of decency 
by permitting conditions to prevail of a shocking and debased nature,” the 
court had to “intervene promptly—to restore the primal rules of a civilized 
community in accord with the mandate of the Constitution of the United 
States.”61 In addition to “regular change of bedding, clothing, bathing and 
feeding,” the judge ruled that: 
The punitive segregation section and all the cells in it should be evenly heated 
and adequately lighted and ventilated. Artificial ventilation is usually 
necessary. . . . Toilets which the occupant of the cell cannot flush need constant 
supervision by the officer. Wholly dark cells should not be used and if there is 
a solid door on the cell, it should be so designed that it does not exclude all 
light.62 
 
 57 Soledad Prison Goes on Trial Tomorrow, supra note 39, at 4. The judge appointed a San Francisco 
lawyer, Charles B. Cohler, to represent Jordan. See Tom Hall, Soledad ‘Strip Cells’ Shock Federal Judge, 
S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 6, 1966, at 1; Jordan, 257 F. Supp. at 675. 
 58 See Jordan, 257 F. Supp. at 680. Jordan’s first federal lawsuit was dismissed on August 12, 1965 
based on the view that he had not exhausted his state remedies. The California Supreme Court denied his 
petition on October 7, 1965. See Resubmission for Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Jordan v. 
Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (No. 43983); Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Jordan v. 
Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (No. 44786). He then submitted his petition in federal court 
on October 14, 1965, and the decision on the merits was rendered on September 6, 1966. 
 59 Jordan, 257 F. Supp. at 682. 
 60 Id. at 680. The judge’s citations included Trop v. Dulles, as well as the Supreme Court’s rulings 
in Robinson v. California, Monroe v. Pape, and Cooper v. Pate, all discussed supra notes 27–32 and 
accompanying text. 
 61 Jordan, 257 F. Supp. at 680. 
 62 Id. at 683–84. The Oakland Tribune reported that California transferred Jordan out of that facility. 
See Soledad Prisoner to Serve Term Elsewhere, supra note 39, at 17; see also Jordan Is Moved to Quentin, 
CALIFORNIAN, Sept. 9, 1966, at 1. Newspapers also reported that California officials stated after the ruling 
that they planned to continue to use strip cells. See Jack Welter, Strip Cells Defended by McGee, S.F. 
EXAMINER, Sept. 7, 1966, at 1. Prisoners were not to stay more than twenty-nine days unless the Director 
of Corrections permitted it, and the official invoked in the headline, Richmond McGee, defended the cells 
as “humane.” Id. at 6. “We don’t use the dark dungeons or handcuff them and hang them to the wall as 
they once did in Folsom.” Id. 
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Chief Judge Harris’s revulsion at the lack of bedding, clothing, 
sanitation, hygiene, light, and ventilation was echoed by the Second Circuit 
in Wright v. McMann63 and by the D.C. district court in Fulwood v. 
Clemmer,64 as well as by other courts.65 
 
 63 See 387 F.2d 519, 526–27 (2d Cir. 1967). The court cited Trop v. Dulles among other cases and 
quoted Chief Judge Harris’s discussion in Jordan about California’s breach of “elemental concepts of 
decency.” Id. at 526 n.16. On remand, another federal district court judge, James Thomas Foley, who was 
appointed by President Truman and served as the Chief Judge of the District from 1963 to 1980, held that 
New York’s treatment of Wright violated the Eighth Amendment. Wright v. McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127, 
138–41 (N.D.N.Y 1970), aff’d in part, modified in part, and rev’d in part, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 Wright had sought $10,000 in damages; the district court awarded $1,500 in compensation, and that 
smaller amount was justified in part because of a lack of medical and other records. Id. at 144. Wright’s 
case had been consolidated with claims by Robert Mosher. The district court held that Mosher’s rights 
were violated by the five-month placement in solitary confinement because he had not signed a “safety 
sheet” stating he had read the prison’s rules. Relying in part on testimony by James Bennett, the former 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the district court held that punishment was disproportionate 
and restored the good-time credits lost. Id. at 146. Thereafter, the district court issued an unreported order 
directing New York State not to use segregation until it promulgated new rules to be sure the cells 
“safeguard[ed] the health of occupants, that heat and ventilation were sufficient, that nudity could not be 
enforced solely as a disciplinary measure,” and that unannounced inspections were necessary. See Wright, 
460 F.2d at 128; see also N.Y. State Prison Reforms Ordered by Federal Judge, TIMES REC., Aug. 4, 
1970, at 10. 
 Thereafter, and citing the 1972 en banc decision of Sostre v. McGinnis (discussed infra), the Second 
Circuit reversed the case. See Wright, 460 F.2d at 130. The court reversed the injunction on rulemaking 
and use of solitary confinement while it upheld the relief accorded the individuals, including Judge 
Foley’s award to Wright of $1,500 in damages for the thirty-two days spent in “inhuman solitary 
confinement.” Judge J. Edward Lumbard, writing for the Second Circuit, cited the court’s first 1967 ruling 
in Wright v. McMann as he made plain that the conditions the court had described as “foul” and 
“inhumane” were clearly “unconstitutional.” Id. at 135; see also Dannemora Convict Gets $1,500 Award, 
TIMES REC., Mar. 17, 1972, at 23. The Second Circuit also objected to strip cells in LaReau v. 
MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972), which involved their use in Connecticut. The court concluded 
that putting individuals in these dark cells violated “the human dignity” of prisoners, as it also noted the 
potential harm to their mental health. Id. at 978. We explain more about the law of the Second Circuit in 
our discussion of Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d. Cir. 1971), infra notes 191–195, which also reference the 
1972 Wright decision. 
 64 206 F. Supp. 370, 378–79 (D.D.C. 1962). Press reports described the holding as the “first time the 
sect” was recognized as a religion. See Black Muslim Faith Ruled a Religion, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, July 4, 1962, at 4. 
 65 See, e.g., Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786, 789 (M.D. Tenn. 1969). As the district judge 
described it, Tennessee prison officials had forced Don Lee Hancock “to remain in the dry cell without 
any means of cleaning his hands, body or teeth. He is denied the use of soap, towel, toilet paper, and other 
hygienic materials. No means have been provided which would enable him to clean any part of his body 
at anytime.” Id. Citing the 1967 decision in Wright v. McMann and the 1965 ruling in Jordan v. Fitzharris, 
the court held that the conditions were cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 792 n.2. Thereafter, the 
prisoners sought damages; the district court held that because Tennessee had “eliminated the dry cell and 
complied with its order,” no relief was appropriate. That ruling was affirmed. See Hancock v. Avery, 
452 F.2d 1214 (6th Cir. 1972). A district judge in Pennsylvania found unconstitutional the placement of 
prisoners for 2.5 days in a six-by-nine-foot cell that had no functioning toilets, toilet paper, soap, or light. 
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Such victories should not be overstated. During the same era, several 
federal courts rejected similar cases that challenged conditions such as 
solitary confinement in “dry cells” that lacked running water, placement 
naked in cold cells, and days without baths. In the words of one district court, 
such claims did not have a “constitutional dimension.”66 Other courts did not 
find unconstitutional the practice of putting prisoners on thirty days of bread 
and water or other punitive deprivations of food and water and lack of access 
to medical care.67 And even when judges recognized claims of medical care 
and access to the courts, some jurists also described the deference due to 
prison officials. As one court wrote, “The hands-off doctrine operates 
reasonably to the extent that it prevents judicial review of deprivations which 
are necessary or reasonable concomitants of imprisonment.”68 
The judges who did reject some forms of degradation provided various 
accounts of the legal basis to do so. Their opinions did not focus on whether 
strip cells and isolation were used regularly or were “unusual.” Indeed, as 
the states argued and reported decisions reflected, what these prisoners 
experienced was horrifyingly commonplace. Rather, the lower court 
opinions often cited Chief Justice Warren’s 1958 discussion of “decency” in 
Trop v. Dulles, which, as one commentator put it in 1973, was central to the 
“emerging rights of the confined.”69 Illustrative is Chief Judge Harris’s 
assessment in Jordan v. Fitzharris that the strip cell was shocking in light of 
“developing concepts of elemental decency.”70 That opinion, like others, 
invoked the concept of proportionality—that the Constitution did not permit 
a prisoner to be “unreasonably punished for the infraction of a rule,” and, 
therefore, a “punishment out of proportion to the violation may bring it 
 
See Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff’d, 435 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1970); see also 
Austin v. Harris, 226 F. Supp. 304, 308–09 (W.D. Mo. 1964) (noting that “petitioner’s allegations” that 
he has a “long-standing case of bone arthritis” for which his repeated requests for medical attention were 
denied “are sufficient to require further investigation”). 
 66 See Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415, 431 (D. Md. 1966), cert. denied 389 U.S. 877 (1967). 
That district court ruled that twenty-seven hours in solitary and another sixteen days in “semi-
segregation” were “milder” than the conditions found unconstitutional in Fulwood. Id. Likewise, in 1962, 
a district court in Colorado held that Theodore Charles Ruark and Charles Willard Ferguson had not stated 
a claim when they alleged that they were held for fifty-two hours without food, water, or toilet paper. See 
Ruark v. Schooley, 211 F. Supp. 921 (D. Colo. 1962). The Third Circuit also rejected a proposed class 
action that challenged New Jersey’s use of dry cells. See Ford v. Bd. of Managers of N.J. State Prison, 
407 F.2d 937, 938 (3d Cir. 1969). 
 67 See e.g., Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 668, 671 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 68 Edwards v. Duncan, 355 F.2d 993, 994 (4th Cir. 1966). 
 69 See William S. McAninch, Penal Incarceration and Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 25 S.C. L. 
REV. 579, 602 (1973). 
 70 257 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal. 1966); see also Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 578–79 (8th 
Cir. 1968). 
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within the bar against unreasonable punishments.”71 Sometimes courts also 
raised concerns that in-prison treatment did not comport with the pursuit of 
any legitimate penological purpose.72 
E. Scaling Up: Prison Systems’ Unconstitutional Conditions 
In 1970, with the infusion of resources from court-appointed lawyers 
and under the umbrella of the 1966 revisions to the federal class action rule, 
the scale shifted from individual to system-wide litigation. Many 
commentators have provided detailed accounts that analyze specific 
jurisdictions as well as decades of case law on prison conditions.73 Here, we 
focus on the relationship between the rulings on strip and solitary cells and 
class action litigation about conditions in general population, so as to 
document the links. What was held impermissible in individual cases was 
likewise ruled unconstitutional system-wide. 
A federal judge in Arkansas—J. Smith Henley—was the first in the 
country’s history to conclude that an entire “prison system” constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment.74 Two years later, Chief Judge William Keady, 
sitting in a federal court in Mississippi, held that the state’s Parchman Farm 
had housing units “unfit for human habitation under any modern concept of 
decency.”75 In 1976, Judge Frank Johnson (who, as discussed, in 1966 held 
Alabama’s segregation of prisoners unconstitutional) concluded that 
conditions in Alabama’s prisons violated the Eighth Amendment. By 1987, 
 
 71 Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 379 (D.D.C. 1962). The court held that factors relevant 
to proportionality included the placement in “solitary confinement; his subsequent solitary confinement 
for the maximum period for exercising a right to which he was clearly entitled; his detention for six 
months in a special treatment cell; [and] his exclusion for more than two years from the general prison 
population.” Id. 
 72 A summary of the law in the early 1970s also described the lower court cases as inquiring into 
whether a practice “shock[ed] the general conscience.” See McAninch, supra note 69, at 584. 
 73 See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE 
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 30–34 (1998); LARRY W. YACKLE, 
REFORM AND REGRET: THE STORY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALABAMA PRISON 
SYSTEM (1989); Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation, 
97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 2000 (1999). 
 74 The first decision was Holt v. Sarver (Holt I), 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969). The decision on 
the system-wide class action was Holt v. Sarver (Holt II), 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970). Thereafter, 
the litigation was before the Eighth Circuit and the district court and, in 1978, the Supreme Court 
approved implementation efforts. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 681–85 (1978). 
 75 Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 887 (N.D. Miss. 1972), aff’d, 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973), 
and aff’d, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974), and amended by 390 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Miss. 
1975), aff’d, 525 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1976), and supplemented by 423 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Miss. 
1976), aff’d and remanded, 548 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1977). For a detailed account of Mississippi’s racist 
and brutal treatment of prisoners, see DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM 
AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE (1996). 
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more than thirty state prison systems were in litigation about constitutional 
violations.76 
The parallels between individual challenges detailing the filth and 
degradation in strip and solitary cells and these system-wide cases can be 
seen from Judge Johnson’s 1976 findings of fact. Alabama prisons were 
“horrendously overcrowded,” “filthy,” understaffed, and unsafe institutions, 
in which “rampant violence” was “widespread.”77 Windows were “broken 
and unscreened,” permitting in mosquitoes and flies.78 “Old and filthy cotton 
mattresses,” he wrote, led to “the spread of contagious diseases and body 
lice.”79 Heat and ventilation were inadequate, as were the electrical systems; 
the “exposed wiring pose[d] a constant danger to the inmates, and 
insufficient lighting result[ed] in eye strain and fatigue.”80 In one area, where 
more than 200 men were housed, there was “one functioning toilet.”81 The 
court described that as punishment, prisoners were locked into an unstaffed 
building, fed one meal a day, and rarely permitted showers.82 
Before turning to the decades that followed, we need to leap forward to 
the present to underscore the misery that remains—including in systems such 
as Alabama, where litigation is ongoing. In April of 2019, the U.S. 
Department of Justice wrote to Alabama’s governor to report it had 
concluded that “conditions at Alabama’s prisons violate[d] the Eighth 
Amendment” by failing to protect against “prisoner-on-prisoner violence” 
and sexual abuse, and that the unsafe conditions were “exacerbated by 
 
 76 Elizabeth Alexander, Prisoners’ Lawyers Face Critical Issues, 13 J. NAT’L PRISON PROJECT 22, 
24 (1987). 
 77 See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 322–26 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff’d and remanded sub nom. 
Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted in part, judgment rev’d in part sub nom. 
Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978). Painfully graphic detail comes from Matthew Meyers, who 
worked for the ACLU on James v. Wallace. He described going to Draper Correctional Center and finding 
“dozens upon dozens of old, helpless men, many in wheelchairs, incontinent or bedridden, unable to care 
for themselves and jammed into squalid, dilapidated living quarters which could only be described as a 
human death trap.” He then found the “doghouse,” a “concrete building with no windows and a solid 
front door with eight cells, each about the size of a small door. This windowless concrete building and 
the cells in it had no lights, no ventilation, no toilets, no furniture, no beds, no running water, and no sinks 
or showers.” No guards were in, and cells had five to six prisoners, put there for violating minor rules 
like “talking back” to a guard. Matthew L. Myers, 12 Years After James v. Wallace, 13 J. NAT’L PRISON 
PROJECT 8, 8–9 (1987). 
 78 Pugh, 406 F. Supp. at 323. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 327. 
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serious deficiencies in staffing and supervision and overcrowding.”83 On 
January 31, 2020, the New York Times reported that twenty-nine people had 
died due to “suicides, stabbings, and other preventable deaths” in 2019 in 
those facilities,84 and in February of 2020, prisoners’ families brought civil 
rights actions alleging that the failures to provide care had resulted in the 
deaths of four prisoners.85 
Another example comes from a January 2020 order by a district judge 
in Rhode Island who concluded that the State had in the mid-1990s 
“unilaterally and substantively” changed its rules for prison classification 
and discipline, despite a 1974 decree detailing the procedures; the court 
ordered the Department of Corrections to comply with the decree it had 
ignored.86 And yet a third example of contemporary horrors is from 
Mississippi’s Parchman Farm, where twenty-four deaths occurred between 
December 29, 2019 and March 4, 2020, more than double the average rate 
in previous years.87 
These accounts of the evolution and some of the impact of legal 
doctrine show courts’ dependence on those whose behavior they aim to 
change. The gap between judicial order and prisoners’ experiences spans the 
decades of litigation, which returns us to the 1970s, when the U.S. Supreme 
 
 83 Letter from Eric S. Dreiband, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., Louis V. Franklin, Sr., U.S. 
Att’y, M.D. Ala., Jay E. Town, U.S. Att’y, N.D. Ala., Richard W. Moore, U.S. Att’y, S.D. Ala., to Kay 
Ivey, Governor of Ala. (Apr. 2, 2019), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/1150276/download [https://perma.cc/9PHB-LMRC]. The attached investigation was replete 
with horrific discussion of stabbings, beatings, sexual violence, and deaths. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CIVIL RIGHTS DIV. & U.S. ATTORNEYS’ OFFICES FOR THE NORTHERN, MIDDLE, AND SOUTHERN DISTS. 
OF ALA., INVESTIGATION OF ALABAMA’S STATE PRISONS FOR MEN 13 (2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/file/1149971/download [https://perma.cc/SVE4-NPEE]. 
 84 Katie Benner, Plans for Alabama’s Deadly Prisons ‘Won’t Fix the Horrors,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/us/politics/alabama-prisons.html [https://perma.cc/HS5Q-
6J7L]. The inadequate responses and safekeeping of people with mental illness is chronicled in Braggs 
v. Dunn, 367 F. Supp. 3d 1340 (M.D. Ala. 2019). 
 85 Complaint, Head v. Dunn, No. 2:20-cv-132 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 24, 2020). 
 86 Paiva v. R.I. Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-MC-14-JJM-LDA, 2020 WL 430062 (D.R.I. Jan. 28, 2020). 
 87 Lici Beveridge, Mississippi Prison Crisis: 23rd, 24th Inmate Deaths Reported Since Late 
December, MISS. CLARION LEDGER (Mar. 4, 2020, 9:37 AM), 
https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/local/2020/03/04/23rd-mississippi-inmate-death-since-dec-
29-reported/4951406002/ [https://perma.cc/77XV-C8CG]. 
 In 2020, a group of prisoners filed a new class action, Complaint, Lang v. Taylor, No. 4:20-cv-30 
(N.D. Miss. Feb. 25, 2020), that alleged “Parchman has been understaffed and underfunded for decades. 
As a result, prisoners endure abhorrent conditions, abuse and constant violence, inadequate health care 
and mental health care, and overuse of isolation. The conditions of confinement at Parchman are so 
barbaric, the deprivation of health and mental health care so extreme, and the defects in security so severe, 
that the people confined at Parchman live a miserable and hopeless existence confronted daily by 
imminent risk of substantial harm in violation of their rights under the U.S. Constitution.” Id. at 3. 
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Court reviewed eight years of recalcitrance by the Arkansas corrections 
department. Rejecting arguments that the judge had exceeded his powers 
when ordering a thirty-day cap on the length of time a person could spend in 
solitary cells, the Court sustained Chief Judge Henley’s decision.88 Further, 
interpreting the federal statute authorizing attorneys’ fees and the Eleventh 
Amendment, the majority upheld a fee award against the State.89  
We have thus far focused on unsafe facilities, deprivations of food, 
light, and medical care, and discrimination. In addition, several lower courts 
concluded that the profound lack of activity, often called “idleness,” that was 
commonplace in many prison systems was too destructive to permit. In his 
1970 ruling on Arkansas prisoners’ class action, Chief Judge Henley 
commented that the “absence of an affirmative program of training and 
rehabilitation may have constitutional significance where in the absence of 
such a program conditions and practices exist which actually militate against 
reform and rehabilitation.”90 In 1976, Judge Frank Johnson concluded that a 
prison system “cannot be operated in such a manner that it impedes an 
inmate’s ability to attempt rehabilitation, or simply to avoid physical, mental 
or social deterioration.”91 In 1977, Judge Hugh Henry Bownes invoked both 
of those decisions as he identified “[i]dleness and boredom” as sources of 
“debilitation” and held the conditions in New Hampshire unconstitutional.92 
But as the task of constructing constitutional punishment practices 
loomed large, appellate judges pushed back. They rejected efforts to afford 
prisoners opportunities for stimulation and activity, even as they licensed 
holding ever larger numbers of people in prison. One such rule was 
announced by the Fifth Circuit when, in 1977, it overturned aspects of the 
remedies that Judge Johnson had required in Alabama.93 The Fifth Circuit 
stated that: 
If the State furnishes its prisoners with reasonably adequate food, clothing, 
shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, so as to avoid the 
imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, that ends its obligations under 
Amendment Eight. The Constitution does not require that prisoners, as 
individuals or as a group, be provided with any and every amenity which some 
 
 88 Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685–88 (1978). 
 89 Id. at 699. 
 90 Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970). 
 91 Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1976). 
 92 Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 317 (D.N.H. 1977). 
 93 See Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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person may think is needed to avoid mental, physical, and emotional 
deterioration.94 
Four years later, a majority on the Supreme Court echoed the Fifth 
Circuit’s disparaging characterization (“every amenity”) of the obligation to 
provide activities. When addressing the legality of double-celling in 1981 in 
Rhodes v. Chapman, the majority diminished the impact of the resulting 
intense physical contact and lack of any personal privacy by labeling the 
result “discomfort.”95 
Before recounting what was lost by the Court’s condoning double-
celling, we need to underscore what had been won since Robert Jordan, 
William Fulwood, and Lawrence William Wright brought their lawsuits. A 
group of Black and white prisoners, most of whom had little formal 
education and no resources, transformed American law by persuading 
federal judges to regulate some aspects of in-prison punishment. Incarcerated 
individuals, writing about the details of their degradation, sought relief from 
corporal punishment; radical food deprivations; strip cells; solitary 
confinement in dark cells; prohibitions on access to courts, on religious 
observance, and on reading materials; transfers to higher levels of security 
in and out of the same prison; and more. 
Those victories were reflected in 1980, when Ohio sought (and 
obtained) Supreme Court review of lower court orders that had banned 
double-celling. Ohio’s petition for certiorari stated that double-celling did 
not “deprive inmates of minimum constitutional guarantees to adequate 
food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care and personal safety.”96 
Although the State challenged the lower courts’ prohibition on the placement 
of people for long terms in small, double cells, Ohio acknowledged that the 
Constitution did require it to provide what states a decade earlier had argued 
they had no legal obligation to do. Thus, only fourteen years after California 
prison officials claimed in Jordan v. Fitzharris that the U.S. Constitution had 
no role in prisons, states routinely conceded that the Constitution applied to 
 
 94 Id. at 291. In Newman, the Fifth Circuit reviewed and narrowed the scope of U.S. District Court 
Judge Frank Johnson’s structural injunction that mandated sweeping changes to the Alabama prison 
system. The Fifth Circuit upheld Judge Johnson’s order to ameliorate the conditions in Alabama’s 
overcrowded “solitary confinement” scheme but ruled that the district court exceeded its authority in 
mandating rehabilitative and site-specific changes to carceral design. Id. at 288–91. 
 95 See 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). 
 96 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (No. 80-332) (filed 
Sept. 2, 1980). The State’s phrasing is close to but not identical to what the U.S. Supreme Court had read 
the Eighth Amendment to require—“adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.” See Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). 
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their treatment of prisoners, even as they contested whether a particular 
action was unlawful.97 
Ohio succeeded in persuading the U.S. Supreme Court that it could put 
two people in a cell built for one. The pivotal decision by Justice Lewis F. 
Powell in 1981 in Rhodes v. Chapman summarized the Court’s law on prison 
conditions as it constricted it. For the majority, Justice Powell wrote that the 
Eighth Amendment aimed to prevent “the wanton and unnecessary infliction 
of pain” through punishments that were “grossly disproportionate to the 
severity of the crime,” or that “deprive inmates of the minimal civilized 
measure of life’s necessities.”98 Citing the Court’s 1976 decision in Estelle 
v. Gamble, which held that prisons could not be deliberately indifferent to 
known medical needs,99 Justice Powell also explained that “unnecessary and 
wanton” pain was not limited to the “physically barbarous.”100 Practices that 
were “totally without penological justification,”101 such as “deliberate 
indifference to serious medical needs,” violated the Eighth Amendment.102 
Thus, the Eighth Amendment made it unconstitutional to deprive people of 
clothing, sufficient food, medical care, heat, minimal physical exercise, and 
sanitation, and required some level of protection from violence. 
Where did the social density and forced intimacy of overcrowding fit? 
The graphic, gross conditions in the 1960s and 1970s cases could make 
double-celling sound somewhat benign. But “wet” prison cells, which are 
common in U.S. construction patterns, usually include open toilets and sinks. 
As a result, double-celling means that a person has no secluded space in 
which to use a toilet. Further, whether newly constructed (as was Ohio’s 
prison) or old, densely populated prisons increase the risk of violence and 
disease and put a great deal of stress on people and on services from 
programs and health care to security.103 
These factors prompted the lower courts in Rhodes v. Chapman to 
conclude that the Constitution did not permit Ohio to house 2,300 people in 
a facility designed for 1,620 prisoners104 when the result was that double-
celled individuals shared sixty-three square feet.105 As a benchmark, the trial 
 
 97 See, e.g., Brief of Petitioners, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (No. 80-332). 
 98 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. 
 99 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
 100 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. 
 101 Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). 
 102 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. 
 103 Chapman v. Rhodes, 434 F. Supp. 1007, 1014–18 (S.D. Ohio 1977), aff’d, 624 F.2d 1099 (6th 
Cir. 1980), rev’d, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
 104 Id. at 1020. 
 105 Id. at 1021. 
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court had cited the American Correctional Association’s 1977 manual, which 
recommended at least sixty to eighty feet of living quarters for each 
prisoner.106 In contrast, Justice Powell discounted that standard as “an 
aspiration toward an ideal environment for long-term confinement.”107 
Moreover, he appeared to justify the “discomfort” of Ohio’s double-celling 
by commenting that the prison housed “persons convicted of serious 
crimes.”108 In dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall countered that most of the 
Supreme Court’s windows were larger than the space allotted per person in 
double cells.109  
 
 106 Id. That court had sourced the standards to the “American Correctional Institution.” See AM. 
CORR. ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 27 (1977). Other proposed space 
guidelines of that era included the Model Act for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners (fifty square feet). 
 The Supreme Court used the proper name of the American Correctional Association. See Rhodes, 
452 U.S. at 343 n.7. The Supreme Court also referred to the Crime and Delinquency’s Model Act for the 
Protection of Rights of Prisoners, which advises fifty square feet of living quarters. Id. 
 107 Id. at 349. The Court had, by then, also upheld double-celling for pretrial detainees. See Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 520 (1979). The trial judge in Chapman v. Rhodes had distinguished that ruling 
on the grounds that such conditions were short-term, as contrasted with the years that people held in the 
prison would have to spend in such density. See 434 F. Supp. at 1019–21. 
 108 Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349. 
 109 Id. at 371 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In other countries, views closer to the dissent have prevailed. 
For example, in 2017, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that within eighteen months of its judgment, the 
state had to provide “every prisoner and detainee” with a living space of 4.5 square meters (or 48.4 square 
feet), including a shower and lavatory and 4 meters (or 43 square feet) in dry cells that lacked running 
water. HCJ 1892/14 Ass’n for Civil Rights in Isr. v. Minister of Pub. Sec. (unpublished) ¶ 123(A) (June 
13, 2017) (Isr.). Those standards were drawn from regulations that called for that allotment of space. Id. 
¶ 3. 
 The decision gave the authorities eighteen months to become compliant with the 4–4.5-meter 
requirement and nine months to meet the 3-meter requirement. Id. ¶ 123(b). Implementation questions 
are discussed in Lila Margalit, Room for Optimism? Israeli Supreme Court Presses for Implementation 
of Ruling on Inmates’ Right to Personal Space, LAWFARE (June 7, 2018, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/room-optimism-israeli-supreme-court-presses-implementation-ruling-
inmates-right-personal-space [https://perma.cc/N24F-M44T]. 
  In terms of transnational standards, the Council of Europe’s Committee on the Prevention of Torture 
and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) noted that shaping minimum standards was 
complex given variation in the type of facility and the length of stay. Nonetheless, CPT had in the 1990s 
developed what it termed a “rule of thumb” of a minimum of 6 square meters (64.6 square feet) for a 
“single-occupancy” cell and 4 square meters (43 square feet) per person for a “multiple-occupancy cell,” 
which also should have a “fully-partitioned sanitary facility” and, if housing more than two people, should 
be larger. See CPT/Inf (2015) 44, ¶¶ 6, 9, 10, 14, 15 (Strasbourg, Dec. 15, 2015), available at 
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:XXMm-
ZllsyAJ:https://rm.coe.int/1680698462+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us [https://perma.cc/W2D7-
B3XG]. Also noted were that some countries afforded more space of 7.5–9.5 square meters (or about 80–
102 square feet). Id. ¶ 12. Further, a “desirable standard” for multiple-occupancy cells would be at least 
10 square meters for two people plus a “sanitary annexe.” Id. ¶ 16. 
 In terms of enforcement, the European Court of Human Rights has a long list of cases against many 
countries found to be in violations of individuals’ rights not to be subjected to “inhuman or degrading 
treatment,” as provided by Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. A recent decision 
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Rhodes is foundational to the circumscription of the Eighth 
Amendment, and Rhodes is likewise the key to the expansive use of 
incarceration. By declining to enforce rules reflecting architectural, 
correctional, and health guidelines about the space individuals need, the 
opinion enabled states to prosecute more people without internalizing the 
costs of confinement through providing appropriate physical facilities. The 
individuals who were packed in and the communities from which they were 
taken bore the costs instead. A massive number of people in detention was a 
harm that had attracted widespread concern before COVID-19, and since the 
pandemic, the injuries—disproportionately borne by people of color—have 
become all the more vivid. 
1. Expanding the Capacity for and the Reliance on Isolation 
Before delving into more of the legal principles judges crafted to govern 
in-prison punishments, we need to sketch the parameters and impact of the 
contemporary uses of solitary confinement, which can be found throughout 
the United States. As discussed at the outset, more than 60,000 people were, 
as of 2017, in isolation and more than 3,700 people had been there for three 
years or longer. 
The use of solitary confinement goes back centuries. In nineteenth-
century America, its virtues were extolled by officials who ran facilities in 
Pennsylvania and upstate New York, where “cellular” housing put people 
into deep isolation that proponents thought would lead to revelation and 
redemption.110 But within short order, the harms from deprivation of human 
contact became evident, and the generic deployment of silence and solitude 
was rejected. In the century that followed, the social science disciplines 
emerged including criminology and penology, which led to the 
professionalization of corrections. Newly minted experts embraced the 
metaphor of “disease” for crime, as they commended individualization, 
classification, and indeterminate sentences to provide “cures” through work, 
education, and religion. 
Nonetheless, solitary confinement remained, no longer as a mode for 
redemption but as a sanction. The rationales for placement varied. Some 
 
involved prisoners having less than 3 square meters (32.3 square feet) to 4 square meters (43.1 square 
feet) and a lack of privacy when using toilets. See J.M.B. & Others v. France, No. 9671/15 Eur. Ct. H.R., 
at 3 (Jan. 30, 2020), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=002-12702 [https://perma.cc/R867-
PBG5]; Factsheet, Detention Conditions and Treatment of Prisoners, EUR. COURT OF HUM. RTS. 
(Feb. 2020), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Detention_conditions_ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc
/QP35-6LYT]. 
 110 See Ashley T. Rubin & Keramet Reiter, Continuity in the Face of Penal Innovation: Revisiting 
the History of American Solitary Confinement, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1604, 1605, 1613–18 (2018). 
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statutes authorized solitary confinement as part of the prison sentence.111 In 
addition, prison officials used solitary confinement as a punishment for in-
prison behavior and as a mode of control for individuals perceived to be 
difficult. Further, prison officials explained solitary confinement as a form 
of protection to shield individuals from within-prison dangers.  
When prosecutorial and policing efforts became more intensive and 
prison populations expanded in the 1980s, so did the use of solitary 
confinement, both within prisons and through building Supermax facilities 
specially designed to impose profound isolation on people.112 Thirty years of 
data from Kansas provide one exemplar. Before that state expanded its 
prisons in the 1970s, 13% of its prisoners spent thirty days or more in 
solitary.113 Between 1987 and 1992, more than 40% had, with even higher 
percentages in the subpopulations of people of color, who also were held in 
isolation for longer periods of time.114 Evidence of the widespread 
contemporary use of solitary confinement comes from reports coauthored by 
the Association of State Correctional Administrators (ASCA)115 and The 
Arthur Liman Center for Public Interest Law at Yale Law School. These 
monographs provide nationwide data on what correctional officials term 
“restrictive housing”—separating prisoners from the general population 
based on a variety of rationales, including protection and punishment. 
The first report, Administrative Segregation, Degrees of Isolation, and 
Incarceration, published in 2013, reviewed policies from forty-seven 
jurisdictions. This meta-analysis concluded that the criteria for placement in 
isolation were broad, and prison officers at many levels had a great deal of 
discretion to identify individuals as a “threat” to the “orderly operation of the 
institution.”116 As a result, putting a person into segregation was relatively 
 
 111 Id. at. 1619–21. One example comes from a 1913 Nebraska statute, which provided for a 
“[j]udgement to fix term of imprisonment and period of solitary confinement.” NEB. REV. STAT. § 9140-
565 (1913). 
 112 Rubin & Reiter, supra note 110, at 1622–25. See generally KERAMET REITER, 23/7: PELICAN 
BAY PRISON AND THE RISE OF LONG-TERM SOLITARY CONFINEMENT (2016). 
 113 Ryan T. Sakoda & Jessica T. Simes, Solitary Confinement and the U.S. Prison Boom, CRIM. JUST. 
POL’Y REV. (Dec. 29, 2019), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0887403419895315 
[https://perma.cc/K9BE-S4EK]. 
 114 Id. 
 115 ASCA changed its name in 2019 to the Correctional Leaders Association (CLA). See CORR. 
LEADERS ASS’N, https://www.asca.net/ [https://perma.cc/2V3E-STNK]. 
 116 See HOPE METCALF, JAMELIA MORGAN, SAMUEL OLIKER‐FRIEDLAND, JUDITH RESNIK, JULIA 
SPIEGEL, HARAN TAE, ALYSSA WORK & BRIAN HOLBROOK, ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION, DEGREES 
OF ISOLATION, AND INCARCERATION: A NATIONAL OVERVIEW OF STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL 
POLICIES 5–8 (2013). Policies included in the analysis were Federal Bureau of Prisons, 28 C.F.R. 
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easy. In contrast, few policies at the time focused on how individuals could 
be released and the obligations of prison staff to reduce degrees of isolation. 
The next goal was to learn the impact of such rules by finding out how 
many people were held for what period of time. ASCA/Liman sent detailed 
surveys to the directors of the prison systems of the fifty states, the District 
of Columbia, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBOP), as well as some 
large jail systems.117 Given the many terms for solitary confinement, 
ASCA/Liman provided a definition by seeking to learn how many people 
were held inside cells for an average of twenty-two hours or more per day 
for more than fifteen continuous days.118 
Based on self-reported data collected from thirty-four jurisdictions, 
then housing about three-quarters of the national prison population, the 2015 
report, Time-in-Cell, estimated that 80,000 to 100,000 prisoners of the 1.5 
million incarcerated people were held in solitary confinement.119 The 2016 
report, Aiming to Reduce Time-in-Cell, identified almost 68,000 people held 
in isolation.120 
The 2018 report relied on submissions from prison systems from the 
fall of 2017. As reflected in Figure 1, below, the forty-three prison systems 
responding held 80.6% of the U.S. prison population and reported that 
49,197 individuals—4.5% of the people in their custody—were in restrictive 
housing.121 Across all the reporting jurisdictions, the median percentage of 
the population held in restrictive housing was 4.2%; the average was 4.6%.122 
The percentage of prisoners in restrictive housing ranged from under 1% to 
19%.123 Extrapolating from these numbers to include jurisdictions that did 
not provide data, ASCA/Liman estimated that some 61,000 individuals were 
 
§ 541.21 (2012), CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3335(a), FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 33‐602.220(c)(3)(g), and 
NEB. ADMIN. REG. 201.05(V)(A). Id. 
 117 ASCA/LIMAN 2018 REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING, supra note 11, at 153. An example of 
the 2017–2018 survey can be found in Appendix A of that report. 
 118 Id. at 8 n.20. The definition of restrictive housing used in the ASCA/Liman surveys varied. In 
2014, the focus was on thirty days; thereafter, the survey defined restrictive housing as “separating 
prisoners from the general population and holding them in their cells for 22 hours per day or more for 15 
or more continuous days.” Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the 2018 report and the 2020 
report (forthcoming, as of this writing), the definition continued to rely on the metric of fifteen days or 
more but used the term “an average of 22 hours” in cell rather than measuring each day of twenty-two 
hours in a cell. Id. Based on the responses, the questions were refined to enable more accurate information. 
 119 ASCA/LIMAN 2014 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION, supra note 11, at 
10. 
 120 ASCA/LIMAN 2016 AIMING TO REDUCE TIME-IN-CELL, supra note 11, at 20. 
 121 ASCA/LIMAN 2018 REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING, supra note 11, at 10, 12 tbl.1, 13 tbl.1. 
 122 Id. at 11. 
 123 Id. at 12 tbl.1, 13 tbl.1. 
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in isolation in prisons in the fall of 2017.124 Below, we have reproduced some 
of the figures that summarize aspects of the survey data. 
FIGURE 1: NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF PRISON POPULATION IN RESTRICTIVE HOUSING AS OF 
THE FALL OF 2017 (N=43)125 
Total in Custody 1,087,671 
Total in Restrictive Housing 49,197 (4.5%) 




 One data point collected in the surveys is the number of people held in 
isolation, and another is the length of time spent there. Getting that 
information is difficult, in part, because not all prison systems have tracked 
or published that information. As Figure 2 below reflects, thirty-six 
jurisdictions responded in 2017 to questions about duration and reported that 
most people were held in segregation for a year or less. Twenty-five 
jurisdictions counted more than 3,700 individuals who were held for more 
than three years. Almost 2,000 of those individuals had been in isolation for 
more than six years. 
 
 
 124 Id. at 10. 
 125 Id. at 11, 12 tbl.1, 13 tbl.1. 
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FIGURE 2: PRISONERS IN RESTRICTIVE HOUSING IN 2016 BY LENGTH OF TIME (N=36)126 
 
Demographics of the population held in solitary has been another 
subject of inquiry. The surveys have sought to understand the relevance of 
gender, race and ethnicity, and age of individuals held in solitary 
confinement. As Figure 3 shows, men were much more likely than women 
to be in solitary confinement.127 Figure 4 details that Black men comprised a 
greater percentage of the restrictive housing population than of the total 
custodial population. Figure 5 reflects that Black women were yet a larger 
percentage of the restrictive housing population than of the general 
population. 
 
 126 The original chart appears in id. at 14 fig.3 (reproduced with the permission of the authors). 
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FIGURE 3: PERCENT OF TOTAL POPULATION IN RESTRICTIVE HOUSING BY GENDER128 
 
 
FIGURE 4: RACIAL AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF MALE PRISONERS IN TOTAL CUSTODIAL 
POPULATION AND IN RESTRICTIVE HOUSING POPULATION (N=33)129  
 
 
 128 The original chart appears in id. at 17 fig.4 (reproduced with the permission of the authors). 
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FIGURE 5: RACIAL AND ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF FEMALE PRISONERS IN TOTAL CUSTODIAL 
POPULATION AND IN RESTRICTIVE HOUSING POPULATION (N=32)130  
 
A substantial number of people, whom prison systems categorize 
under their varying definitions of “serious mental illness,”131 were, as of 
2017, held in restrictive housing. Given the range in scope and detail, a 
person could be classified as seriously mentally ill in one jurisdiction but 
not in another. Thus, rather than scaling the information, ASCA/Liman 
 
 130 The original chart appears in id. at 23 fig.10 (reproduced with the permission of the authors). 
 131 The report included an appendix providing definitions from all the responding jurisdictions. For 
example, Alabama defined “Serious Mental Illness” (SMI) to be “[p]sychotic disorders, bipolar disorders, 
and major depressive disorders; any diagnosed mental disorder currently associated with serious 
impairment in psychological, cognitive, or behavioral function that substantially interferes with the 
person’s ability to meet the demands of living and requires an individualized treatment plan by a qualified 
mental health provider.” Alaska reported that “Mental Illness is an organic mental or emotional 
impairment that reduces an individual’s exercise of conscious control over the individual’s actions and 
reduces an individual’s ability to perceive reality, to reason or understand.” Arizona responded that SMI 
was “ADC Mental Health Technical Manual, 06/18/2015 Defined: Those who according to a licensed 
mental health clinician or provider possess: 1) A qualifying mental health diagnosis as indicated on the 
SMI determination form, and 2) A severe functional impairment directly relating to their mental illness.” 
In Arkansas, the definition was: “Serious Mental Illness-Psychotic, Bipolar and Major Depressive 
Disorders and any other diagnosed mental disorder (excluding substance use disorders) associated with 
serious behavioral impairment as evidenced by examples of acute decompensation, self-injurious 
behaviors, and mental health emergencies that require an individualized treatment plan by a qualified 
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provided tables by jurisdiction and tallied the numbers provided. As of the 
fall of 2017, more than 4,200 people with serious mental illness were in 
restrictive housing. 
 
FIGURE 6: MALE PRISONERS WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS (SMI, VARIOUSLY DEFINED)132 IN 












% with SMI 
in RH 
 
Alabama 20,282 1,064 5.30% 248 23.30%  
Arizona 38,117 1,559 4.10% 284 18.20%  
Arkansas 14,561 397 2.70% 21 5.30%  
Colorado 16,624 1,234 7.40% 1 0.10%  
Connecticut 13,182 28 0.20% 3 10.70%  
Delaware 4,100 354 8.60% 3 0.90%  
Illinois 39,767 3,998 10.10% 356 8.90%  
Indiana 23,847 4,762 20.00% 567 11.90%  
Iowa 7,578 1,009 13.30% 24 2.40%  
Kansas 8,999 2,677 29.70% 43 1.61%  
Kentucky 20,427 386 1.90% 66 17.10%  
Louisiana 32,953 2,113 6.40% 417 19.70%  
Massachusetts 8,459 608 7.20% 10 1.60%  
Mississippi 12,038 61 0.50% 10 16.40%  
Missouri 29,675 3,768 12.70% 703 18.70%  
Nebraska 4,762 192 4.00% 50 26%  
New Jersey 18,594 208 1.10% 1 0.50%  
New Mexico 6,306 36 0.60% 23 63.90%  
New York 48,407 2,420 5.00% 47 1.90%  
North Carolina 34,326 385 1.10% 27 7.00%  
North Dakota 1,606 345 21.50% 5 1.50%  
 
 132 The original table appears in id. at 48 tbl.15 (reproduced with the permission of the authors). 
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Ohio 45,796 3,477 7.60% 150 4.30%  
Oklahoma 23,816 7,011 29.40% 615 8.80%  
Oregon 13,302 812 6.10% 112 13.80%  
Pennsylvania 44,300 3,691 8.30% 0 0.00%  
Rhode Island 2,722 140 5.10% 16 11.40%  
South Dakota 3,402 111 3.30% 12 10.80%  
Tennessee133 20,214   98   
Texas134 133,229 1,440 1.10% 0 0.00%  
Utah 5,822 199 3.40% 11 5.50%  
Washington 15,744 1,628 10.30% 99 6.10%  
Wisconsin 21,050 1,654 7.90% 90 5.40%  
Wyoming 1,894 204 10.80% 41 20.10%  









FIGURE 7: FEMALE PRISONERS WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS (SMI, VARIOUSLY DEFINED) IN 













% Pop. with 
SMI  
Alabama 1,310 86 6.60% 1 1.20% 
Arizona 4,029 313 7.80% 14 4.50% 
Arkansas 1,344 2 0.10% 0 0.00% 
Colorado 1,673 497 29.70% 0 0.00% 
Connecticut 955 8 0.80% 0 0.00% 
Delaware 233 64 27.50% 0 0.00% 
 
 133 The ASCA/Liman 2018 report, Reforming Restrictive Housing, indicated that “Tennessee 
reported 505 prisoners with serious mental illness in its total custodial population. This number is not 
included in [the table] because it is not known how many of the 505 prisoners are female and how many 
are male.” Id. at 116 n.79. 
 134 Texas had informed the researchers that it did “not define ‘serious mental illness.’” Its numbers 
reflect prisoners who were “on an inpatient mental health caseload.” Id. at 116 n.80. 
 135 The original table appears in id. at 49 tbl.16 (reproduced with the permission of the authors). 
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Illinois 2,410 619 25.70% 24 3.90% 
Indiana 2,470 954 38.60% 36 3.80% 
Iowa 705 167 23.70% 3 1.80% 
Kansas 897 525 58.50% 0 0.00% 
Kentucky 3,139 163 5.19% 8 4.90% 
Massachusetts 588 46 7.82% 0 0.00% 
Missouri 3,529 1,102 31.20% 48 4.40% 
Nebraska 416 71 17.10% 4 5.60% 
New Jersey 774 24 3.10% 0 0.00% 
New Mexico 741 9 1.20% 0 0.00% 
New York 2,357 188 8.00% 3 1.60% 
North Carolina 2,933 80 2.70% 2 2.50% 
North Dakota 224 37 16.50% 0 0.00% 
Ohio 4,158 1,113 26.80% 10 0.90% 
Oklahoma 3,079 2,086 67.70% 14 0.70% 
Oregon 1,272 168 13.20% 11 6.60% 
Pennsylvania  2,620 529 20.20% 0 0.00% 
Rhode Island 130 9 6.90% 0 0.00% 
South Dakota 525 40 7.60% 1 2.50% 
Tennessee 1,946     1   
Texas 12,180 84 0.70% 0 0.00% 
Utah 471 21 4.50% 0 0.00% 
Washington 1,302 193 14.80% 0 0.00% 
Wisconsin 1,539 414 26.90% 19 4.60% 
Wyoming 260 64 24.60% 2 3.10% 







The 2018 report compared the responses of the forty prison systems that 
answered the ASCA/Liman surveys in both 2015 and 2017. During that time, 
several prison systems initiated policy reforms to limit the use of solitary 
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confinement.136 The jurisdictions’ self-reported data on the numbers may be 
evidence of the impact of these policy reforms, as the total number was down 
somewhat even though the changes were not uniform across the 
jurisdictions. 
In those forty systems, 56,000 people had been placed in restrictive 
housing in 2015. The number of prisoners reported in restrictive housing 
decreased in 2017 by almost 9,500 to 47,000 people.137 The percentage of 
individuals in isolation decreased from 5.0% to 4.4%.138 In more than two 
dozen states, the numbers of people in restrictive housing decreased.139 In 
eleven states, the numbers went up.140 In thirty-one jurisdictions responding 
to questions about length of time in both 2015 and 2017, the number of 
individuals in restrictive housing for three months or less increased.141 The 
number of people in isolation for longer than three months decreased. The 
decreases were greatest for time periods longer than six months.142 
2. Experiencing Isolation 
The efforts to document and quantify the ways in which solitary 
confinement is used by prison staff are paralleled by efforts to assess the 
effects on individuals held for long periods of time in isolation. In some 
ways, such inquiries seem unnecessary because humans are “social beings,” 
 
 136 See ASCA/LIMAN 2018 REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING, supra note 11, at 67–81; ASS’N OF 
STATE CORR. ADM’RS & THE ARTHUR LIMAN CTR. FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW AT YALE LAW SCH., 
WORKING TO LIMIT RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: EFFORTS IN FOUR JURISDICTIONS TO MAKE CHANGES 
(2018), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/Liman/asca_liman_2018_workingtolimit.p
df [https://perma.cc/J4VV-VPN6]. 
 137 ASCA/LIMAN 2018 REFORMING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING, supra note 11, at 95. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 151 n.427 (“Those 28 jurisdictions, starting with the largest decrease in percentage points, 
were Utah (from 14.0% to 4.7%); Delaware (from 8.8% to 0.8%); New Mexico (from 9.0% to 4.2%); 
Nebraska (from 11.0% to 6.3%); Tennessee (from 8.8% to 5.3%); New York (from 8.5% to 5.3%); Illinois 
(from 4.8% to 2.2%); North Dakota (from 3.0% to 0.4%); Wyoming (from 6.2% to 3.8%); Alabama (from 
5.7% to 4.0%); New Jersey (from 6.7% to 5.2%); South Carolina (from 5.1% to 3.7%); Kansas (from 
5.9% to 4.6%); Colorado (from 1.2% to 0.1%); Maryland (from 7.5% to 6.5%); Georgia (from 6.8% to 
5.8%); North Carolina (from 4.0% to 3.0%); Texas (from 3.9% to 2.9%); Iowa (from 3.0% to 2.0%); 
Kentucky (from 4.2% to 3.4%); Michigan (from 3.1% to 2.3%); Idaho (from 5.0% to 4.3%); South Dakota 
(from 3.0% to 2.3%); Oklahoma (from 5.6% to 5.1%); Wisconsin (from 3.7% to 3.2%); Pennsylvania 
(from 3.4% to 3.2%); Ohio (from 2.7% to 2.6%); and Hawaii (from 0.5% to 0.4%).”). 
 140 Id. at 6; see also id. at 151 n.429 (“Those 12 jurisdictions, starting with the largest increase in 
percentage points, were Louisiana (from 14.5% to 19.0%); Mississippi (from 1.0% to 4.1%); Montana 
(from 3.5% to 6.4%); Missouri (from 6.3% to 9.0%); Massachusetts (from 2.3% to 4.9%); Oregon (from 
4.3% to 6.4%); Connecticut (from 0.8% to 2.3%); Alaska (from (7.2% to 8.6%); Indiana (from 5.9% to 
6.6%); Washington (from 1.7% to 2.3%); Arizona (from 6.0% to 6.5%); and FBOP (from 4.7% to 
5.2%).”). 
 141 Id. at 6. 
 142 Id. at 100. 
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and solitary confinement is so obviously harmful.143 Indeed, the injuries from 
a lack of meaningful human interaction have been apparent for hundreds of 
years. Seeing how disabling solitary was, prison officials in the nineteenth 
century abandoned the forms of that regime that had been used in Auburn, 
New York and in the Eastern Penitentiary in Pennsylvania.144 Moreover, 
individuals subjected to solitary have chronicled their profound suffering, 
including disorientation, a loss of depth perception, and thoughts of 
suicide.145 
The then-nascent correctional establishment recognized solitary’s 
harms, and those views made their way in 1890 into U.S. Supreme Court 
case law. The Court discussed the oppressiveness of isolation when holding 
that Colorado’s solitary confinement of James Medley violated the Ex Post 
Facto Clause because the statute mandating solitary confinement for capital 
offenders had been enacted after Medley’s conviction of a capital offense.146 
In recounting the “very interesting history” of solitary confinement, the 
Court borrowed from an encyclopedia article citing punishment theorists 
Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham and the work of the International 
Penitentiary Commission (founded in 1872).147 The Court wrote that 
isolation put some prisoners into a “semi-fatuous” condition and rendered 
others “insane.”148 More than a century later, other Justices acknowledged 
that long-term isolation could cause “madness.”149 
Given that intuitive revulsion at the deprivations of “meaningful human 
contact and social interaction, the enforced idleness and inactivity, [and] the 
 
 143 See Jules Lobel & Peter Scharff Smith, Solitary Confinement—From Extreme Isolation to Prison 
Reform, in SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: EFFECTS, PRACTICES, AND PATHWAYS TOWARD REFORM 1, 1–2 
(Jules Lobel & Peter Scharff Smith eds., 2020) [hereinafter SOLITARY CONFINEMENT]. 
 144 Peter Scharff Smith, Solitary Confinement—Effects and Practices from the Nineteenth Century 
Until Today, in SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, supra note 143, at 33–37. 
 145 See, e.g., WOODFOX, supra note 14; Betts, supra note 14; Robert King, Dolores Canales, Jack 
Morris & Armondo Sosa, Sharing Experiences of Solitary Confinement—Prisoners and Staff, in 
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, supra note 143, at 243–245. King reported on how, during his twenty-nine 
years in solitary confinement in Angola, Louisiana, he had trouble with depth perception and that, 
thereafter, he continued to struggle with “differentiating long distances and special relationships.” Id. at 
244; see also Huda Akil, The Brain in Isolation: A Neuroscientist’s Perspective on Solitary Confinement, 
in SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, supra note 143, at 204–05. 
 146 In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890). 
 147 Id. at 167. The Court cited (with an incorrect volume number) to Prison and Prison Discipline, 
in XIV THE AMERICAN CYCLOPAEDIA: A POPULAR DICTIONARY OF GENERAL KNOWLEDGE 6–16 
(George Ripley & Charles A. Dana eds., 1875). That article provided accounts of the history and current 
state of modern “[p]enitentiary science.” Id. at 6–7. 
 148 Medley, 134 U.S. at 168. 
 149 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2209 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also infra note 235 
(discussing Justice Breyer’s analyses in Glossip v. Gross and subsequent cases). 
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oppressive security and surveillance,”150 one question is why courts have not 
banned the practice, when, in the 1960s and 1970s, they outlawed whipping, 
strip cells, and radical food deprivations. Partial answers come from how the 
Court’s own doctrine contributed to arguments from the correctional 
establishment about their need to have solitary confinement as a punishment. 
Hyper-isolation traveled with hyper-density, which the Supreme Court 
licensed in 1981 in Rhodes v. Chapman. The percentage of people held in 
solitary confinement increased with prison expansion and overcrowding.151 
Thereafter, the Supreme Court relied on the practices of prison officials 
as evidence of what was “normal” in prison and as a metric of what was 
legal. Justices acceded to prison officials’ arguments about the need for 
discretion to use a range of “management tools,” including transfers to 
restrictive forms of confinement. Furthermore, judicial toleration of solitary 
confinement relates to other prison practices which courts have tolerated. As 
we discussed, while upholding bans on filth and violence for all segments of 
prison populations, appellate courts rejected efforts by lower courts to stop 
the enforced idleness in general populations.152 Solitary confinement is the 
extreme example of how prisons deplete individuals by failing to provide 
meaningful social interactions and activities.153 
In short, as of this writing, more than lived experiences and human 
insights are needed for constitutional law to reject solitary confinement 
outright. Therefore, before turning to how courts in the last decades have 
responded to solitary confinement, we provide a brief synopsis of some of 
the research on isolation’s destructiveness. 
Many social scientists and trained health professionals have formulated 
research paradigms, interviewed individuals in solitary, and analyzed 
correctional data in an effort to determine what isolated confinement means 
for the people who experience it and the institutions that impose it. Some 
studies have also explored whether solitary confinement has the utilities that 
its proponents have claimed: reducing violence among prisoners and staff 
 
 150 Craig Haney, Solitary Confinement, Loneliness, and Psychological Harm, in SOLITARY 
CONFINEMENT, supra note 143, at 129–30 [hereinafter Haney, Loneliness]. 
 151 Sakoda & Simes, supra note 113. 
 152 One example comes from Judge Johnson’s efforts to do so, which were limited by the Fifth 
Circuit. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 323–26 (M.D. Ala. 1976),  aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. granted in part, judgment rev’d in part 
sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978). 
 153 See generally Judith Resnik, Not Isolating Isolation, in SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, supra note 143, 
at 89–115. 
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and enhancing safety.154 This avenue of research is salient for those interested 
in “evidence-based” practices and for litigation in which governing doctrine 
requires courts to consider whether punishment serves legitimate 
penological purposes. 
Identifying the specific effects of solitary confinement is made complex 
given the myriad ways in which prisons constrain individual autonomy and 
the challenges people encounter before incarceration.155 The hurdles for 
scientists include cataloguing, distinguishing, and measuring variables such 
as different degrees and durations of isolation, the level of staffing and the 
skills of correctional officers, health resources, activities made available and 
used, budgets, the opportunities and conditions for those not in solitary 
confinement, cell design, the facility itself, and the density and kinds of 
individuals housed within both segregated and general populations. 
Moreover, even as the people entering prison are diverse, they share 
demographics and documented needs. Compared to the population at large, 
a disproportionate number are people of color. Many people enter prison 
with health problems, limited income, and low levels of education. For 
example, one profile of some 230,000 people released from North Carolina’s 
prisons between 2000 and 2015 identified almost 70% who had substance 
abuse problems, at least 12% in need of mental health support, and 65% who 
had not completed high school.156 In a 2020 encyclopedic overview focused 
on incarcerated women, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission found they were 
likely to have suffered many forms of trauma and more likely than men to 
be the primary caregivers for their households.157 
Between the range of people and of situations, a few commentators 
argue that the “purported negative physiological and psychological effects” 
 
 154 For some researchers, the answer is clearly no. See, e.g., Homer Venters, Mythbusting Solitary 
Confinement in Jail, in SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, supra note 143, at 178–79 [hereinafter Venters, 
Mythbusting]. 
 155 An analysis of the research challenges comes from Brie Williams & Cyrus Ahalt, First Do No 
Harm: Applying the Harms-to-Benefits Patient Safety Framework to Solitary Confinement, in SOLITARY 
CONFINEMENT, supra note 143, at 158 [hereinafter Williams & Ahalt, First Do No Harm]. 
 156 Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Josie Sivaraman, David L. Rosen, David H. Cloud, Gary Junker, 
Scott Proescholdbell, Meghan E. Shanahan & Shabbar I. Ranapurwala, Association of Restrictive 
Housing During Incarceration with Mortality After Release, JAMA NETWORK OPEN, Oct. 2019, at 4, 
available at https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2752350 
[https://perma.cc/LLA9-LJDF] [hereinafter Brinkley-Rubinstein et al., Mortality After Release]. 
 157 See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WOMEN IN PRISON: SEEKING JUSTICE BEHIND BARS 3–4 
(2020), https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2020/02-26-Women-in-Prison.pdf [https://perma.cc/G26J-YQJN]. 
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have been overstated.158 In the main, however, most experts in this arena 
agree that deprivations of sociability have brutal effects.159 One summary 
concluded that solitary confinement caused “a wide range of harmful 
psychological effects, including increases in negative attitudes and affect, 
insomnia, anxiety, panic, withdrawal, hypersensitivity, ruminations, 
cognitive dysfunction, hallucinations, loss of control, aggression, rage, 
paranoia, hopelessness, lethargy, depression, emotional breakdowns, self-
mutilation, and suicidal impulses.”160 Moreover, to adjust to long-term 
isolation, individuals developed what would otherwise be pathological 
behaviors, making a return to human sociability difficult.161 This form of 
“social death” resulted in grief and loneliness.162 
One focus of these studies has been the impact of sensory deprivation, 
when an individual is limited to a small space for long periods of time and 
given no variation of experiences.163 Another area of study is on the effects 
of banning human interaction and touch.164 A 1983 study found that 
profoundly isolated prisoners became hypersensitive to external stimuli and 
developed difficulties with concentration and memory.165 Some also 
experienced visual and aural hallucinations.166 Later research, based on self-
 
 158 See Robert D. Morgan, Ryan M. Labrecque, Paul Gendreau, Taylor R. Ramler & Brieann 
Olafsson, Questioning Solitary Confinement: Is Administrative Segregation as Bad as Alleged?, 
CORRECTIONS TODAY, Sept./Oct. 2017, at 18, 19. 
 159 See Manfred Nowak (Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council), Interim Rep. on Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. A/63/175, at 22 (July 28, 
2008); Soledad Prison Goes on Trial Tomorrow, supra note 39, at 4. 
 160 Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis of 
Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 477, 530 (1997); see also 
Haney, Loneliness, supra note 150, at 132–33; Craig Haney, The Science of Solitary: Expanding the 
Harmfulness Narrative, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 211 (2020). 
 161 Haney, Loneliness, supra note 150, at 138–39. 
 162 Id. at 140. 
 163 Craig Haney, Restricting the Use of Solitary Confinement, 1 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 285, 294 
(2018) [hereinafter Haney, Restricting]; see also Reassessing Solitary Confinement: The Human Rights, 
Fiscal, and Public Safety Consequences: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights 
& Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 75 (2012) (statement of Dr. Craig Haney). 
 164 Haney, Restricting, supra note 163, at 297–98; see also Craig Haney, The Psychological Effects 
of Solitary Confinement: A Systematic Critique, 47 CRIME & JUST. 365, 371–75 (2018) [hereinafter 
Haney, Psychological Effects]. 
 165 Stuart Grassian, Psychopathological Effects of Solitary Confinement, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
1450, 1452–53 (1983) [hereinafter Grassian, Psychopathological]. 
 166 Id. at 1452. 
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reports and on interviews, found similar effects.167 This body of work argues 
that an “isolation syndrome” can be identified.168 
Another effort analyzed data from 2004 of mentally ill prisoners held 
in solitary confinement in New York prisons. That research reported that 
more than “half (53%) of the inmates with mental illness . . . . interviewed 
in disciplinary lockdown reported previous suicide attempts” and “40% 
reported committing an act of self-harm during their current 
incarceration.”169 An observational study of individuals detained in New 
York City’s jails between 2010 and 2013 found that “acts of self-harm were 
strongly associated with assignment of inmates to solitary confinement. 
Inmates punished by solitary confinement were approximately 6.9 times as 
likely to commit acts of self-harm.”170 Moreover, the populations exposed to 
solitary confinement in this analysis were disproportionately people of color, 
as has been evident in other studies as well.171 
To measure physical effects, one study of individuals held in isolation 
in Pelican Bay, California compared 283 people in general population with 
343 people in the isolation of the “special housing unit” (SHU), as well as 
315 people held for at least ten years in general population and 246 
individuals in the SHU.172 After controlling for age and other health 
conditions, the study concluded that hypertension was more prevalent in the 
 
 167 Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 325, 
347–54 (2006) [hereinafter Grassian, Psychiatric]; Haney, Psychological Effects, supra note 164, at 371–
74. 
 168 Grassian, Psychopathological, supra note 165, at 1453. One summary, presented in a 2016 
amicus filing to the U.S. Supreme Court, came from health care experts. See Brief of Amici Curiae 
Professors & Practitioners of Psychiatry & Psychology in Support of Petitioner, Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 
245 (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 319 (2015) (No. 15-31). These experts argued that “while 
mentally ill prisoners are particularly susceptible to these harms, solitary confinement affects even 
psychologically resilient individuals,” putting all prisoners “at significant risk of severe psychological 
harm.” Id. at 6. 
 169 CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y., MENTAL HEALTH IN THE HOUSE OF CORRECTIONS: A STUDY OF MENTAL 
HEALTH CARE IN NEW YORK STATE PRISONS 3, 59 (2004), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5b2c07e2a9e02851fb387477/t/5c4f6d9642bfc11a842e8e97/15487
09275093/2004+Mental+Healthcare+in+New+Yorks+Prisons.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8A7-K8E8]. 
 170 Fatos Kaba, Andrea Lewis, Sarah Glowa-Kollisch, James Hadler, David Lee, Howard Alper, 
Daniel Selling, Ross MacDonald, Angela Solimo, Amanda Parsons & Homer Venters, Solitary 
Confinement and Risk of Self-Harm Among Jail Inmates, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 442, 445 (2014). That 
study had considered 244,600 incarcerations, of which more than 7% had been exposed to solitary 
confinement. See Venters, Mythbusting, supra note 154, at 173–75. 
 171 Id. at 176–77; see also Sakoda & Simes, supra note 113; supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 172 See Louise Hawkley, Social Isolation, Loneliness, and Health, in SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, 
supra note 143, at 190. 
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SHU population, and by a significant margin.173 SHU prisoners were 
therefore “set on a trajectory toward early onset cardiovascular disease and 
mortality.”174 
These results reflect the relationship between social bonds, activities, 
and health.175 Stress, as well as environments lacking stimulation and natural 
light, have been demonstrated to have deleterious health effects.176 By 2020, 
health care experts, relying on the U.S. Food and Drug Administration metric 
of “harms-to-benefits” for medications and medical devices, concluded that 
solitary confinement was “inappropriate for use with humans.”177 Part of that 
analysis drew on research that high rates of solitary confinement did not 
predict lower institutional violence.178 Furthermore, prison staff working in 
such environments had higher rates of household violence, ill health, and 
suicide than other staff.179 
Research has also explored what happens to individuals held in solitary 
confinement who are later released. One study evaluated people incarcerated 
between 2000 and 2015 in North Carolina.180 Individuals who had been 
placed in solitary were “24% more likely to die in the first year after 
release . . . [and] also 127% more likely to die of an opioid overdose in the 
first [two] weeks after release” compared with incarcerated people who had 
not been placed in solitary.181  
Some researchers have questioned the strength of conclusions that 
solitary is debilitating. They point to the variety of variables affecting 
 
 173 See id. at 191. In general population, about 18% had hypertension; in the SHU, more than 48% 
did. Id. 
 174 Id. at 196. 
 175 See generally Laura Fratiglioni, Stephanie Paillard-Borg & Bengt Winblad, An Active and 
Socially Integrated Lifestyle in Late Life Might Protect Against Dementia, 3 LANCET NEUROLOGY 343 
(2004); Federica Coppola, The Brain in Solitude: An (Other) Eighth Amendment Challenge to Solitary 
Confinement, 6 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 184, 204–07 (2019) (citing DANIEL SIEGEL, THE DEVELOPING MIND: 
HOW RELATIONSHIPS AND THE BRAIN INTERACT TO SHAPE WHO WE ARE 27 (2d ed. 2012)). 
 176 Akil, supra note 145, at 206–10. Animal studies have provided evidence of the physiological 
effects of isolation. See Michael J. Zigmond & Richard Jay Smeyne, Use of Animals to Study the 
Neurobiological Effects of Isolation, in SOLITARY CONFINEMENT, supra note 143, at 221–36. 
 177 Williams & Ahalt, First Do No Harm, supra note 155, at 159, 163. 
 178 Id. at 164. 
 179 Id. at 165. 
 180 Brinkley-Rubinstein et al., Mortality After Release, supra note 156, at 1. 
 181 Id. at 1. Another recent study of Danish prisoners showed an association between time spent in 
solitary confinement and increased recidivism and unemployment after release. See Christopher 
Wildeman & Lars Højsgaard Andersen, Long-Term Consequences of Being Placed in Disciplinary 
Segregation, 58 CRIMINOLOGY 423 (2020). But this study could not show that isolation caused these 
effects, since its analysis did not rule out the possible role of unobserved factors that might differentiate 
prisoners who experienced isolation from those who had not. See id. at 449. 
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incarcerated individuals and the challenges of comparisons. One article that 
termed itself a meta-analysis concluded that research had not established that 
all individuals were harmed by isolation, and indeed that some were 
“unchanged” or improved.182 In response, researchers whose work had been 
criticized argued that the article failed to conform to the standards of a meta-
analysis because it conflated studies of different kinds and duration.183 That 
debate echoes a central theme of this Essay, which is the role that baselines 
play. Given the profound alteration of “normal” behavior in solitary 
confinement and the many constraints imposed on incarcerated people held 
in high-security and other prisons, researchers seeking to identify the effects 
in sets of individuals have to determine which subsets of free and detained 
people to assess to compare their illness and well-being and that of 
individuals in solitary confinement. 
III. THE LAW OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
PROHIBITIONS AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT BUFFERS AGAINST 
ARBITRARY PLACEMENTS 
We turn then to the “law” of solitary confinement, as we begin with 
Eighth Amendment rulings and then turn to Fourteenth Amendment law 
focused on due process protections. Before delving into the distinct lines of 
doctrine, the continuities merit comment. When assessing constitutionality, 
Justices created evaluative tools that implicitly or explicitly compare 
prisons’ strictures to the free world. The governing frameworks include 
whether officials provided the “minimal civilized measure of life’s 
necessities,”184 deliberately caused “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of 
pain,”185 or imposed an “atypical and significant hardship”186 as distinguished 
 
 182 Morgan et al., Questioning Solitary Confinement, supra note 158, at 20; see also Robert D. 
Morgan, Paul Gendreau, Paula Smith, Andrew L. Gray, Ryan M. Labrecque, Nina MacLean, Stephanie 
A. Van Horn, Angelea D. Bolanos, Ashley B. Batastini & Jeremy F. Mills, Quantitative Syntheses of the 
Effects of Administrative Segregation on Inmates’ Well-Being, 22 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 439 (2016); 
MAUREEN L. O’KEEFE, KELLI J. KLEBE, ALYSHA STUCKER, KRISTIN STURM & WILLIAM LEGGETT, ONE 
YEAR LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION, at 
viii–ix (2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/232973.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VN3-NAHC]. 
The O’Keefe group concluded that individuals held in administrative segregation did not deteriorate 
compared to a control group of similar prisoners who were not held in segregation. This study analyzed 
deterioration via looking at reports by prison clinicians and staff and prisoners of anxiety, cognitive 
impairment, depression-hopelessness, hostility–anger control, hypersensitivity, psychosis, somatization, 
and withdrawal‐alienation. O’KEEFE ET AL., supra, at ii. 
 183 See, e.g., Haney, Psychological Effects, supra note 164, at 375–401. 
 184 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). 
 185 Id. 
 186 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). 
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from what were within “normal limits,” “ordinary incidents of prison life,” 
or “expected” in prisons.187 Other formulations reference the inherent liberty 
and dignity of individuals188 and insist on the obligations of social orders to 
be decent and respect the dignity of all persons, incarcerated or not.189 
Aspects of these tests appear to rely on empirical questions about the 
on-the-ground, lived experiences of free and incarcerated people and of the 
practices of prison administrators. At times, judges referenced manuals and 
standards shaped by professionals to inform their views of what prisons 
legally had to provide. But often, judges asserted without explication or 
verification that particular practices were “normal” or “ordinary” or 
“incident” to incarceration. At some junctures, forms of deprivation struck 
judges as grotesque and hence, impermissible, while courts held that other 
practices required constitutionally constrained decision-making or were up 
to the discretion of prison staff. That mix came to be assimilated into a set of 
activities understood to constitute “prison.” 
A. On the Merits Impermissible, or Not 
1. Prohibitions Collapse: Condoning Solitary Confinement in the 
1970s and 1980s 
In 1970, the Honorable Constance Baker Motley, the first Black woman 
to sit on the U.S. federal courts,190 held unconstitutional the placement of 
Martin Sostre in solitary confinement for more than fifteen days.191 Decades 
before the wave of social science research sketched above, Judge Motley 
found that, as a matter of fact, lengthy punitive segregation was “physically 
harsh, destructive of morale, . . . needlessly degrading, and dangerous to the 
maintenance of sanity.”192 She held that, as a matter of law, the prison system 
had unconstitutionally retaliated against Sostre for winning recognition of 
his constitutional rights to practice his Muslim faith.193 
 
 187 Id. at 478, 483, 485. 
 188 See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 233 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J. 
and Marshall, J.). 
 189 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101–03 (1958). 
 190 Constance Baker Motley: Judiciary’s Unsung Rights Hero, U.S. COURTS (Feb. 20, 2020), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/02/20/constance-baker-motley-judiciarys-unsung-rights-hero 
[https://perma.cc/76QX-2WMB]; see also CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 
(1998). 
 191 Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Sostre v. Oswald, 
404 U.S. 1049 (1972), and cert. denied sub nom. Oswald v. Sostre, 405 U.S. 978 (1972). 
 192 Id. at 868. 
 193 Id. at 869. 
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The district court awarded damages and put the fifteen-day cap in place. 
(In 2015, international rules on the treatment of prisoners used the same 
benchmark and called for prohibiting any isolation beyond that time.194) 
Further, Judge Motley concluded that prison officials could return Sostre to 
solitary confinement only if they found, after a hearing, that he had 
committed serious offenses.195 Given that such placement could result in a 
risk of loss of “good time,” a lawyer was also required. Judge Motley 
awarded some $13,000 in compensatory and punitive damages to be paid by 
the prison officials, whom she found acted in bad faith.196 
The Second Circuit agreed that prison officials had unconstitutionally 
retaliated but disagreed about the constraints on solitary that Judge Motley 
had ordered.197 Describing the conditions in solitary as “harsher” than those 
of general population, the en banc ruling called them neither “unendurable 
or subhuman or cruel and inhuman in a constitutional sense.”198 Moreover, 
“[f]or a federal court . . . to place a punishment beyond the power of a state 
to impose on an inmate is a drastic interference with the state’s free political 
and administrative processes . . . [even if] to us the choice may seem 
unsound or personally repugnant.”199 
The Second Circuit was not alone in deferring to prison officials, who 
argued that solitary confinement was an important part of their in-prison 
disciplinary repertoire. Examples come not only from that era,200 but also in 
the decades that followed. Yet a few decisions concluded that particular 
conditions of segregation could be unconstitutional. Examples included 
filthy, crowded cells201 and long-term solitary confinement.202 On occasion, 
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judges found that the penalty of segregation was arbitrary and 
disproportionate to the alleged misconduct and violated either the Eighth 
Amendment or substantive due process.203  
Insight into what could have happened comes from “A Model Act to 
Provide for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners,” put forth in 1972 by a 
committee of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency. As the 
organization’s title suggests, it sought to ameliorate conditions in prisons and 
responses to crime in general and did so through a series of standard-setting 
publications.204 The subcommittee on the model act included the Director of 
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, correctional staff at prisons in Pennsylvania 
and Illinois, a state court judge, and academics. Its staff counsel, Sol Rubin, 
wrote one of the first casebooks on the law of prisons.205 
The group aimed to have legislatures adopt its model act to provide 
“minimum standards” to protect prisoners’ rights. The act stated that 
prisoners ought to have adequate food, medical care, sanitation, space, and 
protection from violence. Prohibited was “inhumane treatment,” including 
corporal punishment, and confining prisoners in solitary “for punishment.”206 
While the model act did not define solitary, it did call upon the “highest 
ranking officer on duty” to be responsible for leaving a person in solitary for 
more than an hour and that doctors had to consider placements of more than 
two days.207 Critics argued the act served the interests of correctional officials 
 
cruel and unusual punishment because they were not permitted out of their cells and were deprived of 
personal belongings and of visits. Id. at 187. The Fourth Circuit also ruled that long-term isolation could 
be unconstitutional. See Sweet v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1975). The court held that a 
“restriction of two exercise periods of one hour” per week could constitute cruel and unusual punishment 
when plaintiff’s segregated confinement had “extended already over a period of years” and was “likely 
to extend indefinitely.” Id. at 866. 
 203 In 1973, for example, a judge concluded that while segregation for sixteen months or more in the 
“control unit” in the federal facility at Marion was not per se an Eighth Amendment violation, evidence 
was sufficient that the confinement of thirty-six prisoners in that setting was disproportionate, or left open 
the possibility of such claims. See Adams v. Carlson, 368 F. Supp. 1050 (E.D. Ill. 1973); see also 
Hardwick v. Ault, 447 F. Supp. 116, 125–27 (M.D. Ga. 1978); Wilwording v. Swenson, 502 F.2d 844, 
851 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 912 (1975); Chapman v. Kleindienst, 507 F.2d 1246, 1252 
(7th Cir. 1974); Black v. Warden, U.S. Penitentiary, 467 F.2d 202, 203–04 (10th Cir. 1972). 
 204 NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR MINIMUM STANDARDS 
FOR THE PROTECTION OF RIGHTS OF PRISONERS (1972) [hereinafter NCCD MODEL PRISONERS’ RIGHTS 
ACT]; see also Sol Rubin, Introduction: A Model Act for the Protection of Rights of Prisoners, 
1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 553; James A. Jablonski, Controlling Discretionary Power in Prison Organizations: 
A Review of the Model Act, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 563. 
 205 See Rubin, supra note 204, at 553 n.3; SOL RUBIN, HENRY WEIHOFEN, GEORGE EDWARDS & 
SIMON ROSENZWEIG, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 617–18 (1963). As the book’s front-page 
states, this project was endorsed by of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency. 
 206 NCCD MODEL PRISONERS’ RIGHTS ACT, supra note 204, at § 1. 
 207 Id. 
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more than prisoners and gave as examples the failure to address isolation for 
reasons often couched as “administrative.”208 Yet the model act could have 
been one route to building limits on solitary confinement, as was the lower 
court case law sketched above, which could have expanded as the prisoners’ 
rights movement developed.209 Instead, as we detail below, the Supreme 
Court led a retrenchment as it circumscribed its rulings on both the Eighth 
Amendment and on the application of the Due Process Clause’s procedural 
protections. 
In some of these opinions, judges justified profound isolation as an 
appropriate response. Illustrative is a 1988 decision by federal appellate 
judge Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit; he deployed the kind 
of utilitarian calculus for which, as a founder of law and economics, he is 
famous. In permitting the profound isolation in the federal Supermax in 
Marion, Illinois to continue,210 Judge Posner posited that prisoners who had 
“no expectation of ever being released from prison and are in no danger of 
being executed” could not “be deterred by threat of punishment from trying 
to kill and maim the inmates and guards who displease them.”211 
This conclusion came from one of a series of cases upholding the 
“permanent lockdown” (in which all persons were held in isolation) that the 
federal government put in place in 1983 in its Marion facility after the murder 
of eleven individuals in the prison. As Judge Posner put it five years later, 
“‘only’ 3 murders” had been committed since the permanent lockdown; 
armed assaults by prisoners also declined from 115 to 34.212 Judge Posner 
argued that the real beneficiaries of the total lockdown were prisoners, who 
had been the “principal victims.”213 On his account, Marion reflected—albeit 
“in a weird way”—the “aspirations to a humane criminal justice system” that 
forbade “murderous inmates” from being executed or “beat senseless by 
outraged guards.”214 If the highly restrictive conditions in Marion “‘opened 
up’ . . . the lives and safety of the inmates and guards would be in grave 
jeopardy.”215 
 
 208 See, e.g., Fred Cohen, In Search of a Model Act for Prisoners’ Rights, 1973 WASH. U. L.Q. 621, 
632. 
 209 See James B. Jacobs, The Prisoners’ Rights Movement and Its Impacts, 1960-80, 2 CRIME & JUST. 
429 (1980). 
 210 Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 211 Id. at 166. 
 212 Id. at 165. 
 213 See id. 
 214 Id. at 166. 
 215 Id. 
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2. Ruling Out “Ruin”: Questioning Solitary Confinement in the 
1990s and Thereafter 
Judge Motley and Judge Posner had conflicting metrics for the 
constitutionality of profound isolation. Judge Motley found it impermissibly 
debilitating while Judge Posner thought it a viable route to a kind of safety 
in prisons. The research that we have outlined substantiates Judge Motley’s 
views of the harms. Moreover, Judge Posner’s claims of solitary-as-safety 
are undermined by assessments comparing rates of violence in general and 
solitary populations and its toll on both prisoners and staff.216 In the decades 
since Judge Posner wrote, new challenges to solitary confinement argued 
that its harms were akin to deprivations of medical care, adequate food, and 
heat, and therefore was an impermissible punishment. 
The kinds of deprivations the Court has held prohibited are sometimes 
summarized as “life’s necessities.” But that category does not explain why 
states have to provide them when imposing punishment. One way to 
illuminate the underlying proposition is that this body of law implicitly 
recognizes that governments cannot, as part of their sanctioning powers, set 
out to “ruin” people. The term “ruin” was invoked in a 2019 decision, Timbs 
v. Indiana, which held that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on 
excessive fines applied to the states.217 Both the majority and concurring 
opinions explained that the Constitution’s ban on excessive fines was 
predicated on the view that governments ought not to use punishment to ruin 
a person economically.218 In his concurrence, Justice Clarence Thomas 
discussed the history of the Excessive Fines Clause, imported at the 
Founding from England, which he explained aimed to ensure that the state 
“should not deprive a wrongdoer of his livelihood”;219 governments’ 
sanctioning power ought not to result in “the ruin of the criminal.”220 
An open question is whether this holding will affect the widespread 
imposition of monetary sanctions in the criminal and administrative 
 
 216 See generally Cyrus Ahalt, Colette S. Peters, Heidi Steward & Brie A. Williams, Transforming 
Prison Culture to Improve Correctional Staff Wellness and Outcomes for Adults in Custody “The Oregon 
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 217 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019). 
 218 Id. at 687–88; id. at 697–98 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment). 
 219 Id. at 693 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 
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contexts.221 Another is how to square historic protections with what today are 
seen as the “barbaric” punishments that England imposed, such as execution 
for many kinds of crimes, as well as branding and banishment to colonies.222 
Some commentators of that era proffered utilitarian rationales for the 
incongruity that governments could end a person’s life yet not “ruin” a 
person economically. One justification proffered was that doing otherwise 
would create perverse incentives, as a minor offense might leave a person in 
a “worse Condition” than committing a capital crime.223 Another was that 
ruining people imposed harms on communities. As Benjamin Franklin 
explained, taking the property that was “necessary to a Man” was not what 
the “Welfare of the Publick” demanded.224 
Leaving a person in a “worse Condition” by forms of deprivations in 
prison is likewise dysfunctional, as most incarcerated people leave prison. 
But more than utility was at work when the common law duty of safekeeping 
of prisoners became a constitutional obligation to provide “life’s 
necessities.” The political theory recognizing the equality and dignity of all 
persons in a democratic order helped to propel the courts to accord prisoners’ 
status as rights-holders. Courts have come to insist that democratic 
governments must be purposeful in their punishments. The list of 
punishment’s licit aims—rehabilitation, deterrence, incapacitation, 
retribution, economic conservation of resources, and community safety—are 
not served by purposefully debilitating individuals, no more than they are 
served by withholding necessary medical care. Moreover, the prisoners’ 
rights law of the second half of the twentieth century has added to these 
purposes that had been formulated long before the second half of the 
twentieth century: punishments have to respect the equality of persons and 
preserve certain aspects of their liberty and dignity.225  
 
 221 See Brandon Buskey, A Proposal to Stop Tinkering with the Machinery of Debt, 129 YALE L.J.F. 
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These ideas are reflected in the 1995 decision that held unconstitutional 
the placement of seriously mentally ill people (but not others) in solitary 
confinement.226 Judge Thelton Henderson explained that “mental health is a 
need as essential to a meaningful human existence as other basic physical 
demands our bodies may make for shelter, warmth or sanitation.”227 
Concluding that the Eighth Amendment did not protect prisoners from “some 
psychological effects from incarceration or segregation,”228 Judge Henderson 
ruled that “if the particular conditions of segregation . . . inflict[ed] a serious 
mental illness, greatly exacerbate[d] mental illness, or deprive[d] inmates of 
their sanity, then defendants have deprived inmates of a basic necessity of 
human existence—indeed, they have crossed into the realm of psychological 
torture.”229 
The research of the last decades raises questions about the viability of 
that line-drawing and, indeed, of sharp distinctions between harms to one’s 
brain as contrasted to one’s body. In 2005, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
authored the Wilkinson v. Austin decision that condoned solitary 
confinement, even as it required a modicum of process for certain forms of 
isolation.230 A decade later, in 2015, he argued that placing people into 
isolation would cause many to become seriously mentally ill. Joining in the 
rejection of a habeas petition in Davis v. Ayala,231 Justice Kennedy explained 
that the petitioner, Hector Ayala, who had been sentenced to death in 1989, 
had likely been held for decades “in a windowless cell no larger than a typical 
parking spot for 23 hours a day . . . [and] allowed little or no opportunity for 
conversation or interaction with anyone.”232 To underscore his views of the 
injuries imposed, Justice Kennedy posited that sentencing judges warn 
defendants that “during the many years you will serve in prison before your 
execution, the penal system has a solitary confinement regime that will bring 
you to the edge of madness, perhaps to madness itself.”233 Justice Kennedy 
then added that the “judiciary may be required . . . to determine whether 
workable alternative systems for long-term confinement exist, and, if so, 
whether a correctional system should be required to adopt them.”234 
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Soon thereafter, other Justices discussed the ruinous injuries of isolation 
as they questioned its constitutionality. Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, echoed Justice Kennedy’s concerns in a dissent 
that argued the unconstitutionality of the death penalty. Justice Breyer noted 
the “numerous deleterious harms”235 that could “cause prisoners to 
experience ‘anxiety, panic, rage, loss of control, paranoia, hallucinations, 
and self-mutilations.’”236 In 2019, Justice Sonia Sotomayor likewise invoked 
the image of a “penal tomb” when pointing to the constitutional infirmities 
of solitary confinement.237 
Yet some members of the Court have distanced themselves from this 
approach and from evaluating Eighth Amendment questions through the lens 
of “evolving standards of decency.”238 In 2015, responding to Justice 
Kennedy’s critique of solitary confinement, Justice Thomas argued that the 
focus should be on the individuals murdered; he wrote that “the 
accommodations in which Ayala is housed are a far sight more spacious than 
those in which his victims . . . now rest.”239 Moreover, Justice Thomas has 
disavowed the application of the Eighth Amendment to prisons, and he is 
one of several Justices who have raised objections to class-wide relief in 
prison-conditions litigation.240 
Furthermore, in 2019, when interpreting the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause in Bucklew v. Precythe, a five-person majority 
permitted use of a method of execution that would be brutally painful. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Neil Gorsuch embraced a historical 
approach that looked to the Founding Era and the punishments then in 
common usage as examples of what were not “cruel and unusual 
 
 235 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2765 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.) 
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punishments.”241 He provided details of aggressively brutal practices which 
the Court appeared to put outside the reach of the Eighth Amendment. Only 
the dissent by Justice Breyer on behalf of four argued that the Eighth 
Amendment was not a “static prohibition” but banned “gruesome 
punishments,” whether used at the Founding or not, that entail “excessive 
suffering.”242 
3. Outlawing (Again) Some Forms of Solitary Confinement 
In the last decade, prisoners again challenged solitary confinement, and 
several lawsuits ended with settlements that required reductions of isolation. 
In addition, a few lower courts concluded that certain forms of solitary 
confinement did violate the Eighth Amendment. In this wave of lawsuits, in 
which some solitary conditions are no longer laden with filth, the focus has 
been on the harms of isolation itself. The challenges have produced a mix of 
opinions and settlements that intersected with administrative revisions of 
policies (some of which are detailed in the ASCA/Liman reports), legislative 
initiatives, and political action that aims to “stop solitary.”243 
As a result, in some jurisdictions, the formal criteria and procedures by 
which people are put into solitary confinement have changed, the duration 
of time spent in-cell reduced, and some out-of-cell activities required.244 
Even as conflicts exist about whether genuine change is taking place or 
whether solitary is being reconstituted under other names,245 the debates have 
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shifted away from the fierce defenses of earlier decades when correctional 
professionals were insistent on the desirability of using solitary confinement 
to acknowledgments by prison authorities of the need to limit its use. 
In this body of law, references are sometimes made to “evolving 
standards of decency,” which provided the framework for much of the 1970s 
case law.246 More often, judges determine that solitary confinement’s impact 
constitutes what the 1976 Supreme Court held in Estelle v. Gamble to be 
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs,”247 and/or what the Court 
in Rhodes v. Chapman termed deprivation of “the minimal civilized measure 
of life’s necessities,” or imposition of “the wanton and unnecessary infliction 
of pain” and, for some in-prison punishments, “grossly disproportionate” 
sanctions in light of “the severity of the crime.”248 Judges have not yet 
invoked the anti-ruination explanation we flagged above, even while aspects 
of their law stand for that proposition. Indeed, Eighth Amendment rulings 
that call for an inquiry into both the objective and subjective intent of prison 
officials seek to determine what administrators could reasonably have known 
about the harms inflicted.249 
A few details of some settlements show the kinds of constraints agreed 
upon. A first example comes from Pelican Bay, where in 1995 Judge 
Henderson had prohibited solitary confinement for seriously mentally ill 
people but not for others.250 Prisoners again were in the forefront as their 
hunger strike brought national attention to the extensive use of profound 
isolation.251 In 2015, in Ashker v. Governor of California, the federal court 
approved a class-wide settlement that required the reduction by hundreds of 
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the number of people held in isolation and changes in the conditions for those 
who remained.252 Behavior, rather than being assumed to belong to “security 
threat groups” (gangs), was to be the predicate for placement. As a result, 
about 2,000 individuals were to be moved to general population, as were 
individuals who had spent more than ten years in solitary confinement.253 
Furthermore, placements were not to be indefinite, and the State was to 
provide step-down programs and social contact.254 
System-wide settlements in New York, Arizona, and Pennsylvania have 
sought to limit the legitimate predicates for placement in solitary 
confinement.255 The New York case began in 2011, when unrepresented 
prisoners protested the imposition of long-term solitary confinement.256 In 
the 2016 settlement of what had by then become the class action of Peoples 
v. Annucci, New York agreed to change the offenses that resulted in solitary 
confinement, to cap the time spent, to create alternative programs for 
prisoners with special needs, and to end the “Loaf”—a baked tasteless food 
that had been used as a punishment.257 
Implementation of these settlements has been uneven, as reflected in 
the Ashker class’s 2019 return to court; their lawyers alleged that many 
individuals were held in the functional equivalent of the SHU under another 
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name and that monitoring with court oversight remained necessary.258 As in 
California, concerns emerged in New York following the Annucci v. Peoples 
settlement; some commentators believe that many people remained in 
solitary confinement under another name (“keeplock”) in which people were 
held continuously in their own cells rather than moved to a segregated unit. 
In 2019, the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) reported that 
“40,000 solitary confinement sanctions were given in 2018,” and 6,000 
sanctions “were served directly after a previous” penalty (“back-to-
backs”).259 NYCLU argued that, while the settlement had reduced the number 
of SHU sanctions by 2,400, the state had increased its keeplock sanctions by 
3,100.260 What was needed, NYCLU argued, was enactment of the “HALT 
Act” to limit solitary confinement to fifteen days, to require time out of cell, 
and to prohibit putting into isolation individuals under age twenty-one or 
over fifty-five or persons with a “diagnosed mental health challenge.”261 
Ashker and Peoples exemplify resolutions on behalf of all persons in a 
system’s solitary confinement. Several other cases address subpopulations, 
such as individuals with distinct health challenges, juveniles, or individuals 
subject to capital sentences. Two lawsuits involving prisoners in 
Pennsylvania are illustrative. A 2015 settlement responded to Disability 
Rights Network of Pennsylvania v. Wetzel, which alleged that the State’s 
Department of Corrections kept people with serious mental illness and other 
disabilities in solitary confinement, that they cycled in and out, and that such 
treatment led to their deterioration.262 The agreement barred the Department 
of Corrections from using solitary confinement for individuals with 
disabilities (except in narrowly defined circumstances); ruled out placements 
based on acts of self-harm; created protections against repeat assignments; 
and, for individuals held in “secure residential treatment units,” required that 
the prisoners had twenty hours out-of-cell time per week—of which half was 
structured—and that such individuals not remain in these units longer than 
thirty days.263 Another consent agreement, Reid v. Wetzel, responded to 
claims on behalf of individuals with capital sentences whom Pennsylvania 
 
 258 Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Answering Brief on Appeal, Ashker v. Brown, supra note 245; Order 
Granting Motion to Extend Settlement Agreement, Ashker v. Baker, No. 09-cv-05796-CW (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 25, 2019). 
 259 SHAMES & DESGRANGES, supra note 16, at 1. 
 260 Id. at 9. 
 261 Id. at 10, 22. 
 262 See Complaint at 18, Disability Rights Network of Pa. v. Wetzel, No. 1:13-cv-00635-JEJ (M.D. 
Pa. Mar. 11, 2013). 
 263 For additional terms of the settlement, see Settlement Agreement & General Release, Disability 
Rights Network of Pa. v. Wetzel, No. 1:13-cv-00635-JEJ (M.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2015). 
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had held in solitary confinement. In November 2019, Pennsylvania agreed 
to provide at least 42.5 hours of out-of-cell time per week264 and accord these 
prisoners the same “rights and privileges” for phone calls and contact visits 
that were available in general population.265 The settlement agreement was 
finalized in April 2020.266 
In addition to consent decrees, a few published opinions since 2016 
have held specific forms of solitary confinement unconstitutional or found 
that the solitary confinement of certain individuals violated the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
ACT (RLUIPA), or the Free Exercise Clause.267 A leading example of an 
Eighth Amendment ruling comes from a 2019 Fourth Circuit decision, 
Porter v. Clarke, which addressed conditions on Virginia’s death row.268 
Individuals had spent years “alone, in a small . . . cell” with “no access to 
congregate religious, educational, or social programming.”269 Relying on 
evidence that such long-term solitary confinement posed “an objective risk 
of serious psychological and emotional harm to inmates,”270 the district court 
 
 264 Settlement Agreement at 13, Reid v. Wetzel, No. 18-cv-00176-JEJ (M.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2019) 
[hereinafter Settlement Agreement, Reid v. Wetzel]. For the complaint, filed in January 2018 by the 
ACLU, Abolitionist Law Center, and pro bono counsel, see Class Action Complaint for Declaratory & 
Injunctive Relief, Reid v. Wetzel, No. 1:18-cv-00176-JEJ (M.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2018). 
 265 See Settlement Agreement, Reid v. Wetzel, supra note 264, at 10. 
 266 Memorandum & Order, Reid v. Wetzel, No. 1:18-cv-00176-JEJ (M.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2020). 
 267 See, e.g., Greenhill v. Clarke, 944 F.3d. 243, 251–52 (4th Cir. 2019). Alfonza Greenhill, initially 
appearing without an attorney, argued that because Virginia had placed him in solitary confinement and 
would not let him join in watching the televised Friday Muslim prayer services, the State was preventing 
him from observing his religion. Further, he argued that the state “grooming” rules prevented him from 
having the beard his religion counseled. The appellate court reversed the lower court’s dismissal and 
remanded to consider whether Virginia could establish that its bar on television access for the services 
was “in furtherance of a compelling government interest” and “the least restrictive means of furthering 
that compelling government interest,” as well as met First Amendment obligations. Id. (quoting criteria 
from the statute and the case law). 
 268 923 F.3d 348, 353–57 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (May 6, 2019), reh’g en banc denied (Jul. 26, 
2019); see also Mary Marshall, The Promise of Porter? Porter v. Clarke and Its Potential Impact on 
Solitary Confinement Litigation, 120 COLUM. L. REV. F. 67 (2020). 
 269 Porter, 923 F.3d at 357. That the prison did not call it solitary was not conclusive given these 
conditions. Id. at 359–60. 
 270 Id. at 356–57 (citing to expert reports submitted by plaintiffs, written by Dr. Mark Cunningham 
and Dr. Michael Hendricks, as well as a leading survey of the literature on solitary confinement that 
concluded “there is not a single published study of solitary or supermax-like confinement [for more than 
10 days] . . . that failed to result in negative psychological effects”). The Fourth Circuit also cited the 
Third Circuit, which, after analyzing the “robust body of scientific research on the effects of solitary 
confinement,” held that there is a “scientific consensus” that solitary confinement “is psychologically 
painful, can be traumatic and harmful, and puts many of those who have been subjected to it at risk of 
long-term . . . damage.” Id. at 357 (citing Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 848 F.3d 549, 566–67 (3d 
Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Walker v. Farnan, 138 S. Ct. 357 (2017), and cert. denied sub nom. 
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held, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, that the conditions violated the Eighth 
Amendment.271 As the Fourth Circuit put it, putting individuals into this form 
of solitary confinement “posed a substantial risk of serious psychological 
and emotional harm” and “State Defendants were deliberately indifferent to 
that risk.”272 
The remedy was to ease the restrictiveness.273 The district court ordered 
the end of confinement for twenty-three hours alone in a cell and the ban on 
contact visitation and communal recreation.274 Instead, Virginia prison 
authorities were to create policies “relating to cell time, visitation, and 
recreation that defendants, in their professional expertise, believe satisfy 
both the Eighth Amendment and the prison’s need for security.”275 By the 
time of the appeal, prison officials argued that the case was moot because 
they had complied with the injunctive requirements.276 Rejecting that 
proposition based on “a cognizable danger of recurrent violation,” the Fourth 
Circuit upheld the injunction.277 
 A few other lower court decisions have likewise found conditions 
unconstitutional. A 2016 district court ruling, Johnson v. Wetzel, responded 
to Arthur Johnson, whom the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections had 
isolated for thirty-six years278 in a continuously lit sixty-eight-square-foot 
cell, where he was held twenty-three to twenty-four hours a day.279 The 
district court determined that Johnson’s confinement constituted an 
“objectively ‘serious’ deprivation of life’s basic needs or a ‘substantial risk 
of serious harm’ to his or her health” and that prison officials knew “well the 
risks inherent in prolonged isolation,” and then ordered Johnson’s release 
 
Williams v. Wetzel, 138 S. Ct. 357 (2017); see also, e.g., Grissom v. Roberts, 902 F.3d 1162, 1176–77 
(10th Cir. 2018) (Lucero, J., concurring in the judgment) (reviewing academic literature and determining 
that “solitary confinement, even over relatively short periods, renders prisoners physically sick and 
mentally ill” and that “[t]hese harms, which are persistent and may become permanent, become more 
severe the longer a person is exposed to solitary confinement”). 
 271 Porter, 923 F.3d at 364. 
 272 Id. at 368. 
 273 See Porter v. Clarke, 290 F. Supp. 3d 518, 537–38 (E.D. Va. 2018), aff’d, 923 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 
2019), as amended (May 6, 2019). The court imposed an injunction that, in accordance with the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, was to be reevaluated after two years. Id. 
 274 Id. at 537. 
 275 Id. 
 276 Porter, 923 F.3d at 364–65. 
 277 Id. at 365. 
 278 209 F. Supp. 3d 766, 774–75 (M.D. Pa. 2016). 
 279 Id. The one hour of permitted exercise took place in a nine-by-twenty-foot cage that had no 
equipment. Id. at 777. 
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from solitary confinement.280 The judge commented that, after thirty-six 
years, “Mr. Johnson deserves the opportunity to shake hands with someone 
other than his attorneys.”281 
In 2019, rulings in Virginia and Connecticut likewise identified Eighth 
Amendment violations. At issue in Reyes v. Clarke was Virginia’s treatment 
of prisoners in its Red Onion Prison where Nicolas Reyes was held.282 The 
district court rejected efforts to dismiss the case because, both objectively 
and subjectively, prison authorities knew of the harms from long-term 
confinement in a cell “roughly half the size of a parking space,” with no 
natural light, constant artificial light, and the “nearly absolute” lack of social 
contact.283 
In Reynolds v. Arnone,284 lawyers for Richard Reynolds, held in 
Connecticut’s prisons, told the court that since 1995 he “has spent nearly 
every moment of his life alone” in a cell with “almost no natural light.”285 By 
2018, Connecticut was providing no more than six hours a week of fresh air, 
subject to limits for institutional needs or weather.286 No meaningful 
interpersonal contact was permitted, and such isolation was to continue “for 
the rest of his life.”287 
The district judge concluded that Reynolds had established “both an 
objective element—that the prison officials’ transgression was ‘sufficiently 
serious’—and a subjective element—that the official acted, or omitted to act, 
with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’ i.e., with ‘deliberate indifference 
to inmate health or safety.’”288 The district court granted summary judgment; 
the court concluded that that Reynolds had established that his confinement 
violated the Eighth Amendment as well as Fourteenth Amendment due 
 
 280 See id. at 776–82. 
 281 Id. at 782. Thereafter, the State settled with Johnson for $325,000 (including attorney’s fees) and 
an agreement that he would not be returned to solitary confinement on the basis of his prior record. 
Settlement in Lawsuit That Ended 37-Year Solitary Confinement, ABOLITIONIST L. CTR. (Dec. 21, 2017), 
https://abolitionistlawcenter.org/tag/johnson-v-wetzel/ [https://perma.cc/RJ4Q-U3NB]. 
 282 No. 3:18-cv-611, 2019 WL 4044316, at *6–7 (E.D. Va. Aug. 27, 2019). 
 283 Id. at *6–7, *15–18. 
 284 Ruling on Defendants’ Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, Reynolds v. Arnone, No. 3:13-cv-1465-
SRU (D. Conn. Oct. 16, 2019). 
 285 Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 1, Reynolds v. Arnone, No. 19-2858 (2d Cir. Feb. 20, 2020). 
 286 Id. at 2. 
 287 Id. at 3 
 288 Reynolds v. Arnone, 402 F. Supp 3d. 3, 15–16 (D. Conn. 2019) (citing Phelps v. Kapnolas, 
308 F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). The judge 
linked the objective prong (deprivations of “basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical 
care, and reasonable safety” as well as “extreme social isolation”) to violations of “contemporary 
standards of decency.” Id. at 16 (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993)). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
108 
process protections. In addition, the court determined that the 2012 statute 
requiring his confinement in such profoundly limiting circumstances 
constituted an illegal bill of attainder.289 
B. Line-Drawing: The Quest to Distinguish Among In-Prison Punishments 
Even as a few lower courts have mandated, as we outlined above, an 
end to certain forms of isolation, other judges are refusing to require 
procedural protections for people placed in solitary confinement. In contrast 
to that small body of Eighth Amendment law, a large number of cases 
address whether procedural protections are required under the Fourteenth 
Amendment when a person is placed in solitary confinement. And, unlike 
the appreciation in the Eighth Amendment decisions of the harms that flow 
from the radical limits on human movement, many Fourteenth Amendment 
opinions take for granted long-term profound isolation as so normal an 
incident of prison life that no judicial oversight is needed. 
These decisions turn on questions posed at the outset of this Essay about 
whether prison officials have unfettered authority to impose different 
degrees of constraint on individual movement. Critical scholarship 
sometimes argues that lawyers focus unduly on process, which distracts from 
concerns about justice.290 Yet the filings by incarcerated people reflect fear 
of both unfair decisions and unjust treatment. Repeatedly, prisoners have 
reached out to find buffers—including but not limited to procedural 
protections—to constrain the unilateral power of prison officials. Many of 
these efforts have now been rejected, as the Court’s majority developed the 
mantra that, given incarceration, a host of radical incursions on human 
functioning were “normally expected.”291 
1. Liberty’s Sources and Life in Incarceration 
We turn now to disagreements among the Court’s Justices about 
liberty’s sources, the kinds of constraints reasonably imposed by virtue of 
confinement, the function of process, and the role of courts in protecting 
people from punishment through transfers and segregation. As we detail 
below, Justices John Paul Stevens, William Brennan, and Marshall viewed 
 
 289 Id. at 25. The district court concluded that Reynolds had a protected liberty interest in freedom 
from extreme social isolation and was deprived of his due process rights. Id. at 30. Further, the court held 
that Reynolds’s conditions of confinement violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 
33–34. The injunction to reduce the degree of isolation imposed has been stayed pending appeal. 
 290 Now-classic statements of such concerns come from William H. Simon, The Rule of Law and the 
Two Realms of Welfare Administration, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 777 (1990), and Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. 
Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 861 (1990). 
 291 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995). 
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human liberty as an “unalienable right[]” which lawful incarceration did not 
extinguish.292 For others—Justice Byron White at times and Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist always—imprisonment ended most forms of liberty. 
Liberty interests were extinguished but aspects of liberty could derive from 
federal or state law if creating entitlements that provided opportunities such 
as statutory good-time and structured rules on when disciplinary sanctions 
would be imposed.293 
Because Chief Justice Rehnquist, appointed in 1971, has been central 
to shaping the case law that today frames solitary confinement, his 
background assumptions merit analysis.294 Generally hostile to constitutional 
evolution, which he decried in a 1976 essay entitled The Notion of a Living 
Constitution,295 Chief Justice Rehnquist railed against an expanding role for 
the federal judiciary, the “litigation explosion,” and, specifically, filings by 
prisoners.296 Further, he repeatedly evidenced lack of concern for the 
vulnerability of prisoners. Illustrative is his choice to pluck from obscurity a 
1973 Third Circuit ruling, Russell v. Bodner, which he accused of lowering 
the “stature” of the United States Constitution and of the federal courts.297 
The appellate court had reversed the dismissal of what Chief Justice 
Rehnquist characterized as “a claim by a prison inmate against a prison guard 
for allegedly stealing a carton of the inmate’s cigarettes.”298 
But reading the Third Circuit’s per curiam decision tells a different 
story.299 Proceeding without a lawyer, Herman Russell alleged that Joseph 
Bodner, a guard at a state prison in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, had entered his 
cell and taken some of his food; after Russell protested, Bodner told Russell 
that he would “prove” he could do whatever he wanted.300 Russell alleged 
that Bodner then came into his cell and stole several packages of cigarettes. 
 
 292 Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 293 See, e.g., id. at 225–26 (majority opinion) (Justice White distinguishing transfers from loss of 
good-time credit); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470–71 (1983) (Chief Justice Rehnquist finding that 
state statues that set forth the procedures for confining a prisoner to administrative segregation did create 
a liberty interest). 
 294 See generally Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and 
Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223 (2003); Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837 (1984). 
 295 See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 706 (1976). 
 296 See William H. Rehnquist, Whither the Courts, 60 A.B.A. J. 787, 787–89 (1974). 
 297 William H. Rehnquist, A Plea for Help: Solutions to Serious Problems Currently Experienced by 
the Federal Judicial System, 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 9–10 & n.28 (1984). 
 298 Id. at 9–10 (citing Russell v. Bodner, 489 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1973)). 
 299 Judge Arlin Adams concurred but argued that the injury was de minimis and doubted whether 
federal courts ought to be concerned with such issues. Russell, 489 F.2d at 281–82 (Adams, J., 
concurring). 
 300 Id. at 281 (majority opinion). 
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After requests to the warden were unavailing, Russell filed suit, and the Third 
Circuit reversed the dismissal of the complaint because the “misuse of 
power” under color of state law was actionable. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
belittling of Russell’s fears was matched in other writings, such as when he 
chose the phrase “austere” to describe the profound isolation of solitary 
confinement.301 
Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s indifference to prison terrors is 
likewise vivid in arenas outside the prisoners’ rights canon. Illustrative is his 
majority decision in United States v. Bailey302 addressing the interpretation 
of the federal statute that prohibited “escapes or attempts to escape from the 
custody of the Attorney General.”303 The defendants—Clifford Bailey, 
Ronald Cooley, and Ralph Walker—asserted that they did not have specific 
intent to escape from the D.C. Jail but rather acted under duress because 
guards frequently set fires, beat them, and withheld needed medical care; 
they wanted to argue to the jury that they had left the jail to save 
themselves.304 Writing for the D.C. Circuit, Judge J. Skelly Wright called for 
a new trial because the lower court had not given proper jury instructions and 
excluded relevant evidence.305 
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion that resurrected the 
conviction. As he explained, the D.C. Circuit had interpreted the 
“confinement” of the federal statute to encompass “only the ‘normal aspects’ 
of punishment prescribed by our legal system”; when prisoners aim “to avoid 
‘non-confinement’ conditions such as beatings or homosexual attacks,” they 
would not have the requisite intent for a conviction.306 But the prisoners not 
only left, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated—they stayed away. To be entitled 
to the instruction on duress, they would have to have provided “evidence 
justifying . . . continued absence,” which they had not.307 Absent a showing 
 
 301 Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466–67 (1983). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: “Respondent 
argues, rather weakly, that the Due Process Clause implicitly creates an interest in being confined to a 
general population cell, rather than the more austere and restrictive administrative segregation quarters.” 
Id. 
 302 444 U.S. 394 (1980). 
 303 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (1976). This phrase is still in use in the most recent version of § 751(a). 
 304 United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev’d, 444 U.S. 394 (1980). Bailey 
and Cooley asserted that they were beaten; Walker said his codefendants forced him to leave because he 
had epileptic seizures and could not get care. Id. 
 305 Id. 
 306 Bailey, 444 U.S. at 401. 
 307 Id. at 412. 
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“of a bona fide effort to surrender or return to custody as soon as the claimed 
duress or necessity had lost its coercive force,” no instruction was required.308 
These propositions prompted Justice Harry Blackmun, joined by Justice 
Brennan, to counter that the majority’s “technical legalism” and “pious 
pronouncements” were about an “ideal world” where prisons were “truly 
places for humane and rehabilitative treatment.”309 But in this one, where 
every appellate court learned “almost daily from prisoners about conditions 
of incarceration, about filth, about homosexual rape, and about brutality,” 
this “stark truth”310 ought not to require people to “return forthwith to the hell 
that obviously exceeds the normal deprivations of prison life and that 
compelled their leaving in the first instance.”311 
Justice Blackmun further detailed that the record included “the 
brutalization of inmates,” beatings with “slapjacks, blackjacks, and 
flashlights,” and rapes; in his view, punishment could not flow when “society 
has abdicated completely its basic responsibility for providing an 
environment free of life-threatening conditions.”312 As his dissent in Bailey 
made plain, Justice Blackmun, who as an appellate judge had written the 
1968 Eighth Circuit decision that banned whippings in Arkansas prisons, 
understood the chaotic violence that was routine in some prison systems.313 
Yet the records in many cases presented the appearance that, given 
regulations and written procedures, prisons were full of law—which some 
judges equated with being lawful. Prison officials often recounted their 
detailed regulations and their statistics about the thousands of hearings they 
conducted related to discipline. One can almost hear some Justices saying: 
“What more do ‘they’ want?” Yet the records are also evidence of the 
lawlessness of prisons in that exercises of power by staff repeatedly resulted 
in stunningly substantial punishments for minor violations of any of the 
many rules each prison had. Thus, one can hear other Justices explaining: 
“What ‘they’ want is a real opportunity to stop unbounded authority and 
unfair treatment.” 
 
 308 Id. at 415. 
 309 Id. at 419, 420 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J.). Justice Marshall did not 
participate, id. at 417 (Marshall, J., taking no part in the consideration or decision), and Justice Stevens 
concurred only on the grounds that the evidence presented by the defendants did not suffice for the 
defense, but that all must be concerned about the prison conditions, id. at 417–19 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 310 Id. at 420 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 311 Id. 
 312 Id. at 421–22. 
 313 Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968). Justice Blackmun, however, shifted in the 
decade after and joined majorities deferring to prison administrators’ discretion on transfers as well as 
administrative and disciplinary confinement. See infra notes 407–410, 449–450 and accompanying text. 
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a. In or out of prison 
The Supreme Court’s approach to procedural protections for solitary 
confinement is predicated on a series of due process opinions beginning in 
1974 with Wolff v. McDonnell, the first case exploring the process due for 
in-prison punishments. At issue then was the penalty system when a prisoner 
engaged in “flagrant or serious” misconduct; the Court required Nebraska 
prison officials to hold hearings before taking away prisoners’ good-time 
credits.314 The class action had begun with challenges to various rules at the 
Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex; the prisoners alleged officials 
censored mail, limited access to legal services, retaliated against “writ 
writers,” and imposed discipline unfairly.315 
The district court generally agreed, as it identified prisoners losing good 
time for “messing up the count up, cussing a guard, bringing a sandwich into 
the shop,” as well as for fighting and organizing protests.316 Concluding that 
“fundamental due process is a right of all persons, including inmates,” the 
lower court noted the limited approach the Eighth Circuit had taken to the 
process due; the court therefore limited their order to compliance with 
Nebraska’s rules and called for the restoration of good time for some of the 
prisoners who lost it for activities outside the grounds proscribed by 
Nebraska’s statute.317 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit expanded the mandate for procedural 
protections by requiring the procedures, then called the “Morrissey-Scarpelli 
procedures,” based on the two cases in which the Supreme Court had 
prescribed that protections be afforded when the government wanted to 
revoke probation or parole.318 The appellate court, relying on the district court 
opinion, reasoned that, just as sending people to prison based on violations 
of the rules for conditional releases, in-prison punishments could entail 
“substantial” and “serious” penalties “such as incarceration in a dry cell or 
solitary confinement” and the loss of good time.319 Given the impact on both 
 
 314 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 547, 557–58 (1974). 
 315 See McDonnell v. Wolff, 342 F. Supp. 616, 617, 619–20, 622, 626–28 (D. Neb. 1972), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 483 F.2d 1059 (8th Cir. 1973), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). The 
appellate court affirmed the lower court holding unconstitutional the prison searches of outgoing legal 
mail and some of the restrictions on law library access. McDonnell, 483 F.2d at 1066–67. In the Supreme 
Court, the focus was on the rules for discipline. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 542. 
 316 McDonnell, 342 F. Supp. at 628 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 317 Id. at 627–28. The appellate court affirmed the expungement of records, and the Supreme Court 
rejected the “retroactivity” of the procedural rights. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 573. 
 318 McDonnell, 483 F.2d at 1062–63; Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560; see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 
778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
 319 See McDonnell, 483 F.2d at 1063–64; McDonnell, 342 F. Supp. at 627–28. 
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the nature and duration of confinement, the State had to provide in-person 
hearings with cross-examination and confrontation.320 Specifics, including 
whether to add lawyers, were reserved for the trial court after more fact-
finding.321 
The “primary issue” at the Supreme Court was the process due for in-
prison discipline.322 The litigants and amici presented radically different 
pictures of the nature of prisons, the impact of discipline, the procedures 
already in place, and the potential contributions or risks of making counsel 
and cross-examination available. Several amici filings on behalf of the 
prisoners discussed the hopes of incarcerated people for accuracy and 
fairness and the utility of lawyers and witnesses at prison hearings.323 The 
National Council on Crime and Delinquency reminded the Court of the 
findings of the New York State Commission that investigated the 1971 
uprising at Attica, which detailed how debilitating prison conditions were 
and how arbitrary the power exercised by guards was.324 The National 
Council wrote about prisoners’ isolation, their fear of “injustice” at the hands 
of “poorly trained[] and poorly educated” staff, and the importance of using 
 
 320 McDonnell, 483 F.2d at 1062–63. The cases that required hearings before a person was 
incarcerated for violating parole or probation were Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471, and Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 
and as discussed above, the Court declined to import the full set of procedures it had proscribed in those 
contexts for in-prison discipline. 
 321 McDonnell, 483 F.2d at 1063–64. Rejecting the request for rehearing en banc, the court added 
that it had only required legal counsel when, as in Scarpelli, doing so was required for “fundamental 
fairness.” Id. at 1067. The appellate court affirmed other aspects of the rulings on censorship, mail, and 
legal assistance, and remanded for more information on some issues. Id. at 1064–67. 
 322 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 580 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court also 
revised the lower court rulings on how prison officials can control prisoners’ mail; the Court held that 
Nebraska could require lawyers to identify the letters as privileged and that staff could open mail in front 
of the prisoner to ensure no contraband was inside but that staff could not read the contents. The Court 
affirmed the Eighth Circuit’s remand to ensure that access to legal assistance—including from other 
prisoners and for civil rights as well as habeas corpus petitions—was required. Id. at 576–79 (majority 
opinion). 
 323 See, e.g., Brief of Inmates of the District of Columbia Correctional Complex at Lorton, Virginia, 
Amici Curiae at 4–15, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (No. 73-679), 1974 WL 185775, at *4–
15. Quoting one prison official, the brief noted that most of the time the accused prisoner knew who had 
leveled accusations against him. Id. at *12. 
 324 Brief of the National Council on Crime & Delinquency as Amicus Curiae at 3–5, Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (No. 73-679), 1974 WL 185767, *3–5 [hereinafter Brief of the National 
Council on Crime & Delinquency as Amicus Curiae, Wolff v. McDonnell]; N.Y. STATE SPECIAL COMM’N 
ON ATTICA, ATTICA: THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA 
2, 3–6, 74, 95–98 (1972). 
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disciplinary hearings as one way to lower tensions, express respect, and 
foster reintegration into the social order.325 
The litigants also referenced the American Bar Association’s Survey of 
Prison Disciplinary Practices and Procedures, which depicted “the collective 
judgment of correctional administrators, judges, lawyers, prisoners, and 
others about the appropriate balance of interests.”326 That survey reported 
that most states had written policies setting forth disciplinary procedures; 
included were obligations to provide notice, opportunities to present 
evidence, an impartial tribunal, and written decisions with some review.327 
Further, thirty-nine states reported that some “counsel-substitute” could 
assist prisoners; thirty-one permitted prisoners to confront “accusing 
witnesses”; and twenty-eight permitted “cross-examination of adverse 
witnesses.”328 Moreover, a Department of Justice Corrections Commission 
had, in 1973, provided standards that reflected that “[c]orrectional systems 
on their own initiative” had created procedures for discipline that 
incorporated “substantial portions of the recognized elements of 
administration agency due process.”329 
A very different account came from the United States through then-
Solicitor General Robert Bork, who both joined the oral argument and filed 
an amicus brief warning against the procedures the appellate court had 
mandated.330 While committed to “accurate fact-finding in the context of 
 
 325 Brief of the National Council on Crime & Delinquency as Amicus Curiae, Wolff v. McDonnell, 
supra note 324, at 3–4, 9–11, 14–16, 21–26; see also Brief of the Legal Aid Society of New York, Amicus 
Curiae at 2, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (No. 73-679), 1974 WL 185769, at *2. 
 326 See, e.g., Brief for the Respondent at 14, 26 n.22, 27 n.24, 28 nn.25 & 27, 30 nn.29–30, app. at 
7a, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (No. 73-679), 1974 WL 185771, at *14, *26 n.22, *27 
n.24, *28 nn.25 & 27, *30 nn.29–30 [hereinafter Brief for the Respondent, Wolff v. McDonnell]. The 
ABA report was issued before Wolff was decided and then revised to include an “analysis” of its impact. 
See Melvin T. Axilbund, Preface, in RES. CTR. ON CORR. LAW & LEGAL SERVS., AM. BAR ASS’N, 
SURVEY OF PRISON DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES: WITH AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF 
WOLFF V. MCDONNELL (1974); Brief for the Respondent, Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, app. at 4a–6a. 
 327 Brief for the Respondent, Wolff v. McDonnell, supra note 326, app. at 11a. 
 328 Id. 
 329 Id. at 30 & n.31 (citing DEP’T OF JUSTICE CORR. COMM’N, CORRECTIONS 52 (1973)). 
 330 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (No. 
73-679), 1974 WL 185774, at *5 [hereinafter Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Wolff v. 
McDonnell]; Transcript of Oral Argument of Robert H. Bork for the United States, as Amicus Curiae, 
Supporting Petitioner at 11, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (No. 73-679). California also filed 
a brief urging the Court to limit the Eighth Circuit decision See Brief of Evelle J. Younger, Attorney 
General of the State of California, Amicus Curiae at 3, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (No. 
73-679) [hereinafter Brief of Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General of the State of California, Amicus 
Curiae, Wolff v. McDonnell]. California argued that prison authorities ought to be required to provide 
“minimum standards,” and that a fair process included “a fact finding system based upon an investigation 
by an independent officer, notice and opportunity to be heard before an impartial tribunal, the right to 
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prison disciplinary proceedings,” he asserted that “the unique conditions of 
the prison environment and the nature of the interests served by the 
disciplinary process in that environment” meant that the Court ought not to 
apply its rules for parole and probation revocation, even if “there may be a 
slightly increased risk of factual mistakes in a few cases.”331 
The U.S. government opined that “the impact of prison discipline on 
the individual, although not unimportant to him, is almost invariably far less 
grave than the consequences of a criminal conviction or of revocation of 
parole or probation.”332 Discipline altered prisoners’ liberty but “only 
marginally—and often only briefly.”333 Because prisons were often “tense 
and volatile,” the brief reported that prison officials thought “that testimonial 
confrontations between an inmate and staff members or other inmates can be 
dangerous and are to be avoided whenever possible.”334 In short, “substantial 
governmental interests and needs” were to trump the risks to prisoners of a 
less fair process.335 
Justice White’s majority opinion reflected those concerns even as it 
used Cold War Era terminology to insist that no “iron curtain” separated 
prisons from the Constitution.336 While “[l]awful imprisonment necessarily 
makes unavailable many rights and privileges of the ordinary citizen,” it did 
so to accommodate institutional needs; prisoners retained many 
constitutional rights, including the guarantees of the Due Process Clause.337 
The Court held that, given that the State had created a system of good-time 
credits and authorized officials to take away time earned for specified serious 
misconduct, due process protections were required to buffer against arbitrary 
retraction.338 
As we analyze below, Wolff’s approach was cabined in later years. But 
at the time, the Court’s procedural requirements applied to both the loss of 
good time and the sanction of solitary confinement, which the Court 
described to include either the “usual ‘disciplinary cell,’ with privileges 
severely limited, for as long as necessary, or . . . a ‘dry cell,’ which, unlike 
 
present evidence, to receive written findings . . . and [a] speedy . . . review” and state court oversight for 
“arbitrary or capricious action,” but no “right to counsel [or] to cross-examine.” Id. at 2–3. 
 331 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Wolff v. McDonnell, supra note 330, at 11. 
 332 Id. 
 333 Id. at 7. 
 334 Id. 
 335 Id. at 11. 
 336 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974). 
 337 Id. 
 338 Id. at 558. 
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regular cells, contains no sink or toilet.”339 The Court bundled those two 
punishments together and contrasted them with the “imposition of lesser 
penalties such as the loss of privileges.”340 
That reference to “privileges” reflected that the Court’s discussion was 
not clear about the sources of prisoners’ liberty or about when process would 
be required. The majority’s formulation, quoted above, could mean that 
prisoners, as humans, have liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, or, 
alternatively, that if either the Constitution or state law created specified 
entitlements, the Constitution required procedural fairness. Moreover, the 
opinion also referenced the Court’s other discussions of state-imposed losses 
of property and liberty as it then insisted that “protection of the individual 
against arbitrary action” was the core concern of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.341 
Justice Marshall’s partial dissent endorsed the first reading, as he 
described his agreement with the majority’s “holding that the interest of 
inmates in freedom from imposition of serious discipline is a ‘liberty’ 
entitled to due process protection.”342 Likewise, Justice William Douglas, 
concurring in the result but dissenting in part, explained that incarceration 
did not “render one a nonperson whose rights are subject to the whim of the 
prison administration”; he argued that prisoners ought to have the right to 
call and cross-examine witnesses during disciplinary hearings that could 
send them to solitary and cut their good time.343 
 
 339 Id. at 552 n.9. 
 340 Id. at 571 n.19. As Justice White explained, 
Although the complaint put at issue the procedures employed with respect to the deprivation of 
good time, under the Nebraska system, the same procedures are employed where disciplinary 
confinement is imposed. The deprivation of good time and imposition of “solitary” confinement 
are reserved for instances where serious misbehavior has occurred. This appears a realistic 
approach, for it would be difficult for the purposes of procedural due process to distinguish 
between the procedures that are required where good time is forfeited and those that must be 
extended when solitary confinement is at issue. The latter represents a major change in the 
conditions of confinement and is normally imposed only when it is claimed and proved that there 
has been a major act of misconduct. Here, as in the case of good time, there should be minimum 
procedural safeguards as a hedge against arbitrary determination of the factual predicate for 
imposition of the sanction. We do not suggest, however, that the procedures required by today’s 
decision for the deprivation of good time would also be required for the imposition of lesser 
penalties such as the loss of privileges. 
Id. 
 341 Id. at 557–58. 
 342 Id. at 581 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 343 See id. at 593–94 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the result in part). 
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What Justice White did make clear was that prisoners had no 
constitutional right to good time itself, which instead was a creature of state 
law. Because Nebraska both provided for it and limited the grounds for its 
withdrawal, process was due.344 However, Justice White commented that the 
accommodations to both sides were not “graven in stone,” and that the door 
was open to “further consideration” as changing circumstances warranted.345 
Whatever his theory of liberty’s sources and thoughts about future 
cases, Justice White’s Wolff opinion distinguished the “grievous loss” of 
losing the status of parolee or probationer from the loss of good time, which 
was not the “same immediate disaster” and might not “work any change in 
the conditions of his liberty.”346 Furthermore, drawing on the picture 
presented by state and federal governments, Justice White deemed cross-
examination and confrontation too risky because prisoners “may have little 
regard for the safety of others,” and an “unwritten code . . . exhorts inmates 
not to inform on a fellow prisoner.”347 Countering arguments that hearings 
could lower tensions and build collaboration, he invoked the “incorrigible,” 
manipulative prisoner, the “personal antagonism[s]” that put “personal 
safety” at risk, and rejected “encasing the disciplinary procedures in an 
inflexible constitutional straightjacket”348 or imposing “unduly crippling 
constitutional impediments.”349 
Hence, the Court selected a few of the Morrissey v. Brewer procedures, 
including advance written notice (in this context, at least twenty-four hours) 
of the charges, an opportunity to speak and present witnesses, and a written 
statement of reasons for the sanction.350 But unlike the Morrissey-Scarpelli 
rules, the Court licensed prison staff to bar evidentiary presentations if they 
believed that doing so would “create a risk of reprisal or undermine 
authority” or be “unduly hazardous to institutional safety.”351 Moreover, 
prisoners were not entitled to lawyers, but prisoners with limited abilities 
were to have access to aid from staff or from other prisoners.352 
 
 344 Id. at 557 (majority opinion). 
 345 Id. at 571–72. 
 346 Id. at 560–61 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 347 Id. at 562. 
 348 Id. at 562–63. 
 349 Id. at 566–67. 
 350 Id. at 564–66. 
 351 Id. at 566. 
 352 Id. at 570. 
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Instead of using Justice White’s terms of “straitjacket[s]” and 
“crippling” constitutionalization,353 the dissenters presented a picture of 
prisoners in need of protection and cited evidence that the proposed 
procedures were feasible. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, 
argued that the Court’s packet of procedures had hollowed out the “essential” 
components of a defense: the right to present evidence, have witnesses 
testify, and confront and cross-examine others.354 Citing the American Bar 
Association survey of prison discipline proceedings, Justice Marshall argued 
that the use in many jurisdictions of cross-examination countered the 
Nebraska authorities’ “speculative fears.”355 Justice Douglas wrote 
separately and provided a brief history of the inhumanity to prisoners, 
invoked the 1970 Holt v. Sarver conclusion that an “entire prison system” in 
Arkansas was so “inhumane” as to violate the Eighth Amendment,356 and 
identified the “unchecked power of prison administrators” as the “central 
evil” that was the “problem that due process” procedures were to “cure.”357 
Given the “threat of any substantial deprivation of liberty . . . such as solitary 
confinement,” a “full hearing with all the due process safeguards” was 
required.358 
Within a year, Justice White wrote again for the Court in Baxter v. 
Palmigiano to inscribe Wolff’s mandates as the “reasonable accommodation 
between the interests of the inmates and the needs of the institution.”359 The 
United States again provided an amicus filing, arguing against “any 
particular set of inflexible rules.”360 The case raised the question of whether 
the hearing officers could draw adverse inferences from a prisoner’s 
declining to speak. Nicholas Palmigiano, held in a Rhode Island prison, 
relied on the Fifth Amendment when, as advised to do so by his counsel-
substitute, he stayed silent in a disciplinary hearing.361 The majority did not 
 
 353 Id. at 563, 566. 
 354 Id. at 581–83 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Brennan, J.). 
 355 Id. at 589. 
 356 Id. at 599 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the result in part). 
 357 Id. at 596–99 (citations omitted). 
 358 Id. at 594. 
 359 425 U.S. 308, 324 (1976) (quoting Wolff, 418 U.S. at 572). 
 360 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Baxter v. Palmigiano, supra note 26, at *2–3. 
 361 Baxter, 425 U.S. at 312–13. The Court heard the case along with Enomoto v. Clutchette, id. at 
308, a California case that had not been certified but which the district court improperly treated as a class 
action and which had been brought by John Wesley Clutchette and George L. Jackson to require 
California to revamp its disciplinary system at San Quentin. Id. at 310–11 & n.1. By the time the Supreme 
Court heard the case, the named plaintiffs’ claims had been mooted. Id. at 310 n.1. Clutchette had been 
paroled, and Jackson (the author of Soledad Brothers who, in 1971, was to be tried on charges of 
murdering a prison guard) was killed in the prison yard. Id. See generally GEORGE L. JACKSON, BLOOD 
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bar the staff from using his silence against him; further, it reiterated that no 
rights to counsel existed in prison disciplinary hearings, prison officials 
retained discretion to permit confrontation and cross-examination, and 
adverse inferences could be drawn when prisoners declined to testify.362 
Justice White had not addressed the underlying liberty interests,363 
which was the centerpiece of the objections by Justices Brennan and 
Marshall, who again concurred in part and dissented, with Justice Brennan 
writing this time for them both. Justice Brennan explained that the only 
evidence against Palmigiano came from written reports by the staff who filed 
the charges; after Palmigiano’s silence and a five-minute deliberation, the 
prison authorities sent him to thirty days in punitive segregation.364 Instead, 
because liberty remained vital despite incarceration, the Court’s law on the 
privilege outside of prison ought to have been applied and no adverse 
inferences drawn from a person’s silence.365 
Even with these limits, Wolff is one of several decisions that imposed 
affirmative obligations on prison officials and made certain practices 
“normal” artifacts of incarceration. Before the decision, as the ABA 
reported, most prison systems had policies that called for some form of 
process when imposing certain punishments. Since the ruling, all systems 
must provide process when seeking to change the length of incarceration by 
taking away good time. The volume of hearings both before and after Wolff 
also provides a window into the breadth of regulation governing prisoners’ 
behavior. The government’s amicus brief in Wolff cited data from the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons which, in 1973, housed more than 23,000 prisoners and 
had conducted some “19,000 misconduct hearings.”366 (The brief did not 
report what percentage resulted in prisoners being acquitted of the charges.) 
California also filed an amicus that argued against cross-examination and 
 
IN MY EYE (1990). An intervenor, Alejandro R. Ferrel, was stipulated as a named party and his individual 
case proceeded. Baxter, 425 U.S. at 310 n.1. 
 362 Id. at 315–16, 321–22. The Court returned to the question of Miranda rights for the incarcerated 
in Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112–13 (2010), and in Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 511 (2012), 
each exploring what “in custody” meant for the incarcerated. In Howes, Justice Samuel Alito for the 
majority concluded that the “ordinary restrictions of prison life, while no doubt unpleasant, are expected” 
and did not involve the compulsion of being taken to a police station. Id. at 511 (citing Shatzer, 559 U.S. 
at 103). 
 363 In the discussion of the case coming from the Ninth Circuit, the majority said that the record did 
not make clear “the degree of ‘liberty’ at stake in loss of privileges” that was requisite to determining 
what process was due, and hence its order could not stand. Baxter, 425 U.S. at 323. 
 364 Id. at 332 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Marshall, J.). 
 365 See id. at 334–35. 
 366 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Wolff v. McDonnell, supra note 330, at *2–3. 
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counsel in disciplinary hearings and reported that in 1973 its prisons 
“averaged over 50 disciplinary hearings every day of the year.”367 
More than fifty years later, statistics provided by Oregon painted a 
comparable picture of a huge number of hearings conducted annually. In 
2018, Oregon incarcerated more than 14,000 people and had a dedicated 
group of hearing officers charged with overseeing in-prison disciplinary 
hearings.368 The state concluded that in approximately 13% of the more than 
10,000 disciplinary hearings it conducted, hearing officers dismissed the 
charges against the prisoner.369 
b. The adverse impacts of transfers 
In the years after Wolff, Justice White’s limited approach to prisoners’ 
liberty hardened as the Court’s membership shifted along with national 
politics, in which popular officials championed being “tough on crime.”370 
More Justices evidenced anxiety about prisons and too many prisoner filings, 
demonstrated minimal concern about racial discrimination, and evidenced 
no appreciation for the experiences of incarcerated individuals. As Linda 
Greenhouse and Michael Graetz explained, “Equality took a backseat to 
other values” under the Burger Court, which prized “the prerogatives of 
states and localities . . . the efficiencies of the criminal justice system . . . 
[and] rolling back the rights revolution” of the Warren Court.371 The result 
was that the Supreme Court reshaped its doctrine to conclude that conviction 
and incarceration extinguished most of an individual’s liberty interests.372 
Soon after Wolff, the Supreme Court addressed decisions by prison 
officials to transfer incarcerated individuals from one facility to another. The 
issue was framed through two cases involving prisoners caught up in unrest 
at facilities in New York and Massachusetts. The uprising at Attica Prison in 
 
 367 Brief of Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General of the State of California, Amicus Curiae, Wolff v. 
McDonnell, supra note 330, at 10 n.9. 
 368 Telephone Interview with Melissa D. Nofziger, Assistant Inspector Gen. for Hearings, Or. Dep’t 
of Corr. (Nov. 15, 2019); E-mail from Melissa D. Nofziger, Assistant Inspector Gen. for Hearings, Or. 
Dep’t of Corr., to Judith Resnik, Arthur Liman Professor of Law, Yale Law Sch. (Nov. 18, 2019, 11:05 
AM PST) (on file with authors). 
 369 Telephone Interview with Melissa D. Nofziger, supra note 368; E-mail from Melissa D. Nofziger, 
supra note 368. 
 370 See generally MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS (2015); ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME 
(2016). 
 371 MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND THE RISE OF THE 
JUDICIAL RIGHT 341 (2016). 
 372 See, e.g., Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 
(1995). 
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upstate New York took place in September 1971.373 Within the year, prison 
officials at Attica removed Rodney Haymes from his job at the prison law 
library. Two days after Haymes had helped eighty-two prisoners circulate a 
document that was addressed to a federal judge and that protested his 
removal, New York transferred him to Clinton Correctional Facility 
hundreds of miles further from his home in Buffalo.374 
Chief Judge Irving Kaufman, writing for the Second Circuit, catalogued 
the impact of the transfer. Clinton was “several hundred miles farther away 
from Haymes’s home in Buffalo,”375 which meant being far from family and 
his lawyer, and the loss of educational and other programs underway. 
Further, a “real hardship” came from “being shuttled from one institution to 
another,” even if both were labeled maximum security.376 On arrival, 
individuals were put into administrative segregation (a form of solitary 
confinement) and upon release were in a new and complex environment; 
moreover, the process of transfer could result in a deprivation of healthcare 
and medications.377 
Given the risk of being punished “at the whim of those charged” to 
control their confinement, the court concluded that prisoners merited 
protection.378 Reversing the trial court’s rejection of Haymes’s pro se 
complaint was proper because “[w]hen harsh treatment is meted to 
reprimand, deter, or reform an individual, elementary fairness demands that 
the one punished be given a satisfactory opportunity to establish that he is 
not deserving of such handling.”379 The Second Circuit remanded for fact-
finding on whether the transfer was punitive and on the impact of the 
transfer.380 
The First Circuit issued a parallel ruling in 1975; prison officials at a 
medium-security facility, the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at 
Norfolk, transferred Arthur Fano and five other prisoners to a maximum-
security facility. The prompt for reclassification was “unrest,” which 
 
 373 N.Y. STATE SPECIAL COMM’N ON ATTICA, supra note 324, at xi. 
 374 United States ex rel. Haymes v. Montanye, 505 F.2d 977, 977–78, 982 (2d Cir. 1974), rev’d 
judgment sub nom. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976). The document stated that individuals 
were “deprived of legal assistance” because of the removal of Haymes and another prisoner, and as a 
result, “constitutional rights to adequate access to the courts” were violated. Montanye, 427 U.S. 236, 237 
& n.1 (1976). Prison officials took the document. Id. at 238. 
 375 Haymes, 505 F.2d at 978. 
 376 Id. at 981–82. 
 377 Id. at 982. 
 378 Id. at 977, 981. 
 379 Id. at 980–82. The Second Circuit did not address the access-to-courts issue. Id. at 982. 
 380 See id.; Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 240 (1976). 
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included a series of fires at Norfolk.381 The basis for the transfer decision was 
information from informants that had not been disclosed to the prisoners at 
their reclassification hearings.382 As the First Circuit explained, whether the 
decision was termed “classification” for institutional order or “discipline” 
imposed as punishment, the impact was the same.383 At the higher level 
facility, the conditions were “substantially more adverse” in terms of 
programs, furloughs, and effects on parole.384 
What was the process due? The First Circuit had already ruled that 
interstate transfers required procedural protections.385 In Fano v. Meachum, 
the First Circuit also concluded that the intrastate transfers imposed “a 
significant modification of the overall conditions of confinement” that 
affected prisoners’ liberty and therefore required procedural protection.386 At 
least a summary of the basis for the decision had to be provided, as well as 
adequate notice of the charges leveled.387  
Before the Supreme Court, the two cases (heard together in April of 
1976) intersected with an ongoing debate in the Court about whether due 
process protections were required in a variety of circumstances, such as when 
state officials make decisions relating to school children,388 to state 
employees,389 to beneficiaries of benefit programs,390 and to holders of state 
licenses,391 as well as to prisoners. The predicate insight that some process 
was due stemmed from a 1964 article by Charles Reich, who identified how 
government power both created forms of property—through the provision of 
licenses, contracts, benefits, and franchises—and made holders of this “new 
property” vulnerable to arbitrary state power.392 Justice Brennan embraced 
those ideas in the Court’s 1970 decision Goldberg v. Kelly, which recognized 
 
 381 Fano v. Meachum, 520 F.2d 374, 376, 377 & n.3 (1st Cir. 1975). 
 382 Id. at 376. 
 383 Id. at 376 n.2 
 384 Id. at 378 (quoting Fano v. Meachum, 387 F. Supp. 664, 667 (D. Mass. 1975)). 
 385 See Gomes v. Travisono, 490 F.2d 1209, 1211, 1215–16 (1st Cir. 1973). In 1983, the U.S. 
Supreme Court concluded that the Constitution does not protect prisoners from interstate transfers even 
when a person was sent from Hawaii to California. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 248 (1983). 
 386 520 F.2d at 378–79. 
 387 Id. at 379–80. 
 388 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 567 (1975). 
 389 Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 566–69 (1972). 
 390 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 391 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 535–37 (1971). The Court held that the State of Georgia could not 
deprive someone of their driver’s license and vehicle registration before providing an opportunity to 
determine “whether there is a reasonable possibility of a judgment being rendered against him as a result 
of the accident.” Id. at 542–43. 
 392 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733, 783–84, 787 (1964). 
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the “grievous loss” that termination of welfare benefits entailed and held that, 
prior to termination of benefits, governments had to provide due process 
protections including an in-person oral hearing.393 
But two months before the hearings in the prison transfer cases, the 
Court had retreated from its approach in Goldberg. In February 1976, when 
addressing the termination of disability benefits in Mathews v. Eldridge, the 
Court held that post-termination hearings sufficed.394 Justice Powell’s 
majority opinion in Mathews shifted the focus away from the experiences 
and the impact of decisions on those affected (their “grievous loss”) and onto 
the interests of governments in conserving costs when making decisions. The 
majority did not address the mandate from Congress that administrators treat 
like cases similarly, nor concerns about the need to respect the dignity of 
individuals in their encounters with the state.395 
In Mathews, the U.S. government had conceded that disability benefits 
were a statutory entitlement and that some process was due. In contrast, in 
the arguments held on April 21, 1976 in Haymes and in Meachum, New York 
and Massachusetts, joined by California and the federal government, 
contended that no “liberty” or “property” interests existed when they moved 
prisoners to higher security settings and hence that officials had no 
constitutional obligation to provide any process at all.396 As Solicitor General 
Robert Bork’s amicus briefs in both Montanye v. Haymes and Meachum v. 
Fano argued, the decisions made by the Federal Bureau of Prisons relating 
 
 393 397 U.S. at 263 (citation omitted). The history of the litigation and its impact on constitutional, 
administrative, and property law are discussed in MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE 
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 394 424 U.S. at 349. 
 395 See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative 
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28, 42–45, 54 (1976). 
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252), 1976 WL 181738, at *3–11 [hereinafter Brief for U.S. in Meachum]; Brief of the State of California 
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[hereinafter Brief for U.S. in Montanye]. 
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to the placement or transfers of the 16,529 individuals committed in fiscal 
year 1975 to federal custody397 were “completely discretionary.”398 
California, which reported that it had transferred more than 30,000 men 
between fiscal years 1974 and 1975,399 likewise argued that the federal 
Constitution had no role to play. The State asserted that the transfer of 
prisoners was “a critical component in the achievement of the objectives of 
the correctional system.”400 Such movement was “not solely a means for 
achieving the most economic utilization of available facilities and staff [but 
also] a process [to achieve] the dual objectives of security and 
rehabilitation.”401 California further argued that when “the needs and desires 
of a particular inmate” were in tension with the “welfare and security of the 
correctional system as a whole,” correctional staff ought to be tasked with 
making the “difficult” determination of how to best accommodate 
conflicting objectives.402 
Yet the State’s own materials acknowledged what the lower courts in 
Haymes and Meachum had understood: prison authorities had the power to 
make the experience much worse, and constraints on staff authority were 
needed. One subpart of California’s regulation, which the State put before 
the Supreme Court, was labeled “Fairness Procedures.”403 The obligation to 
provide fair process was, under California’s rules, triggered when the State 
sought to impose what it termed a “Substantial Adverse Effect,” defined to 
include the “[t]ransfer to another institution for the purpose of providing 
more restrictive custody,” as well as increasing custody levels and placement 
in a “security housing unit.”404 
The oral argument and notes from the Supreme Court Justices’ papers 
reveal the anxiety occasioned by the potential impact of the proposition that 
the Constitution required fair hearings for transfers. The Justices offered 
 
 397 Brief for U.S. in Montanye, supra note 396, at *1–4 (arguing that the outcome of the case would 
have a “substantial impact” on the procedures used to assign, classify, and transfer people in federal 
custody); see also Brief for U.S. in Meachum, supra note 396, at *2–3 (arguing that the interest in the 
case is similar to that presented in the United States’ amicus curiae brief in Montanye and adding that the 
questions raised in Meachum about transferring custody level was of special interest to the United States 
given that the Federal Bureau of Prisons relies on custody level for classification and transfer). 
 398 Brief for U.S in Montanye, supra note 396, at *10; Brief for U.S. in Meachum, supra note 396, 
at *13. 
 399 Brief of California in Montanye, supra note 396, at *1. 
 400 Id. at *2. 
 401 Id. 
 402 Id. 
 403 Id. app. at *2a. 
 404 Id. app. at *3a. The rules also authorized actions on “a temporary emergency basis when necessary 
without prior notification.” Id. 
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hypotheticals that ignored the State’s punitive intent (on which the Second 
Circuit had focused) and the impact of transfer (central to the analysis of the 
First Circuit). Instead, the Justices imagined prisoners complaining about 
what the Justices evidently thought were not important aspects of 
confinement; these Justices imagined lower court judges unable or unwilling 
to differentiate among forms of injury. 
Then-Justice Rehnquist posited: “Supposing the man stays at Walpole, 
but they’ve had a bad time at Walpole, so [prison officials] decide that 
instead of getting one hour’s exercise in the afternoon, you’re only going to 
get half an hour, you’re only going to get two meals a day, the whole 
population.”405 In conference, Chief Justice Warren Burger used the example 
of whether “any move—even from a cell on south side of prison to north 
side” would suffice as an impingement on liberty requiring a due process 
hearing.406 
A typed memorandum from Justice Blackmun (and written before the 
argument on April 13, 1976) provided a fuller account of his concerns about 
the extent of judicial oversight of prison officials’ decisions. Justice 
Blackmun explained that when he was on the Eighth Circuit, he had initially 
assumed that “the administration of a prison was the state’s business” but 
that he had come to recognize that prisoners had constitutional rights “to be 
safe, to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, to be fed and the like.”407 
(Justice Blackmun’s memo did not mention that he had authored the 
landmark decision of Bishop v. Jackson, holding in 1968 that whipping of 
prisoners by Arkansas prison staff was unconstitutional.408) 
Justice Blackmun said he found “it exceedingly difficult to draw lines 
between original placement in a custodial atmosphere and secondary 
placement. If the one is the decision for the prison administrator,” the second 
would be too, even if a transfer was “somewhat punitive in nature.”409 
However, “there is a limit;” if a transfer affected “rehabilitation or parole,” 
then “some kind of minimal due process procedurally is due.”410 Yet despite 
 
 405 Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976) (No. 75-252) 
[hereinafter Meachum v. Fano Oral Argument]. 
 406 Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Papers, Box 427/Folder 16-17, at 27, available at 
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1768&context=casefiles 
[https://perma.cc/32ZK-MNG6]. 
 407 Harry Blackmun Papers, Meachum v. Fano file, at 9 (housed at the Library of Congress) 
(photocopy on file with authors). 
 408 404 F.2d. 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968). 
 409 Harry Blackmun Papers, supra note 407, at 9–10. 
 410 Id. at 10. 
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those concerns, Justice Blackmun joined the two majority opinions that 
imposed no limits on correctional officials’ authority over prison transfers. 
Both decisions, filed in June 1976, were written by Justice White, and 
both reversed the judgments below. In Montanye v. Haymes, the Court held 
that while “state law” or the Constitution could provide “some right or 
justifiable expectation,”411 “no Due Process Clause liberty interest of a duly 
convicted prison inmate is infringed when he is transferred from one prison 
to another within the State.”412 Meachum v. Fano explained that even as “life 
in one prison” could be “much more disagreeable than in another,” those 
differences did not suffice to implicate Fourteenth Amendment liberty 
interests, nor did “any [other] substantial deprivation imposed by prison 
authorities.”413 
Why? The Court answered with a Delphic reference to practices it 
deemed to be “normally incident to a criminal conviction”414 and created the 
formulation: “As long as the conditions or degree of confinement . . . [do not 
exceed those normally incident to a criminal conviction and are] not 
otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in 
itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial 
oversight.”415 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented in 
both cases.416 Their disagreement centered not on the State’s needs but on 
people’s liberty. In Meachum, Justice Stevens wrote that the majority had 
described liberty as stemming either from the Constitution or from state 
law.417 Justice Stevens countered that “[i]f a man were a creature of the State, 
 
 411 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). 
 412 Id.; see also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224–25 (1976). Although some of the Court’s case 
law had acknowledged the role played by individuals’ “expectations” in entitlement theory, the Court 
came to require finding sources in positive law, such as statutes. Later, the Court held that even when 
state statutes or regulations recognized prisoners’ interests, such as in visits, state provisions did not 
necessarily create interests that required federal due process protections before their infringement. See 
Kentucky v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989). See generally Thomas C. Grey, Procedural Fairness and 
Substantive Rights, in 18 NOMOS: DUE PROCESS 182 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 
1977); Reich, supra note 392; Resnik, The Story of Goldberg, supra note 393. 
 413 427 U.S. at 225. The majority distinguished Wolff v. McDonnell as predicated on state-based 
statutory rights to good time, which generated the liberty interest that required due process protections. 
Id. at 225–26. 
 414 Letter from Chief Justice Rehnquist to Justice White (June 3, 1967) (on file with authors). 
 415 Montanye, 427 U.S. at 242. Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall) dissented; 
he argued that the pro se complaint had also alleged a claim of punishment for helping individuals 
communicate with courts and that, under liberal pleading rules, the decision should be remanded to the 
district court. Id. at 244–45 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 416 Id.; Meachum, 427 U.S. at 229–35 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 417 Meachum, 427 U.S. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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the analysis would be correct.”418 He disagreed. The Constitution was not the 
source of “individual liberty,” which was “one of the cardinal unalienable 
rights,” but rather of its protection against government infringement.419 He 
reiterated what he had said in a 1973 Seventh Circuit decision, that 
“‘[l]iberty’ and ‘custody’ are not mutually exclusive concepts.”420 If, 
however, prisoners’ protected interests were “no greater than the State 
chooses to allow, he is really little more than the slave described in the 19th 
century cases.”421 Instead, prisoners retained “an unalienable interest in 
liberty—at the very minimum the right to be treated with dignity—which the 
 
 418 Id. 
 419 Id. Some commentators attribute Justice Stevens’s concerns for individuals in conflict with the 
state to his and his family’s work history. After the Depression, some of his relatives were accused of 
embezzling funds to deal with debts from a hotel they had owned in Chicago. His father’s conviction was 
overturned by the Illinois State Supreme Court. People v. Stevens, 193 N.E. 154, 156, 160 (Ill. 1934). 
Further, in 1969 Justice Stevens gained public attention when he was the chief investigator into corruption 
at the Illinois Supreme Court, from which two justices resigned. See Christopher E. Smith, Justice John 
Paul Stevens and Capital Punishment, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 205, 215–19 (2010). 
 420 Meachum, 427 U.S. at 232 (citing United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 712 (7th 
Cir. 1973)). His Seventh Circuit opinion in Twomey cites Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335, 1338 (7th 
Cir. 1973), modified on reh’g en banc, 494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974). However, in Morales, Justice (then 
Judge) Stevens was in dissent from a March 1973 Seventh Circuit decision reversing a district court 
injunction against limits on correspondence between a prisoner and his sister-in-law. Id. at 1344 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). The majority decision, explaining that “[t]he Constitution provides no clear answer to 
federal courts seeking to determine the civil rights of state prisoners,” cited the texts of the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, cordoning off rights for those who are “duly convicted,” as well as explicating 
a growing body of commentary and law on “prisoners’ rights.” Id. at 1337–39 (majority opinion) 
(emphasis omitted). While courts ought to be “hesitant” to be involved in daily operations, they could not 
“abdicate [their] responsibilities” to “determine the constitutional rights of a convicted person.” Id. at 
1342. Because the lower court had looked to a “compelling state interest,” rather than a “rational 
relationship,” for the restriction, the injunction could not stand. Id. at 1343–44. In contrast, Justice Stevens 
found that abridgement of First Amendment rights requires “a heavier burden of justification.” Id. at 1348 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The en banc decision permitted the injunction that had been in effect to remain, 
pending remand for more fact-finding given the passage of time. Morales v. Schmidt, 494 F.2d 85, 87 
(7th Cir. 1974) (en banc). Justice Stevens, joined by two others, concurred to explain the burden on the 
state to limit communication. Id. at 87–88 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 The case from which Justice Stevens took the quoted sentence was United States ex rel. Miller v. 
Twomey, 479 F.2d at 712. Twomey—issued in May of 1973, two months after Stevens’s initial dissent in 
Morales—considered the disciplinary rules in Illinois’s prisons. Unrepresented prisoners alleged loss of 
good time and placement in solitary confinement for an array of offenses, including fifteen days in 
isolation for “sending a letter to an ex-inmate in an illegal way.” Id. at 703, 706. Justice Stevens read the 
Court’s Morrissey decision to mean “that due process precede any substantial deprivation of the liberty 
of persons in custody.” Id. at 713. His opinion recognized the “sufficient contrast between the privileges 
associated with membership in the general prison population and the severe restraints resulting from 
‘segregation’” and concluded that “prolonged segregated confinement” constituted a “grievous loss” for 
which some procedural protections were required, albeit not always a hearing before isolation nor all the 
Morrissey processes. Id. at 717–18 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). 
 421 Meachum, 427 U.S. at 233 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
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Constitution may never ignore.”422 When prisoners suffered a “grievous 
loss,” which included placement in solitary confinement or transfers to 
“equally disparate conditions between one physical facility and another,” 
protection from arbitrary decisions should have been required.423 
c. Segregation through administrative placements, discipline, 
and exile 
In the years thereafter, the Court selected cases through which it 
continued to narrow prisoners’ opportunities to have buffers against 
decisions that made more adverse the conditions of their confinement. The 
Court took up transfers to out-of-state prisons and placement into isolation 
falling under two labels—“administrative segregation,” which is justified on 
managerial needs and could be a way station (pending decisions on discipline 
or classification) or could be the basis for a long stay in solitary confinement, 
and “disciplinary segregation,” which frankly imposes isolation as a 
punishment. That distinction was often irrelevant in practice. As the State 
Bar of Michigan’s Prisons and Corrections Committee told the Court in 
1982, whether called “administrative confinement” or “administrative 
segregation,” what was “involved . . . is being placed in the ‘hole.’”424 
Furthermore, by 1972, the corrections profession had commended prisons 
hold hearings before “[s]evere penalties, such as forfeiture of good time or 
extended confinement in punitive segregation” were imposed.425 
Reflecting both prisoners’ experiences and standards promulgated by 
the American Corrections Association, lower courts identified prisoners’ 
liberty interests in avoiding more adverse confinement and required some 
process.426 In contrast, the Supreme Court—in majority decisions often 
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist—repeatedly reversed as the majority 
stiffened its commitment to incarceration eradicating most of prisoners’ 
liberty interests.427 Thus, even as the Court has recognized that prisoners 
 
 422 Id. 
 423 Id. at 234–35. Justice Stevens noted that individuals whom Massachusetts had transferred had 
suffered such losses, including a reduction in income and separation from a counselor. Id. at 235 n.8. 
 424 Brief for the State Bar of Michigan, Prisons & Corrections Committee as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Affirmance, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (No. 81-638), 1982 WL 608431, at *6 n.1. 
 425 Brief of the Petitioners at 29, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (No. 73-679), 1974 WL 
187450, at *29 (citing ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS, UNIFORM CORRECTIONAL POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES 12–15 (1972)). 
 426 See, e.g., Conner v. Sakai, 15 F.3d 1463 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d sub nom. Sandin v. Conner, 
515 U.S. 472 (1995); Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F.2d 487 (3d Cir. 1981); Wakinekona v. Olim, 664 F.2d 708 
(9th Cir. 1981). 
 427 See, e.g., Sandin, 515 U.S. 472; Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983); Olim v. Wakinekona, 
461 U.S. 238 (1983). 
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retained some kinds of liberty (such as the right to marry428), the Court ruled 
that protection against being shipped thousands of miles away from one’s 
home or placed in twenty-four-hour-a-day isolation for weeks and months 
on end did not survive incarceration. This sequence of decisions generated 
the current test for procedural protections for people placed in solitary 
confinement. 
The events undergirding the next key Supreme Court decision took 
place in 1978, when Pennsylvania prison officials put Aaron Helms in fifty-
one days of “restrictive custody status”; Helms alleged that the State had not 
complied with its own regulations or what the Constitution then required.429 
At oral argument, Helms’s attorney described the confinement as “almost 24 
hours a day” with “between five and ten minutes” for exercise a few times a 
week, “virtually nonexistent” access to showers for almost two months, and 
no access to any activities.430 The prompt for such isolation was a “general 
disturbance,” and the question was what role, if any, Helms had played.431 
The State took the position that it had no obligation to provide any process 
for what it termed an administrative decision to confine Helms pending an 
investigation.432 
As the Third Circuit, writing in 1981, then understood Supreme Court 
precedent, liberty could be predicated on state statutes or regulations, such 
as those that delineated the conditions for welfare benefits, tenured 
employment, and good-time credits.433 In addition, albeit “less easily 
defined,” liberty could come from the Constitution or, if a “natural right,” be 
protected by the Constitution.434 And, in this case, Pennsylvania had 
regulations that set forth the criteria for transfers into administrative 
segregation.435 Given the “important rights” at stake, and the fact that the 
 
 428 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987). 
 429 Helms, 655 F.2d at 489, 491. 
 430 Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, 26, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (No. 81-638); see 
also Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 467 n.4; id. at 480 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 431 Helms, 655 F.2d at 489–91. The appellate court noted the “tensions and strains” and “intense 
personal antagonisms” of prison life, and that information from an “unidentified informant” could result 
in a decision of guilt based on “trumped up charges.” Id. at 502. 
 432 Id. at 496–97. 
 433 Id. at 493. 
 434 Id. at 493–94 (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980)). Vitek was about the transfer of a 
prisoner to a mental hospital, and the Court focused on the “grievous loss” and “stigma[]” of such a 
change. 445 U.S. at 488. 
 435 The State had argued that the regulations were “guidelines” that aimed to “promote some 
uniformity” among the various state institutions and accountability for wardens, and that if such guidance 
became the predicate for “time-consuming, expensive and inefficient procedures,” the State might repeal 
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State had created rules that conferred a “protectable liberty interest,” Wolff 
v. McDonnell’s procedural protections applied; moreover, a “conviction” 
could not rest solely on “a hearsay report of an unidentified informant[].”436 
In 1983, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court to protect the 
“discretionary authority” of correctional officials to manage their institutions 
by delineating a “limited range of interests” that fell under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protection.437 Prisoners had what he labeled “basic liberty 
interests” and therefore were only protected from the states imposing 
conditions or degrees of confinement that went beyond the prisoner’s 
sentence.438 A “significant modification in conditions,” even when a 
“grievous loss,” did not fall within the “basic liberty” retained, and hence no 
“judicial oversight” was required, not even when a person was put in “less 
amenable and more restrictive quarters for nonpunitive reasons.”439  
But, because Pennsylvania had rules detailing the criteria for transfers 
into administrative segregation, Helms had a “protected liberty interest in 
remaining in the general prison population.”440 Therefore, the Constitution 
required procedural protection. Nonetheless, no more process was due than 
what Helms had received. As Chief Justice Rehnquist put it, Helms “was 
merely transferred from one extremely restricted environment to an even 
more confined situation,” and the State was concerned about institutional 
safety.441 Therefore, the “informal, nonadversary evidentiary review” which 
Pennsylvania provided sufficed.442 
 
them. Brief for Petitioners, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (No. 81-638), 1982 WL 608424, at 
*17. 
 Pennsylvania’s regulations were an artifact of a consent decree in Imprisoned Citizens Union v. 
Shapp. See Consent Decree at 2–4, Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, 451 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Pa. 1978) 
(Nos. 70-3054, 71-513, 71-1006 & 70-2545) (on file with authors). Litigation in that case also resulted in 
a 1978 ruling that, while “grim and cheerless,” conditions in the nine cells on “Death row” at Graterford 
Prison did not violate the Eighth Amendment, but three maximum security cells, known as the “Glass 
Cage[s],” at Huntingdon did, as they were “dark, dirty,” and “a serious threat to the physical and mental 
well-being” of anyone held there. See Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, 451 F. Supp. 893, 897–98 
(E.D. Pa. 1978). As discussed supra note 264, the 2019 settlement in Reid v. Wetzel required altering 
conditions for people serving capital sentences in Pennsylvania. A 1998 decision terminating the consent 
decree under the Prison Litigation Reform Act discussed the settlement’s amendments in 1983 addressing 
prisoner “misconduct proceedings.” See Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, 11 F. Supp. 2d 586, 592, 
594–95 (E.D. Pa. 1998). 
 436 Helms, 655 F.2d at 494, 503. 
 437 Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466–67 (1983). 
 438 Id. at 467–68. 
 439 Id. 
 440 Id. at 469–72. 
 441 Id. at 472–73. 
 442 Id. at 476. 
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The four concurring Justices demurred on the majority’s account of 
liberty’s parameters and the process due. Justice Blackmun described a 
“residuum of liberty” that prisoners possessed, beyond what positive state 
law provided.443 However, because the transfer was within what he styled 
“the normal limits or range,” that liberty was not infringed.444 Yet, given that 
state law had created a liberty interest, Pennsylvania’s procedures did not 
adequately protect it. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Marshall, Brennan, 
and Blackmun (on process), agreed on the procedural failures but had a 
different theory of liberty that was not tied to state law. Justice Stevens 
insisted that the Court in Wolff had recognized liberty rights independent of 
the Constitution and reiterated, and quoted, his view in Meachum that liberty 
predated the Constitution.445 Citing Ronald Dworkin’s discussion of John 
Stuart Mill and the significance of “independence,”Justice Stevens pointed 
to the “grievous change in a prisoner’s status,” in that Helm was placed in 
“grossly more onerous” conditions when he was held in solitary 
confinement.446 
Two years later, the question returned to the Court when Hawaii 
transferred Delbert Wakinekona to a prison in California.447 The number of 
government amici protesting the Ninth Circuit’s decision that required 
process attested to the anxiety of the correctional establishment about losing 
its unilateral authority to move people.448 The majority, in a decision by 
Justice Blackmun, responded by holding that neither the U.S. Constitution 
nor state regulations recognized Wakinekona’s liberty in incarceration 
within his home state, and therefore no process was due.449 
Although fewer than 3% of Hawaii’s prisoners were moved out of state 
in 1979, Justice Blackmun invoked the concept of the “normal” as he quoted 
Meachum to describe transfers anywhere in the state or country as “within 
the normal limits or range of custody” that flowed from convictions.450 In 
 
 443 Id. at 478 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 444 Id. (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976)). 
 445 Id. at 479, 482–83 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Meachum, 427 U.S. at 230 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)). 
 446 Id. at 484–88 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 447 Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 240 (1983). 
 448 See id. at 246–47. Amicus briefs were filed by attorneys general for two dozen states. See, e.g., 
Amicus Brief of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts & Sister States, Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 
238 (1983) (No. 81-1581); Brief of the States of Alaska et al. in Support of Petitioners, Amici Curiae, 
Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983) (No. 81-1581). 
 449 Wakinekona, 461 U.S. at 251. 
 450 Id. at 247 (quoting Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225). The data on the number of people transferred 
outside Hawaii were provided in Justice Marshall’s dissent. Id. at 254 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, again 
argued that prisoners’ liberty was not an artifact of the Constitution but 
protected by it. Justice Marshall protested the “banish[ment]” of 
Wakinekona, who, “possibly [for] the rest of his life,” would be separated by 
“nearly 2,500 miles of ocean” from family and friends.451 
Whatever the ambiguities about the punitive intent or impact of 
transfers that governments sometimes characterized as “administrative” 
rather than punitive, in 1995 the Court directly addressed prisoners’ rights to 
process when states aimed to punish them with transfer. At issue was the 
thirty-day solitary confinement of Demont Conner, another Hawaii prisoner. 
According to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by state officials, 
Conner was stopped in 1987 and strip searched when he left his cell to attend 
a program area.452 One officer “asked him to step back, bend over and with 
both hands spread his buttocks . . . [to] check for contraband in the rectal area 
to which [Conner] said ‘Fuck!’ in an angry tone of voice.”453 Conner asked 
the officer, “Why are you harassing me?”454 Prison officials responded by 
cancelling what they described as Conner’s “privilege of religious 
counselling”455 and, after an abbreviated hearing based on the record with no 
witnesses testifying, sending Conner into isolation.456 
Conner challenged the underlying treatment and the discipline, and the 
Ninth Circuit agreed that Hawaii provided constitutionally insufficient 
process when it disciplined Conner and denied him access to the law library 
or other forms of legal assistance. Conner could therefore pursue his claims 
“that he was punished for praying aloud in Arabic with a fellow inmate.”457 
 
 451 Id. at 252–53. 
 452 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (No. 93-1911). 
 453 Id. 
 454 Id. 
 455 Id. 
 456 Sandin, 515 U.S. at 475–76, 488. Conner was charged in a prison disciplinary proceeding “with 
‘high misconduct’ for using physical interference to impair a correctional function, and ‘low moderate 
misconduct’ for using abusive or obscene language and for harassing employees.” Id. at 475. Conner was 
present at the hearing and contested all charges, but no prison staff testified at the hearing and the 
committee relied entirely on the officers’ written statements. Conner was not permitted to call staff 
witnesses. Id. at 488 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 457 Conner v. Sakai, 994 F.2d 1408, 1410 (9th Cir. 1993), opinion amended and superseded, 15 F.3d 
1463 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d sub nom. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), and amended in part, 
vacated in part, 61 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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The Supreme Court granted review to address whether and what process was 
due when prison officials disciplined prisoners.458 
Once again, the Justices’ questions at oral argument offered 
hypotheticals far afield from what the record reflected had happened to 
Conner. For example, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor asked if prisoners could 
invoke the Due Process Clause “when the prison decides somebody’s too 
much of a risk to have a tray with a hot lunch” and gets a “sack lunch” 
instead,459 or whether “not allowing prisoners to watch violent television 
programs” would be “stuff” that prisoners would bring to federal court.460 
The oral argument forecast the result. For the majority, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist stepped back from the Court’s reading of Pennsylvania’s 
regulations in Hewitt v. Helms and held that neither Hawaii prison 
regulations nor the Due Process Clause “afforded Conner a protected liberty 
interest” that required procedural protections before placement in 
disciplinary segregation.461 Moreover, the Court expressly disavowed the 
“dicta” Conner had cited: that “freedom from punitive segregation for 
serious misconduct implicates a liberty interest.”462 
Rather, the “regime” of disciplinary segregation fell “within the range 
of confinement to be normally expected for one serving an indeterminate 
term of 30 years to life”463 (whose “normal” expectations were neither 
defined nor sourced). While the discipline was “punitive,” it was not “a 
dramatic departure from the basic conditions of” the sentence,464 and it would 
not “inevitably affect the duration of his sentence.”465 Although some 
ambiguity exists given that the Court referenced state law, its discussion 
identified a constitutionally protected interest when the three factors 
(conditions, duration, and effect on release) were combined. As a matter of 
federal constitutional liberty protections, process was due when prisons 
imposed an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the 
 
 458 Sandin v. Conner, 513 U.S. 921 (1994) (granting certiorari but “limited to Question 1 presented 
by the petition”); see Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (No. 93-
1911). 
 459 Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (No. 93-1911) 
[hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument, Sandin v. Conner]. Justice Breyer discussed this issue of line-
drawing in his dissent, stating that it seemed possible for judges to use their judgment “to separate less 
significant matters . . . from more significant matters.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 500 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 460 Transcript of Oral Argument, Sandin v. Conner, supra note 459, at 33. 
 461 Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487. 
 462 Id. at 485–86 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 463 Id. at 487. 
 464 Id. at 485. 
 465 Id. at 487. 
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ordinary incidents of prison life.”466 This formulation has become the basis 
for hundreds of decisions in the lower courts that, as we discuss below, 
invoke the “ordinary” as if prison were a natural phenomenon rather than the 
construction of law. 
Again, the dissenters protested. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice 
Stevens, reiterated what Justice Stevens said in Meachum—that liberty was 
not a creature of state or federal law but was protected by the Constitution.467 
Further, because the majority had provided no “examples” of its “key words” 
of “atypical and significant hardship,” it left “consumers of the Court’s work 
at sea.”468 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice David Souter, shared Justice 
Ginsburg’s critiques and pointed to the radical differences between the 
regime of disciplinary segregation and that of other prisoners in the same 
prison. Regular prisoners were presumptively out of their cells “for eight 
hours each day,” while people in solitary spent their “entire time alone . . . 
[except for] 50 minutes . . . on average for brief exercise and shower[s],” 
during which they were “constrained by leg irons and waist chains.”469 As 
for the “difficult line-drawing” imposed by the majority’s analysis,470 Justice 
Breyer insisted that lower courts could “separate the unimportant from the 
potentially significant.”471 
2. Baselines, Significance, and Typicality 
Sandin v. Conner involved a person placed into isolation for thirty days. 
A decade after that decision, the Court directly considered long-term solitary 
confinement in Wilkinson v. Austin.472 As the unanimous decision written by 
Justice Kennedy recounted, Ohio’s Supermax could hold more than 500 
people indefinitely. By the time the case was before the Supreme Court, the 
Ohio prisoners’ Eighth Amendment claims had been settled—the focus was 
on the procedures for placing individuals in solitary rather than the 
constitutionality of the practice itself.473 
 
 466 Id. at 484. 
 467 Id. at 489–90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 468 Id. at 490 n.2. 
 469 Id. at 494 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 470 Id. at 497. 
 471 Id. at 500. 
 472 545 U.S. 209 (2005). 
 473 Id. at 213–14, 218. The Court stated that those claims were “settled in the District Court,” 
although “[t]he extent to which the settlement resolved the practices that were the subject of the inmates’ 
Eighth Amendment claim [was] unclear.” Id. at 218. The Sixth Circuit reported that the settlement dealt 
with “Eighth Amendment claims[] related primarily to medical care and the provision of outdoor 
recreation.” Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 F.3d 346, 349 (6th Cir. 2004). The settlement required that Ohio 
establish policies that barred placement of seriously mentally ill people at the State’s Supermax, improved 
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When assessing whether any process was due, the Court’s opinion 
detailed solitary’s horrors, even as it seemed to bolster its legitimacy through 
discussion of the fearsomeness of incarcerated people and the fragility of 
prison security. Conditions in Ohio’s Supermax were described as 
more restrictive than any other form of incarceration in Ohio . . . . [A]lmost 
every aspect of an inmate’s life is controlled and monitored. Inmates must 
remain in their cells, which measure 7 by 14 feet, for 23 hours per day. A light 
remains on . . . at all times, . . . and an inmate who attempts to shield the light 
to sleep is subject to further discipline . . . . [The] cells have solid metal doors 
with metal strips along their sides and bottoms which prevent conversation or 
communication with other inmates. All meals are taken alone . . . . [I]nmates 
are deprived of almost any environmental or sensory stimuli and of almost all 
human contact . . . . for an indefinite period of time, limited only by an inmate’s 
sentence.474 
Nonetheless, according to the Court, “[p]rolonged confinement in 
Supermax may be the State’s only option for the control of some inmates,”475 
as it described Ohio’s prisons as “imperiled by the brutal reality of prison 
gangs[;] . . . [c]landestine, organized, fueled by race-based hostility, and 
committed to fear and violence.”476 
Yet the Court also registered some qualms by holding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment at times required prison officials to ensure the 
fairness of their decision to put a person into this form of solitary 
confinement. The Court’s gruesome details of Ohio Supermax’s 
conditions—where “almost all human contact is prohibited”—coupled with 
its potentially indefinite duration and negative impact on parole, served to 
explain that people so confined had a “liberty interest” upon which 
placement in Supermax infringed.477 The Court provided factors—
conditions, duration, and impact on sentence length—to consider in 
determining if procedural protections were needed. But the decision  did not 
clarify whether all those elements had to be present, whether the list was 
exclusive or could be augmented, how to weigh the factors, the sources of 
information on which to draw, and what baselines to use for comparisons. 
 
and monitored healthcare, and constructed an outdoor recreation space. Austin v. Wilkinson, No. 4:01-
CV-71, 2002 WL 32828650, at *1–2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2002) (approving settlement agreement). 
 474 Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 214–15. 
 475 Id. at 229. 
 476 Id. at 227. In contrast, none of the Justices in Wilkinson discussed the harms of long-term isolation 
that health care professionals explained in their amici filing. See Brief of Professors & Practitioners of 
Psychology & Psychiatry as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 4, Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 
209 (2005) (No. 04-495). 
 477 Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223–24. 
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Indeed, noting “the difficulty of locating the appropriate baseline,” Justice 
Kennedy concluded that the Court did not have to resolve the issue because 
Ohio’s Supermax imposed “an atypical and significant hardship under any 
plausible baseline.”478 Wilkinson thus appeared to recognize a federal liberty 
interest (predating the Constitution or sourced in it) in being free from almost 
total sensory deprivation for an indefinite period that could affect the timing 
of a person’s release from prison. 
To summarize more than fifty years of Supreme Court assessments of 
prison conditions, the Court has classified a series of prison officials’ 
decisions that impose additional adversity on prisoners as part of 
incarceration. The current parameters of what prison entails, according to the 
Court, are first, that transfers are not “atypical and significant hardships,” 
even though corrections regulations term them “adverse” or “significant,” 
and lower courts had chronicled their harmful impacts. Second, thirty days 
in isolation and exercise with irons and chains for a person with an 
indeterminate sentence, in conditions like the Sandin court described for 
prisoners in Halawa Correctional Facility, was not atypical. Third, per 
Wilkinson, potentially indefinite confinement in Ohio’s Supermax version of 
isolation, which both undermined opportunities for parole and entailed 
profound sensory deprivation, was atypical. 
Below, we document that, as Justice Ginsburg flagged in her Sandin 
dissent, the Court’s case law left litigants and judges with few markers to 
direct them when ascribing typicality to some practices and finding others 
“atypical and significant hardship[s].” The questions are many, yet the 
troubling result is, to return to Justice Ginsburg’s metaphor, a sea of lower 
court decisions tolerating profound isolation. 
3. Mining Hundreds of Solitary Confinement Rulings 
To learn how judges have responded to the many questions left open by 
Sandin and Wilkinson, we searched case law databases for opinions that 
assessed claims of solitary confinement and used the phrase “atypical and 
significant hardship.” An initial pull of cases in the lower federal courts from 
1995 (when Sandin was decided) until the end of 2019 produced a total of 
some 9,350 decisions in the Westlaw database.479 Caveats are immediately 
in order, in that neither Westlaw nor Lexis put all district and circuit court 
 
 478 Id. at 223. 
 479 Using Westlaw, we entered the following search string: adv: (atypical! /s significant!) AND 
(“solitary confinement” OR “segregated confinement” OR “adseg” OR “keeplock” OR “special housing 
unit” OR “SHU” OR “restrictive housing” OR “administrative segregation” OR “protective”). We limited 
the search to decisions from January 1, 1995 through September 1, 2019. Those terms generally refer to 
leaving individuals in small cells for twenty-two or more hours a day. 
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decisions online, nor were online posting practices uniform across the time 
period.480 The differences in Figures 8a and 8b therefore do not necessarily 
reflect that certain circuits decided more challenges to solitary confinement 
than others; the decisions in the database may reflect that circuits have 
different practices in terms of making cases available online. Thus, Figures 
8a and 8b provide a window into this voluminous area of law rather than a 
definitive account of all cases that were decided during this time period. 
These numbers are one way to glimpse the hundreds of times that prisoners 
tried to enlist federal judges to protect them from what they believed were 
unfairly imposed in-prison punishments. 
In Figures 8a and 8b below, we tally the decisions we found online by 
circuits, the bulk of which were denominated “unreported” (8,157 at the 
district court and 572 on appeal), as well as the reported cases (414 at the 
district court and 207 on appeal). Among us, we read all the published 
appellate court decisions across all circuits as well as a nonrandom sample 
of unpublished appellate court rulings and a selection of recent lower court 
decisions to confirm that we had found the relevant decisions in each circuit. 
  
 
 480 We contacted both Westlaw and LexisNexis to learn more about their processes for determining 
which opinions are available in the database. Westlaw informed us that the process is “governed by 
agreements that we have with the courts,” while Lexis identified user requests, internal organizational 
guidelines, Shepard’s editors, and competitor benchmarking as the key drivers that shape its process. 
Emails from Westlaw and LexisNexis to Michael VanderHeijden, Head of Reference & Lecturer in Legal 
Research, Yale Law Sch. (Apr. 23, 2020) (on file with authors); see also David A. Hoffman, Alan J. 
Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 
710 & n.138 (2007). 
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FIGURE 8A: VOLUME OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS ADDRESSING ATYPICAL AND 
SIGNIFICANT HARDSHIPS AND SOLITARY CONFINEMENT BY CIRCUIT, 1995–2019 
Circuit Reported Unreported Total 
1st 21 90 111 
2d 174 1015 1189 
3d 39 749 788 
4th 21 830 851 
5th 10 1171 1181 
6th 20 703 723 
7th 34 442 476 
8th 12 539 551 
9th 35 1824 1859 
10th 25 369 394 
11th 7 413 420 
D.C. 16 12 28 




FIGURE 8B: VOLUME OF FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS ADDRESSING ATYPICAL AND 
SIGNIFICANT HARDSHIPS AND SOLITARY CONFINEMENT BY CIRCUIT, 1995–2019 
Circuit Reported Unreported Total 
1st 6 4 10 
2d 44 52 96 
3d 15 76 91 
4th 9 10 19 
5th 14 61 75 
6th 12 94 106 
7th 24 33 57 
8th 26 18 44 
9th 26 100 126 
10th 19 99 118 
11th 5 18 23 
D.C. 7 7 14 
All Circuits 207 572 779 
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In most of the decisions we read, correctional departments sought 
dismissal or summary judgment, and many of the rulings were about whether 
a case can proceed. When assessing the pleadings and limited records, 
circuits varied considerably in their interpretation of what Sandin/Wilkinson 
instructs them to do. Some opinions treated aspects of the inquiry as 
questions of fact, while others considered the issues mixed fact and law, or 
legal issues. Further, some courts either equated atypical with “extreme” or 
“severe” conditions or imposed the additional requirement that prisoners 
demonstrate their conditions were “extreme” or “severe.”481 Moreover, to 
describe the “law” of a circuit requires another caveat because variation 
exists over time and by panels. 
Central to Wilkinson was the potentially indefinite confinement, as 
distinguished from the presumptively fixed term of thirty days in Sandin, for 
which no process was due. Hence, we tried to trace the duration of 
confinement in the body of cases we identified. These opinions do not 
reference empirical research about the impact of isolation on humans, nor do 
they discuss the frequency and length of time people were placed in solitary 
either around the country or in particular jurisdictions. These decisions also 
do not address time frames for isolation set forth in state statutes and 
regulations or in the standards of professional organizations such as the 
American Correctional Association and in international provisions. 
Such resources are now plentiful. For example, in 2015, after an essay 
he wrote that described the experience of being held in isolation for about 
twenty-four hours was published, the Director of the Department of 
Corrections of Colorado imposed a cap that has since become a state 
regulation, placing a fifteen-day limit on holding a person in a cell for 
twenty-two hours or more per day.482 In 2018, Massachusetts required that 
“prisoners held in restrictive housing for a period of more than 60 days” were 
to be provided with “access to vocational, educational and rehabilitative 
programs to the maximum extent possible.”483 A 2019 statute in New Jersey 
prohibited “isolated confinement for more than 20 consecutive days, or for 
more than 30 days during any 60-day period.”484 
 
 481 See, e.g., Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 531–32 (4th Cir. 2015); Joseph v. Curtin, 410 F. 
App’x 865, 868 (6th Cir. 2010); Estate of DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep’t of Corr., Div. of Prisons, 473 F.3d 
1334, 1342 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 482 See Colo. Dep’t of Corr., Reg. No. 650-03, at 2 (effective Mar. 15, 2020), available at 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cdoc/policies-1 [https://perma.cc/N4X3-78J2] (“Restrictive housing 
may only be imposed as a condition of confinement for up to a maximum of 15 consecutive days.”). 
 483 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 127, § 39E (West 2018). 
 484 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-82.8(a)(9) (West 2020). For a compendium of proposed and enacted 
statutes, see ARIANNA ZOGHI, ALEXANDRA HARRINGTON, JUDITH RESNIK & ANNA VANCLEAVE, THE 
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National and transnational standards likewise have set benchmarks and, 
in some instances, have called for the abolition of isolation beyond fifteen 
days. In Canada, the Ontario Court of Appeal held in 2019 that long term 
solitary confinement was unconstitutional and approved a fifteen-day cap on 
placements in solitary.485 In 2016, the American Correctional Association 
adopted new standards for accreditation that labeled confinement lasting 
more than thirty days “extended restrictive housing,”486 and stated that 
prisoners in extended restrictive housing should be given access to certain 
services and programs.487 In 2015, the U.N. adopted the Nelson Mandela 
Rules, which sought to prohibit what it termed to be “[p]rolonged solitary 
confinement,”488 defined as lasting more than fifteen days.489 In addition, data 
from the ASCA/Liman surveys identified that 80% of the people held, as of 
the fall of 2017, spent a year or less in solitary confinement.490 
Instead of routinely turning to these regulations or other sources, federal 
courts recount the days, months, or years a person has been confined and 
 
LIMAN CTR. AT YALE LAW SCH., REGULATING RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: STATE AND FEDERAL 
LEGISLATION ON SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AS OF JULY 1, 2019 (2019), 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/liman/document/restrictive_housing_legislation_resea
rch_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/VPB3-JBDG]. 
 485 The Canadian Press, Ontario Court of Appeal Rules More than 15 Days in Solitary ‘Cruel and 
Unusual,’ CBC (Mar. 28, 2019, 7:05 PM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/ontario-court-of-
appeal-puts-limits-on-solitary-confinement-1.5076169 [https://perma.cc/LMD9-ZR4H]. In April 2020, 
the press reported that the Canadian federal government decided not to pursue an appeal of this decision. 
See Patrick White, Canada Abandons Solitary Confinement Appeal to Supreme Court, GLOBE & MAIL 
(Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-canada-abandons-solitary-
confinement-appeal-to-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/4Q49-B7Y3]. 
 486 AM. CORR. ASS’N, RESTRICTIVE HOUSING PERFORMANCE BASED STANDARDS 3 (2016), 
http://www.aca.org/aca_prod_imis/docs/Standards%20And%20Accreditation/RHStandards2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EWQ3-SEQA] [hereinafter ACA STANDARDS]. 
 487 See id. at 32 (ACA Standard 4-RH-0027 for prisons); id. at 62 (ACA Standard 4-ALDF-RH-021 
for local detention facilities). The ACA 2016 standards also called for not using restrictive housing for 
people under age eighteen, id. at 39 (ACA Standard 4-RH-0034 for prisons); id. at 66 (ACA Standard 4-
ALDF-RH-025 for local detention facilities); for pregnant women, id. at 38 (ACA Standard 4-RH-0033 
for prisons); id. at 65 (ACA Standard 4-ALDF-RH-024 for local detention facilities); and for people with 
“serious mental illness,” id. at 36 (ACA Standard 4-RH-0031 for prisons); id. at 69 (ACA Standard 4-
ALDF-RH-028 for local detention facilities). The standards also called on correctional facilities not to 
place people in restrictive housing solely based on their gender identity. Id. at 40 (ACA Standard 4-RH-
0035 for prisons); id. at 68 (ACA Standard 4-ALDF-RH-027 for local detention facilities). 
 488 Nelson Mandela Rules, supra note 194, at 13. Rule 43 states that “[i]n no circumstances may 
restrictions or disciplinary sanctions amount to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment,” and that both “indefinite” and “prolonged” solitary confinement are “prohibited,” as well 
as placement in a constantly lit or dark cell, corporal punishment, food and drinking water reductions, 
collective punishments, punitive chaining and shackling, and prohibiting contact with family as a 
punishment. Id. at 13–14. 
 489 Id. at 14 (Rule 44). 
 490 See supra Figure 2. 
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then use underspecified criteria to determine whether that length of time 
contributes to, represents, or fails to constitute an “atypical and significant 
hardship.” The opinions demonstrate that federal judges have a high 
tolerance for permitting individuals to be isolated for years and decades, and 
most circuits provide little explication of how long is too long. 
The Second Circuit has established some time frames through a series 
of rulings, creating benchmarks of 30, 101, and 305 days. In 1999, in Sealey 
v. Giltner, that court held that placement for 101 days in the Special Housing 
Unit (SHU) of New York’s Auburn Correctional Facility did not, in and of 
itself, constitute an atypical and significant hardship requiring procedural 
protection.491 Other Second Circuit opinions have since invoked this decision 
for the standard that “restrictive confinements of less than 101 days do not 
generally raise a liberty interest warranting due process protection, and thus 
require proof of conditions more onerous than usual” to warrant procedural 
protections.492 
The Second Circuit has also concluded that an individual who spent 305 
days or more in a special housing unit (SHU), under what the court termed 
“normal SHU conditions,” had spent a period of time that was “a sufficient 
departure from the ordinary incidents of prison life to require procedural due 
process protections under Sandin.”493 Between 101 and 305 days, the Second 
 
 491 See 197 F.3d 578, 580, 589–90 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 492 Smith v. Arnone, 700 F. App’x 55, 56 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (quoting Davis v. Barrett, 
576 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam)). The Second Circuit has generally treated the question of 
what conditions are more onerous than usual as a factual question for the district court to adjudicate based 
on “a detailed record.” Palmer v. Richards, 364 F.3d 60, 64–65 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Colon v. Howard, 
215 F.3d 227, 232 (2d Cir. 2000)); see also Davis, 576 F.3d at 135. The court may have considered the 
conditions alleged by Samuel Ed Davis to be especially onerous. They included twenty-four-hour 
confinement in a cell that flooded daily, a mattress containing “body waste,” and other prisoners throwing 
feces and urine. Id. at 134. But the court in that case did not decide whether such conditions qualified as 
“atypical and significant” because the district court had not developed a factual record detailed enough 
to determine whether it differed from conditions in the general population or in administrative 
segregation. Id. at 133, 135. 
 493 Colon, 215 F.3d at 231. Armando Colon had spent 305 consecutive days in disciplinary 
confinement in two New York State prisons, Clinton Correctional Facility and Attica Correctional 
Facility. Id. at 229. In a portion of his Colon panel opinion that did not garner a majority, Judge Jon 
Newman proposed “establishing a bright-line rule that confinement in normal SHU conditions of more 
than 180 days meets the Sandin standard.” Id. at 232. He argued that doing so would give guidance to 
prison officials and limit the need for litigation. Id. at 233. Judge John Walker objected, writing that the 
proposed cutoff was “not arrived at by adjudication but by legislative fiat.” Id. at 235 (Walker, J., 
concurring). Colon has since been invoked as setting 305 days as a marker triggering procedural 
protections. See Reynoso v. Selsky, 292 F. App’x 120, 122–23 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary order) (citing 
Colon, 215 F.3d at 231–32). 
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Circuit has on occasion called for the “development of a detailed record”494 
that could include “evidence of the psychological effects of prolonged 
confinement in isolation and the precise frequency of SHU confinements of 
varying durations.”495 
The Second Circuit has also concluded that, in general, spending 
between 30 and 101 days in solitary confinement is not in and of itself 
“atypical and significant,” absent evidence that the conditions were worse 
than what the court called “normal SHU conditions” or “that even relatively 
brief confinements under normal SHU conditions were, in fact, atypical.”496 
In such cases, the circuit has sometimes remanded for “a ‘detailed factual 
record.’”497 If a person is confined for less than thirty days—a period the 
Second Circuit has called “exceedingly short”498—then the court has 
generally affirmed lower courts’ dismissals of due process claims without 
requiring a “detailed factual record,”499 unless some information suggested 
that a prisoner “endured unusual SHU conditions.”500 
The inquiry into “unusual SHU conditions” entails some idea of 
“normal” solitary confinement. In its 2000 decision in Colon, the Second 
Circuit relied on New York State’s prison regulations to conclude that “the 
normal conditions of SHU confinement in New York”501 included a person 
being 
placed in a solitary confinement cell, kept in his cell for 23 hours a day, 
permitted to exercise in the prison yard for one hour a day, limited to two 
showers a week, and denied various privileges available to general population 
prisoners, such as the opportunity to work and obtain out-of-cell schooling. 
 
 494 Colon, 215 F.3d at 232; see, e.g., Welch v. Bartlett, 196 F.3d 389, 393–95 (2d Cir. 1999); Brooks 
v. DiFasi, 112 F.3d 46, 48–49 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Reynoso, 292 F. App’x at 123; Sims v. Artuz, 
230 F.3d 14, 23 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[W]e have characterized segregative sentences of 125 [to] 288 days as 
‘relatively long,’ and thus necessitating ‘specific articulation of . . . factual findings’ before the district 
court could properly term the confinement atypical or insignificant.” (citations omitted) (alterations 
omitted)). 
 495 Colon, 215 F.3d at 232. When there is no dispute about the relevant facts, the court has remanded 
to district courts to make “particularized findings.” Id.; see also Welch, 196 F.3d at 393–95. 
 496 Davis, 576 F.3d at 133 (quoting Palmer, 364 F.3d at 65). For confinements between 30 and 101 
days, district courts must also “conduct a thorough comparison of the alleged conditions of . . . 
confinement with those of the general population.” Id. at 135. 
 497 Id. (quoting Palmer, 364 F.3d at 65). 
 498 Palmer, 364 F.3d at 65–66. 
 499 Id. (citing Hynes v. Squillace, 143 F.3d 653, 658–59 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam), cert. denied, 
525 U.S. 907 (1998) (twenty-one days)); see also Arce v. Walker, 139 F.3d 329, 335–36 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(eighteen days); Frazier v. Coughlin, 81 F.3d 313, 317 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (twelve days). 
 500 Palmer, 364 F.3d at 65–66. 
 501 Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 230 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 
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Visitors were permitted, but the frequency and duration was less than in general 
population. The number of books allowed in the cell was also limited.502 
Those confined for less than 101 days had to demonstrate conditions more 
severe than the rules provided to establish an atypical and significant 
hardship. 
Some decisions of the Ninth Circuit have also focused on the length of 
time in isolation. For example, a 2014 decision concluded that twenty-seven 
months in isolation with “no meaningful review” constituted an atypical and 
significant hardship.503 A 2020 decision, Mizzoni v. Nevada, followed and 
relied on the duration of confinement—eighteen months—as the linchpin of 
a liberty interest if, as alleged, that term was “functionally unreviewable.”504 
Other appellate courts have tolerated periods of isolation calculated not 
in days or months but in years. For example, the Tenth Circuit has addressed 
thirteen,505 seventeen,506 and twenty years507 in solitary confinement and has 
not required procedural protections. Moreover, an indefinite term in solitary, 
if coupled with “periodic placement reviews,” did not require due process 
protections.508 
A parallel approach can be found in two decisions of the Seventh 
Circuit, which held in 1997 and again in 2003 that “[t]he length of 
disciplinary segregation does not implicate a federally protected liberty 
interest even if the period extends for the entire term of incarceration.”509 
Applying this rule, the court declined to find that liberty interests required 
due process protections when a prisoner faced a nine-year term in solitary 
confinement.510 After the 2005 Wilkinson decision, the circuit shifted 
 
 502 Id. (citation omitted). 
 503 Brown v. Or. Dep’t of Corr., 751 F.3d 983, 987–88 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 504 795 F. App’x 521, 521–22, (9th Cir. 2020). 
 505 Rezaq v. Nalley, 677 F.3d 1001, 1007, 1016 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 506 Grissom v. Werholtz, 524 F. App’x 467, 469, 474 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 507 Grissom v. Roberts, 902 F.3d 1162, 1166, 1170–72 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 508 Stallings v. Werholtz, 492 F. App’x 841, 845–46 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is not necessary for us to 
closely review the process at this stage. The availability of periodic reviews merely suggests that the 
confinement was not indefinite.” (quoting Rezaq, 677 F.3d at 1016)). Such placement reviews may take 
place as infrequently as twice a year. See Rezaq, 677 F.3d at 1016. 
 509 Hernandez v. Hanks, 65 F. App’x 72, 74 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 
1176 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
 510 At the time of the Seventh Circuit’s decision, Rosalio Hernandez was facing a nine-year term in 
solitary confinement. The court noted that Hernandez’s prison term was “projected to end in 2054.” See 
id. at 73. Under the Wagner rule, Hernandez would therefore have no liberty interest even if he were held 
in solitary confinement for fifty-six years; Hernandez had already been in solitary for five years when the 
opinion was published. Thomas “Wagner[] was ordered to serve a year in disciplinary segregation in the 
Wabash Valley Correctional Institution, in Indiana.” Wagner, 128 F.3d at 1174. 
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somewhat.511 For example, writing that  the “Supreme Court’s decisions are 
helpful in setting out the durational parameters of a prison-segregation due 
process analysis,” the Seventh Circuit held that 240 days in solitary 
confinement could be “sufficiently long to implicate a cognizable liberty 
interest if the conditions of confinement during that period were sufficiently 
severe.”512 
Aside from the Second and Ninth Circuits, most appellate cases have 
not used the length of time alone to constitute an atypical and significant 
hardship.513 For example, in a 1998 (pre-Wilkinson) ruling, the Sixth Circuit 
 
 511 See, e.g., Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2015). In Kervin, the court stated that a duration 
of confinement “considerably shorter” than six months “may, depending on the conditions of confinement 
and on any additional punishments, establish a violation,” id. at 836, and that judges who believe terms 
of less than six months can never trigger due process “may be unfamiliar with the nature of modern prison 
segregation and the psychological damage that it can inflict,” id. at 837. Shane Kervin was incarcerated 
at “an Indiana prison.” Id. at 834. 
 512 Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 694, 697 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 513 Time is assessed in relationship to other factors. In the Eleventh Circuit, for example, a term of 
less than a year in solitary confinement generally has not qualified unless the conditions of confinement 
are substantially worse. See, e.g., Simpkins v. Gulf CI Warden, No. 16-17386-E, 2017 WL 6034508, at 
*3 (11th Cir. Apr. 21, 2017); Mathews v. Moss, 506 F. App’x 981, 983 (11th Cir. 2013); Walker v. 
Grable, 414 F. App’x 187, 188 (11th Cir. 2011); Young v. Rios, 390 F. App’x 982, 983–84 (11th Cir. 
2010); Smith v. Reg’l Dir. of Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 368 F. App’x 9, 13 (11th Cir. 2010); Shaarbay v. Palm 
Beach Cty. Jail, 350 F. App’x 359, 361–62 (11th Cir. 2009); Thomas v. Warner, 237 F. App’x 435, 438 
(11th Cir. 2007). 
 The court has held that over 100 days in solitary confinement with revoked visiting privileges, 
curtailed television and library privileges, and a special management meal triggered due process. See 
Spaulding v. Woodall, 551 F. App’x 984, 985–87 (11th Cir. 2014). The court has also found that two 
years in administrative segregation with no hearings and severe hardships (vermin in the cell, little 
recreation, and unhygienic shower conditions) may trigger due process. Quintanilla v. Bryson, 730 F. 
App’x 738, 745, 747 (11th Cir. 2018). But the court in an earlier case held that while a “four-year 
confinement in administrative segregation was lengthy, it did not tip the balance in favor of establishing 
a liberty interest when weighed against other factors in his case—the conditions of his confinement were 
generally equivalent to general prison population conditions.” Morefield v. Smith, 404 F. App’x 443, 446 
(11th Cir. 2010). 
 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit looks at a combination of duration and specific conditions to determine 
what constitutes an atypical and significant hardship. Though it has not established a temporal baseline, 
its opinions have found in certain cases that around six months in administrative segregation does not 
implicate a protected liberty interest. See Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 501–02 (4th Cir. 1997); see 
also Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 253–54 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding that a 110-day stay in segregation 
did not constitute atypical and significant hardship), cert. denied sub nom. Duffy v. Martin, 138 S. Ct. 
738 (2018). Nor did a six-year stay in solitary on death row constitute atypical and significant hardship. 
See Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 247 (4th Cir. 2015). But a twenty-year stay in security detention, 
combined with severe conditions, did constitute an atypical and significant hardship. See Incumaa v. 
Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 531 (4th Cir. 2015) (finding that a twenty-year confinement to security detention 
was “extraordinary in its duration and indefiniteness”). 
 The District of Columbia Circuit similarly has not found terms of confinement (that were not 
indefinite) to qualify unless accompanied by a deprivation that is sufficiently severe. See, e.g., Hatch v. 
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held that it was “not ‘atypical’” for a prisoner to be in segregation for 2.5 
years when being investigated as a participant in a riot in which a prison 
guard died. The court concluded that, although that duration was unusually 
long, the time in segregation did not give rise to a liberty interest because the 
confinement was “not much different than that experienced by other inmates 
in segregation.”514 
On occasion, an extraordinary length of time has moved appellate 
courts to vary from this approach. In 2014, in Wilkerson v. Goodwin, the 
Fifth Circuit concluded that the thirty-nine years that Albert Woodfox spent 
in solitary confinement at the Louisiana State Penitentiary constituted an 
atypical and significant hardship.515 Whether compared “to other inmates in 
the general population, other inmates in segregated confinement within the 
Louisiana system as a whole, or other inmates serving life sentences,” 
Woodfox’s confinement could not “be classified as ‘ordinary’ according to 
any measure.”516 But within that circuit, lower courts have not relied on this 
decision to classify shorter forms of “long-term segregation” as an atypical 
and substantial hardship.517 
In addition to inter-circuit variation, the case law of some circuits does 
not permit generalizations. For example, in three unreported per curiam 
decisions in the Eighth Circuit, the court held that spending four years, 
twelve years, and thirteen years in segregated confinement qualified as 
 
District of Columbia, 184 F.3d 846, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Neal v. District of Columbia, 131 F.3d 172, 
175 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 514 Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812–13 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 515 774 F.3d 845, 856 (5th Cir. 2014). Woodfox provides a vivid account of his experiences in his 
book. See WOODFOX, supra note 14. 
 516 Wilkerson, 774 F.3d at 856 (citation omitted). The Fifth Circuit has rejected other challenges to 
prolonged confinement. For example, the Fifth Circuit found that Marjan Rroku’s 513-day confinement 
did not trigger due process concerns because he did not show that it was significantly different from the 
general population. See Rroku v. Cole, 726 F. App’x 201, 202, 205 (5th Cir. 2018). He had alleged that 
the confinement included “cold, noise, dirt, no showers, no recreation, no law library access, non-stop 
light, a liquid diet, and improper medical care” that resulted in Rroku’s development of life-threatening 
and irreversible medical conditions. See Rroku v. Cole, No. 1:15-cv-000294, 2016 WL 4821137, at *1 
(W.D. La. Aug. 11, 2016). 
 517 See Gray v. King, No. 3:17-cv-385-CWR-LRA, 2019 WL 3756482, at *2 (S.D. Miss. May 17, 
2019). Depriest Gray, held in Central Mississippi Correctional Institution, alleged that he was placed in 
solitary confinement for a year, which, in addition to isolation, caused him to “los[e] several privileges, 
including the right to use athletic and recreational facilities”; “to walk around the prison”; “to perform 
general work detail”; “to access the library”; “have contact visitation”; or “attend worship services 
allowed to the general population.” Id. at *1. Gray also alleged “that for the first two weeks in segregation, 
he was provided no clothes.” Id. The magistrate judge recommended that his complaint, filed pro se, be 
“dismissed as frivolous.” Id. at *2. No party filed objections and the district court adopted the 
recommendation. See Gray v. King, No. 3:17-cv-385-CWR-LLRA, 2019 WL 3754918, at *1 (S.D. Miss. 
Aug. 8, 2019). 
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atypical and significant hardships.518 Yet reported decisions in the same 
circuit offered the formulation that “administrative and disciplinary 
segregation are not atypical and significant hardships under Sandin.”519 
Indeed, in these decisions, the Eighth Circuit did not focus on the time spent 
but called instead on a prisoner to identify “some specific difference between 
his conditions in segregation and the conditions in the general population 
which amounts to such a hardship.”520 
To capture some of the variation, Figure 9 charts the range of time and 
case law in different circuits. The bars on the left represent durations that 
each court of appeals has deemed not to be in and of itself an atypical and 
significant hardship. The bars on the right show the durations that the courts 
have decided require due process protections. The middle portions denote 
durations that circuits have not addressed or where the law is ambiguous. 
 
 518 See Chestang v. Varner Super Max, 496 F. App’x 684, 686 (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“almost 
four years” in either administrative segregation or “the prison’s behavior modification program”); 
Williams v. Norris, 277 F. App’x 647, 648–49 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (twelve years in administrative 
segregation); Herron v. Schriro, 11 F. App’x 659, 661–62 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (affirming district 
court finding, after trial, that more than thirteen years in administrative segregation was an atypical and 
significant hardship under Sandin). 
 519 Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1065 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 520 Johnson v. Hamilton, 452 F.3d 967, 973 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 
847 (8th Cir. 2003)). For example, the court has found that twenty-six months in administrative 
segregation does not qualify as atypical and significant. See Rahman X v. Morgan, 300 F.3d 970, 972 
(8th Cir. 2002). 
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FIGURE 9: VARYING EVALUATIONS OF THE IMPACT OF THE TIME SPENT WHEN CIRCUITS ASSESS 
ATYPICAL AND SIGNIFICANT HARDSHIPS 
 
Another potential marker under Sandin and Wilkinson is whether 
placement in some form of disciplinary confinement has an impact on release 
from prison by altering a prisoner’s parole eligibility, the ability to accrue 
good-time credits, or otherwise. Not all circuits regularly focus on this issue; 
directives to do so come from the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. For 
example, a 1997 ruling by the Seventh Circuit concluded that a liberty 
interest existed, and hence that procedural protections were required, if 
prison discipline “takes the form of prolonging the prisoner’s 
incarceration,”521 such as causing the loss of good-time credits.522 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit required analysis of “whether the state’s 
action will invariably affect the duration of the prisoner’s sentence,”523 along 
with consideration of the two other Sandin factors: “the duration of the 
 
 521 Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 522 See, e.g., Castro v. Hastings, 74 F. App’x 607, 610 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 523 Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 
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condition, and the degree of restraint imposed” along with “whether the 
challenged condition ‘mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in 
administrative segregation and protective custody.’”524 The Tenth Circuit 
also called for inquiry into whether “the placement increases the duration of 
confinement,” along with consideration of whether “the segregation relates 
to and furthers a legitimate penological interest,” whether “the conditions of 
placement are extreme,” and whether “the placement is indeterminate.”525 A 
Third Circuit decision dealt with a case in which parole had been granted but 
the person had not been released before being placed for thirty-five days in 
disciplinary segregation; the court reasoned that parole authorities’ 
discretion meant that no liberty interest existed and that putting that prisoner 
into solitary confinement did not impose an atypical and significant 
hardship.526 
Circuits differ on whether conditions alone can constitute an atypical 
and substantial hardship, the impact of conditions in a multifactor test, and 
what comparisons to make. What happens inside the cells and the contrast to 
other forms of incarceration were also relevant in Wilkinson, which 
discussed the profound sensory deprivations of Ohio’s Supermax where 
lights were on 24/7. As we discussed, Sandin ignored the different limits on 
movement and hygiene imposed on people in solitary as contrasted with 
those in the general population.527 Wilkinson, acknowledging the lack of 
clarity in the case law on baselines, declined to specify what to use.528  
In making comparisons, lower courts sometimes looked at conditions 
in the general population of the prison where the individual was incarcerated. 
Other decisions relied on the confinement imposed in the most restrictive 
confinement in the state. For example, in the 2017 Third Circuit decision of 
Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, the court 
stated that “[t]he terms ‘ordinary’ and ‘routine’ direct us to use a general 
metric (the general population).”529 The same year, the Fourth Circuit 
 
 524 Id. (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995)). 
 525 Estate of DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep’t of Corr., Div. of Prisons, 473 F.3d 1334, 1342 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 526 Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 186–87 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 527 The Court noted in Sandin that “[b]ased on a comparison between inmates inside and outside 
disciplinary segregation, the State’s actions in placing [the defendant] there for 30 days did not work a 
major disruption in his environment” in holding that “Conner’s discipline in segregated confinement did 
not present . . . [an] atypical, significant deprivation.” 515 U.S. at 486. 
 528 In Wilkinson, the Court acknowledged inconsistency among the circuits as to “the baseline from 
which to measure what is atypical and significant” and concluded that it “need not resolve the issue here.” 
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005). 
 529 848 F.3d 549, 564 (3d Cir. 2017). An earlier Third Circuit opinion explained that although it had 
“not conclusively determined the baseline from which to measure what is ‘atypical and significant’ in any 
particular prison system, and we do not do so here, we are satisfied that [the prisoner] has not 
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compared conditions of solitary to those of “the general population.”530 Two 
years earlier, the Fourth Circuit had, in Incumaa v. Stirling, used that 
reference to conclude that Lumumba Incumaa had demonstrated not only 
that his confinement to a Special Management Unit (SMU) was 
“extraordinary in its duration and indefiniteness,” but also that the conditions 
of his confinement in SMU were “severely restrictive and socially 
isolating.”531 In contrast to individuals in general population, Incumaa was 
held in a small cell for all but approximately ten hours each month; had been 
subjected to “near-daily cavity and strip searches”; had no opportunity to 
socialize with other prisoners; and had no access to “educational, vocational, 
and therapy programs.”532 
Within circuits, comparisons about conditions can also vary. In the 
Second Circuit, some opinions have required a comparison between a 
challenged confinement and conditions within the general population, while 
others compare conditions to those of individuals in administrative and 
protective segregation, or to people either within the same facility533 or 
 
demonstrated that he had a liberty interest that defendants could have infringed.” Fantone, 780 F.3d at 
189. 
 The Williams case sought damages; Craig Williams, a death row prisoner at SCI-Greene, and Shawn 
T. Walker, a death row prisoner at SCI Graterford, who both had their death row convictions vacated, 
argued that officials had “violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process by” subjecting them 
to solitary confinement “without meaningful review of their placements after their death sentences had 
been vacated.” The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on the grounds that 
prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity. Further, the court noted that the circuit had not fixed 
on a specific baseline. Williams, 848 F.3d at 553, 554, 555, 560. As previously noted, the State agreed to 
reduce the isolation of individuals with capital sentences in the 2020 approval of the class action 
settlement in Reid v. Wetzel. See Settlement Agreement, Reid v. Wetzel, supra note 264, at 3. 
 530 Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 253 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 
528–29 (4th Cir. 2015)). Anthony F. Martin, a prisoner of South Carolina’s Perry Correctional Institution, 
challenged his placement in solitary confinement on the grounds that it had been in retaliation for filing 
a grievance. Id. at 243. The Fourth Circuit concluded that while Martin had “failed to state claims under 
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses,” he had pleaded sufficient facts alleging a First 
Amendment violation, and that the defendant prison captain was not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. 
 531 791 F.3d at 521, 528, 531–32. Lumumba Kenyatta Incumaa challenged his placement in solitary 
confinement for over twenty years, first in the Maximum-Security Unit and then, starting in 2005, the 
Special Management Unit of the South Carolina Department of Corrections. Id. at 519, 521. 
 532 Id. at 531. In 2019, a lower court in the Fourth Circuit denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss 
the plaintiff’s complaint that solitary confinement at Virginia’s Red Onion State Prison both violated the 
Eighth Amendment, and gave rise to Fourteenth Amendment due process protections. See supra notes 
282–283 and accompanying text. The “atypical and significant hardship” imposed included a lack of 
human contact, the use of shackles and restraints, frequent cavity searches, and restrictions on commissary 
purchases of food, as compared to conditions of prisoners in general population. Reyes v. Clarke, No. 
3:18-cv-611, 2019 WL 4044316, at *2, *14–23 (E.D. Va. Aug. 27, 2019). 
 533 Davis v. Barrett, 576 F.3d 129, 133–34 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Welch v. Bartlett, 196 F.3d 389, 
392–94 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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statewide.534 Other circuits have used as comparisons the conditions 
experienced by prisoners held in administrative segregation either where the 
prisoner was held or where the state could transfer the prisoner. For example, 
in a 2016 decision, Aref v. Lynch, the D.C. Circuit concluded that, in most 
cases, judges had to assess conditions imposed on similarly situated 
prisoners placed in that facility in “administrative segregation.”535 Yet, 
because it was normally expected for prisoners to be transferred to another 
prison with more restrictive conditions, the conditions at that more restrictive 
facility could also be used to provide the relevant comparison to the 
challenged confinement.536 
In Wagner v. Hanks, a 1997 decision authored by Judge Posner, the 
Seventh Circuit adopted a baseline of the conditions experienced by 
prisoners in the “most restrictive” confinement in the state.537 In contrast, in 
a 2017 case, Judge Posner commented that it could be atypical and 
significant for “an elderly prisoner convicted of a nonviolent crime such as 
bank fraud and serving his prison term in a minimum-security prison[] . . . 
to be sent to a high-security prison for a trivial disciplinary infraction.”538 
Further, Judge Posner clarified that less than six months in solitary 
confinement should not always be considered an insufficient duration for a 
claim to be stated (“[a] considerably shorter period of segregation may, 
depending on the conditions of confinement and on any additional 
punishments, establish a violation”), and suggested that “[j]udges who lean 
toward such presumption may be unfamiliar with the nature of modern 
prison segregation and the psychological damage that it can inflict.”539 
In addition to duration, conditions, and impact on release, which were 
the focus of Wilkinson, some circuits impose other requirements. The Tenth 
Circuit has a four-factor test, focused first on whether “the segregation 
 
 534 See Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 231 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 535 833 F.3d 242, 255 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 536 See Hatch v. District of Columbia, 184 F.3d 846, 857–58 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Donald Hatch, a 
prisoner at the Lorton Correctional Complex, “filed suit against the District of Columbia in the United 
States District Court” on the grounds that his solitary confinement “violated the Due Process Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution as well as D.C. regulations governing Lorton.” Id. at 848–49. 
 537 128 F.3d 1173, 1176–77 (7th Cir. 1997). The Seventh Circuit noted that “[e]very state must have 
somewhere in its prison system single-person cells in which prisoners are sometimes confined not because 
they have misbehaved but simply because the prison has no other space, wishes to protect some prisoners 
from others, wishes to keep prisoners isolated from one another in order to minimize the risk of riots or 
other disturbances, wishes to prevent the spread of disease, and so forth[,]” and thus these conditions 
could not be atypical. See id. at 1176. 
 538 Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 539 Id. at 836–37. Shane Kervin, the plaintiff in the case, received no release, as the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of his suit. Id. at 837. 
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furthers a legitimate penological interest, such as safety or rehabilitation,” 
second on whether conditions in confinement are “extreme,” third on the 
impact of confinement on duration, and fourth on whether placement is 
“indeterminate.”540 In Rezaq v. Nalley, for example, Omar Rezaq, 
Mohammed Saleh, Ibrahim Elgabrowny, and El-Sayyid Nosair had all been 
convicted of “terrorism-related offenses” and transferred from general 
population penitentiaries to ADX Florence, the federal system’s highly 
restrictive prison. The court concluded that the Bureau of Prisons had not 
violated the prisoners’ due process rights because the transfer did not 
implicate a liberty interest, even though 
[p]risoners housed in the general population unit at ADX spend twenty-three 
hours a day confined to their cells. The typical cell at ADX measures eighty-
seven square feet and contains a bed, desk, sink, toilet, and shower. Inmates 
take their meals alone in their cells. Although BOP policy provides for ten hours 
of recreation per week, recreation is frequently cancelled due to staff shortages, 
mass shakedowns, or adverse weather.541 
Since deciding Rezaq, the court has also not found conditions to be 
“extreme” when prisoners were placed under the more restrictive Special 
Administrative Measures (SAM) at ADX Florence. Atop the rules detailed 
above, those prisoners were only to communicate with immediate family 
members, either by monitored phone calls or noncontact visits, and their 
legal representatives.542 
The Tenth Circuit has applied its extremity test to prisoners held in state 
as well as federal facilities. Illustrative are decisions related to the 
confinement of Richard Grissom, incarcerated in Kansas. In 2007, Grissom 
challenged his decade in an “eight-by-fourteen f[oo]t” cell in which, he 
alleged, he was kept twenty-three to twenty-four hours a day.543 He reported 
that the cell was furnished with “a solid concrete bed with a two-inch 
 
 540 Estate of DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep’t of Corr., Div. of Prisons, 473 F.3d 1334, 1342 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 541 Rezaq v. Nalley, 677 F.3d 1001, 1004–05 (10th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). During the course 
of the litigation, and not as the result of any order from the courts, each of the prisoners was transferred 
out of ADX Florence, and into the BOP’s “Communication Management Units” at other facilities—
“more restrictive than the general population units” within typical federal prisons, but less restrictive than 
general population at ADX Florence. Id. at 1005. 
 542 Gowadia v. Stearns, 596 F. App’x 667, 668, 673 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (noting that while Rezaq “dealt with general population prisoners and Gowadia is incarcerated 
in a specialty unit, he fails to assert that his confinement differs from that of the plaintiffs in Rezaq”). 
 543 Grissom v. Roberts (Grissom IV), 902 F.3d 1162, 1169 (10th Cir. 2018); Grissom v. Werholtz 
(Grissom II), 524 F. App’x 467, 469–70 (10th Cir. 2013). Our description of Grissom’s conditions comes 
from the 2018 decision because the Tenth Circuit ruled that his conditions at that time had not become 
“more severe” since the 2013 decision. See Grissom IV, 902 F.3d at 1172. 
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mattress,”544 that lights were “more or less” on all day and all night,545 and 
that the enclosure was “designed to maximize sensory deprivation,” due to 
its “solid metal doors trimmed with rubber seals” that blocked all sound 
entering or exiting the cell.546 In an unpublished 2013 decision, the Tenth 
Circuit found that Grissom had not shown he had a protected liberty interest 
because none of the four factors of its test had been met.547 Five years later, 
and despite an impassioned concurrence that laid out the studies of how 
injurious profound isolation was and called for the Tenth Circuit to revisit its 
law,548 the majority in 2018 upheld the grant of summary judgment for the 
correctional staff on the grounds that Grissom could not overcome their 
qualified immunity; the Tenth Circuit’s earlier decisions did not make such 
treatment clearly violative of established rights.549 
Other circuits’ decisions likewise tolerate radically impoverished 
confinement. In 1997, for example, Brian Beverati and Emil Van Aelst 
averred that their administrative segregation cells in the Maryland 
Penitentiary “were infested with vermin; were smeared with human feces 
and urine; and were flooded with water from a leak in the toilet on the floor 
above.”550 They alleged “they were forced to use their clothing and shampoo 
to clean the cells”;551 that the cells were at times “unbearably hot”; that they 
were released from their cells only “three to four times per week, rather than 
seven”; and that they received considerably less food than prisoners in 
general population.552 Accepting these allegations as true for purposes of 
reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the State, the 
Fourth Circuit concluded that the conditions “were not so atypical that 
exposure to them for six months imposed a significant hardship in relation 
to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”553 
 
 544 Id. at 1169. 
 545 Id. 
 546 Id. 
 547 See Grissom II, 524 F. App’x at 474–75. 
 548 Grissom IV, 902 F.3d at 1175, 1176–77 (Lucero, J., concurring in the judgment). He concluded 
that it was “important to establish that the prolonged term of solitary confinement before us—twenty 
consecutive years—based on what appears to be marginal justification, violates the Due Process Clause.” 
Id. at 1175. 
 549 Id. at 1172–73, 1175 (majority opinion). The court also rejected Grissom’s claim, in part for 
briefing failures, that he had been discriminated against as an African American. Id. at 1173. 
 550 Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 504 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 551 Id. 
 552 Id. 
 553 Id. 
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The Court of Appeals in the Sixth Circuit was similarly unpersuaded 
that Michael Powell had been subjected to atypical and substantial hardships 
in Michigan’s Chippewa Correctional Facility. After the prison found him 
guilty of possessing a weapon and fighting with another prisoner, it placed 
Powell in solitary confinement for what became six months.554 Powell filed 
a Section 1983 civil rights claim, seeking compensatory and punitive 
damages as well as injunctive relief. He alleged that, while in solitary, “he 
was having suicidal thoughts and trouble sleeping and was losing weight”; 
that the water in the cell was shut off from “12:00 a.m. [to] 6:30 a.m.” and 
therefore he could neither “drink water [n]or flush the toilet during this 
time”; and that, for over a month of his confinement, he “had no working 
light in his cell.”555 The district court granted summary judgment for the 
State, and the Circuit commented “that most of the deprivations he 
experienced were not extreme and were no more than temporary 
inconveniences.”556 
Yet, in some cases, descriptions of disabling conditions have prompted 
courts to entertain claims for relief. Exemplary is a decision by the Seventh 
Circuit, which reversed a grant of summary judgment for the State and held 
that the district court had wrongly concluded that the prisoner, Nathan Gillis, 
had no liberty interest in avoiding confinement to his state’s “Behavioral 
Modification Program.”557 That decision began: 
Stripped naked in a small prison cell with nothing except a toilet; forced to sleep 
on a concrete floor or slab; denied any human contact; fed nothing but “nutri-
loaf”; and given just a modicum of toilet paper—four squares—only a few 
times. Although this might sound like a stay at a Soviet gulag in the 1930s, it 
is, according to the claims in this case, Wisconsin in 2002.558 
Likewise, in Serrano v. Francis, the Ninth Circuit held in 2003 that a 
placement for almost two months in the SHU gave rise to a liberty interest 
because 
Serrano was denied use of his wheelchair, which he was permitted to use in the 
general population. Serrano has alleged that he could not take a proper shower; 
that he could not use the toilet without hoisting himself up by the seat; that he 
had to crawl into bed by his arms; that he could not partake in outdoor exercise 
 
 554 Powell v. Washington, 720 F. App’x 222, 226 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 555 Id. at 224–25. 
 556 Id. at 225, 228. The court affirmed the grant except on the Eighth Amendment claim for 
inadequate cell lighting because it found the “alleged deprivation of adequate lighting . . . for thirty-five 
days . . . sufficiently extreme to state an Eighth Amendment claim.” Id. at 228–29. 
 557 Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 489, 495 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 558 Id. at 489. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
154 
in the yard; and that he was forced to drag himself around a vermin and 
cockroach-infested floor.559 
The court stressed that it was “Serrano’s disability” and his placement 
“in a[] SHU that was not designed for disabled persons” that were key 
factors.560 But because the Ninth Circuit had not decided when a physical 
disability could generate a liberty interest in avoiding solitary confinement, 
it affirmed the lower court’s grant of qualified immunity, even though it 
found “deplorable the conditions under which Serrano was kept.”561 
Through this overview of lower court decisions, we have aimed to 
provide a sense of what federal judges have considered and sometimes found 
of concern, but more often condoned, about life in prison in the last two 
decades.562 The descriptions in these cases have parallels to the disturbing 
degradations of the 1960s. Although people are no longer regularly stripped 
and the cells are no longer dark, many cells are always lit, and in some of 
this century’s cases, the dirt and lack of sanitation echoes what California, 
New York, and D.C. did in the 1960s. Even when cells are clean, people 
have spent years alone. Mostly, prisoners lose on the “atypical and 
significant hardship” test. Their wins generally entail reversals of dismissals 
or of grants of summary judgment and remands for further proceedings to 
determine if some process is due.563 And, as we said at the outset, the 
variation among courts on what constitutes an “atypical and significant 
hardship” is substantial, but the toleration of profound constraints on human 
movement spans the country. 
IV. CONSTRUCTING THE “NORMAL” OF PRISONS 
Courts have always been part of the fabric of prisons—from the 
sentences they issue that send individuals to incarceration, to doctrines that 
did not recognize prisoners’ status as individuals protected by law, to the 
more recent constitutional interpretations. In the era of “hands off 
deference,” the federal courts were present in prisons through their absence, 
which gave state officials unbounded authority over individuals in their 
custody. Since the 1960s, when courts acknowledged that the Constitution 
did not stop at the prison gates, judges have aimed to delineate the boundaries 
of their work and to leave most decision-making to administrative officials. 
 
 559 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003). Onofre T. Serrano received no remedy, as the court 
dismissed the due process claim against the State on the grounds of qualified immunity. Id. at 1081. 
 560 Id. at 1079. 
 561 Id. at 1081. 
 562 These cases typically include both Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. See, e.g., Grissom 
v. Roberts, 902 F.3d 1162, 1166–67 (10th Cir. 2018); Gillis, 468 F.3d at 489. 
 563 See, e.g., Gillis, 468 F.3d at 495. 
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Whether focused on “decency,” “liberty,” “dignity,” arbitrariness, 
“minimal necessities,” “deliberate indifference” to known serious medical 
needs, or “atypical and significant hardships,” judges affect the lives of 
prisoners and alter the experiences and practices of correctional officials. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, judges rejected confinement that ensconced filth and 
violence. Courts read the Constitution to require sanitation, protection of 
safety, health care, clothing, bedding, food, and heat for people in and out of 
solitary confinement. Further, courts banned segregation by race and called 
for opportunities for religious practices. 
Those legal proclamations are far from implemented. Yet, when failures 
now become vivid, prison officials do not counter—as they once did—that 
whatever the conditions, their discretion is lawfully paramount.564 The 
decades of case law is part of why prisons became a mandated housing, food, 
and health care service for more than a million and a half people, even when 
many prisons are regularly abysmal.565 Likewise, a mix of legal mandates 
and administrative needs have prompted prisons to host thousands of “due 
process hearings,” and some systems document that, on occasion, prisoners 
successfully rebut charges of misbehavior. 
Atop the detailed accounts of prison squalor in the 1960s and 1970s, we 
provided comparably dense descriptions of confinement in solitary cells 
during the last two decades, as courts debated whether such isolation 
breached either punishment or procedural norms under the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Instead of focusing on when prisons added to 
punishments through imposing “adverse” conditions or transfers, judges 
licensed officials to alter in profound ways the quantum of punishment 
imposed. And, to date, judges and Justices have not united around the 
proposition that “life’s necessities” include space beyond a tiny cell, social 
interaction, environmental stimuli, a range of activities, and regular access 
to natural light. Rather, hundreds of decisions have concluded that months 
and years in isolation are not “atypical,” and through such pronouncements, 
judges have helped to make such evisceration of human contact “normal.” 
 
 564 See, e.g., Jolie McCullough, “The Stakes Could Not Be Higher”: Judge Threatens to Lock Up 
Texas Prison Officials over Air Conditioning Violation, TEX. TRIB. (Sept. 6, 2019) 
https://www.texastribune.org/2019/09/06/texas-prison-officials-threatened-prison-air-conditioning/ 
[https://perma.cc/89FZ-SCLM] (quoting Judge Ellison of the Southern District of Texas, responding to 
the Texas prison system’s violation of a court order to place some incarcerated persons in air conditioning 
by saying, “We ought to have prison officials in prison at the same temperature,” to which the correctional 
department’s attorney replied, “We hear your message . . . .” ); Westefer v. Snyder, No. 00-162-GPM, 
2013 WL 1286971, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2013). 
 565 See generally HOMER VENTERS, LIFE AND DEATH IN RIKERS ISLAND (2019) (chronicling the 
failures of health care delivery); see also Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole 
Pie 2020, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), http://prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html 
[https://perma.cc/38LR-BNTL]. 
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Yet, in the lower courts, a few decisions recognize that—whether clean 
or dirty, dark or light—profound isolation is “deliberate indifference” to the 
human need to interact; that deprivation of these human needs does violate 
the Constitution; and that putting people into isolation for extended periods 
of time is both atypical and a significant hardship. 
Thus, just as the law shifted in the 1960s and 1970s to de-normalize the 
violence and filth that was prison, law may again be finding intolerable 
aspects of in-prison treatment. The baseline that courts had selected—that of 
an incarcerated person—gave rise to inquiries into what was “normally 
incident” in prisons. Contemporary challenges to solitary confinement aim 
to replace this metric with a baseline of how people outside of prisons 
“normally” behave. 
And, once again, changes are propelled by the work of prisoners, who 
interact with social movements, political action, legislation, and litigation 
contesting claims about what is “normal” for prisons. In January of 2020, for 
example, advocates proposed a statute in Connecticut, entitled PROTECT— 
“An Act Promoting Responsible Oversight and Treatment, and Ensuring 
Correctional Transparency”—that called for eight hours of time out of cells; 
limiting physical restraints (e.g., chains) to no more than four hours; 
protecting social relationships; promoting correctional officials’ mental 
health; creating oversight through an ombudsperson; and shutting down that 
state’s Supermax.566 More than two dozen states have considered various 
kinds of legislation to regulate solitary confinement and, as of the spring of 
2019,567 eight have been enacted, including the Massachusetts and New 
Jersey laws referenced above, as well as legislation pending in California 
and Tennessee.568 
Those initiatives are built on concerns from across the political 
spectrum. Organizations sometimes calling themselves “right on crime” and 
“smart on crime” mix both moral and fiscal reform agendas often associated 
with conservative politics.569 During the last decades, the American Friends 
Service Committee aimed to stop Supermax and launched grassroots projects 
that have, since 2010, continued under the umbrella of a “Stop Solitary” 
 
 566 PROTECT ACT, STOP SOLITARY: CONN. (2020), https://www.stopsolitaryct.org/s/PROTECT-
Act.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK7M-H9T8]; see also Kelan Lyons, Advocates Push to Curtail Solitary 
Confinement in CT Prisons, CONN. MIRROR (Jan. 23, 2020), https://ctmirror.org/2020/01/23/advocates-
push-to-curtail-solitary-confinement-in-ct-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/9C8E-67HD]. 
 567  ZOGHI ET AL., supra note 484, at 5–27. 
 568 Id. at 2, 14, 24. 
 569 See generally DAVID DAGAN & STEVEN M. TELES, PRISON BREAK: WHY CONSERVATIVES 
TURNED AGAINST MASS INCARCERATION (2016). 
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campaign in a coalition including the ACLU and religious groups against 
torture.570 
As described, significant calls for reform have come from prison 
administrators, who are joining academics in documenting the use of 
isolation and in condemning its excesses. The Vera Institute and the Urban 
Institute have offered consultation services to support systems that seek to 
reduce reliance on solitary confinement.571 In 2016, the American 
Correctional Association revised its prison accreditation rules to 
circumscribe restrictive housing for subpopulations that include people 
under eighteen, those seeking safety given their sex or gender identity, or 
people with serious mental illness.572 Moreover, the movement to undermine 
solitary confinement has always been transnational, as reflected in the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture’s opposition to the practice.573 
In sum, this sixty-year span demonstrates that nothing is “normally 
incident” to life in prison except what human beings impose and the law 
condones. What has changed both the practices and the law are insights from 
incarcerated people, sometimes held in “gulag”-like conditions,574 and who 
have long understood that the U.S. Constitution guaranteed them recognition 
as holders of the same liberty as all other persons. 
  
 
 570 See, e.g., Andalusia Knoll, The National StopMax Campaign Conference, LEFT TURN, 
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 571 See LÉON DIGARD, SARA SULLIVAN & ELENA VANKO, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, RETHINKING 
RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: LESSONS FROM FIVE U.S. JAIL AND PRISON SYSTEMS (2018), 
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 572 See ACA STANDARDS, supra note 486, at 36, 39, 40. The American Correctional Association 
recommends that prisoners younger than eighteen not be placed in restrictive housing and encourages 
periodic mental health screenings during periods of extended restrictive confinement. AM. CORR. ASS’N, 
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